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1. Mechanisms in science 
Mechanisms are frequently invoked in the scientific literature. Hundreds of papers that 
refer to mechanisms are published every year in journals such as Nature, Science, and 
The Lancet. The mechanism-talk spreads across the whole range of science; it is not 
confined to certain particular areas. Scientists discuss “regulation mechanisms”, 
“mechanisms of action”, “allocation mechanisms”, “selection mechanisms”, 
“mechanisms of suppression”, etc. in very diverse fields. It certainly seems that 
mechanisms play an important part in the scientific enterprise. Nonetheless, that is not 
entirely surprising. The main aims of science are to describe, explain, predict, and control 
worldly phenomena. And mechanisms are relevant in order to achieve those goals. They 
reveal how the phenomena of the world―i.e., the subject of scientific investigation―are 
constituted or produced. 
In order to illustrate the relevance of mechanisms, consider inequality of success in 
cultural markets. Successful cultural products (e.g. best-selling books) are orders of 
magnitude more successful than average. More than one hundred million copies of Harry 
Potter and the Philosopher’s Stone―the first book of the Harry Potter series―have been 
sold since its publication in 1997, while most authors only manage to sell a few hundred 
copies of their cherished manuscripts. Likewise, Avatar grossed 749 million dollars at the 
domestic box office; more than forty-six times the average USA box office in 2010. The 
commonsense explanation of that inequality appeals to intrinsic attributes of successful 
products (e.g. narrative structure) (Watts, 2011). We are inclined to considered that those 
products are qualitatively different from their peers and that that difference is responsible 
for their overwhelming success. However, that explanation is undermined by the 
unpredictability of cultural markets. Even experts are usually unable to determine in 
advance which products will make it to the top. In fact, Harry Potter and the 
Philosopher’s Stone was rejected by twelve publishers before being accepted for 
publication (Gunelius, 2008).  
Then, in order to adequately account for inequality of success in cultural markets, 
it is crucial to identify the mechanism that is responsible for it. The sociologists Salganik, 
Dodds, and Watts (Salganik et al., 2006; Salganik & Watts, 2009a, 2009b) have addressed 
how the (non-independent) behaviour of individual consumers leads to inequality of 
success. Social influence is present in cultural markets, where information about the 
success of offered products is often available (e.g. best sellers lists). Due to the huge 
amount of offered cultural products, individuals are likely to follow others’ choices and 
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buy those products that are already popular. This tendency is also reinforced by structural 
features of many cultural markets, such as giving best-selling books a more prominent in-
store placement. Therefore, cumulative advantage operates. Cultural products that are 
successful tend to become still more successful. Initially small differences become large 
differences and, consequently, inequality increases. In Salganik, Dodds, and Watts’ work, 
the presence of social influence in cultural markets and its contribution to inequality of 
success are supported by experimental studies in artificial cultural markets (see Salganik 
et al., 2006; Salganik & Watts, 2009b). 
The central role of mechanisms is also manifest in the practice of the International 
Agency for Research on Cancer (IARC). The objective of IARC is to prepare and publish 
scientific reviews and evaluations of evidence on the carcinogenicity of particular agents 
(e.g. environmental exposures) (IARC, 2019). On the basis of the available evidence, it 
aims to stablish to what extent those agents can be considered carcinogenic to humans. 
Evaluation of agents is informed by three kinds of evidence: evidence of cancer in 
humans, evidence of cancer in experimental animals, and evidence of mechanisms. In 
that context, evidence of mechanisms mainly refers to information about toxicokinetics 
(e.g. metabolization) and processes of carcinogenesis (e.g. induction of epigenetic 
alterations). After separately analysing every individual study and assessing each stream 
of evidence in conjunction, the three kinds of evidence are integrated in an overall 
evaluation of the carcinogenicity of the agent. Then, according to that assessment, the 
agent is classified as carcinogenic to humans, probably carcinogenic to humans, possibly 
carcinogenic to humans, or non-classifiable as to its carcinogenicity to humans.  
In the overall evaluation of agents, the main role of evidence of mechanisms is to 
guide the extrapolation of causal claims from animal models to humans (Leuridan & 
Weber, 2011). When evidence of cancer in humans is limited or inadequate, evidence of 
mechanisms is required in order to determine if the agent is carcinogenic to humans. That 
role of evidence of mechanisms was crucial in the evaluation of benzo[a]pyrene (IARC, 
2012), which has been discussed in detail by Wilde and Parkkinen (2019). Although no 
evidence of cancer in humans (e.g. epidemiological data) was available, benzo[a]pyrene 
was classified as carcinogenic to humans. The identified similarity between the 
mechanisms operating in experimental animals and those operating in humans enabled 
the extrapolation of the causal claim. It was considered that “[t]he strong and extensive 
experimental evidence for the carcinogenicity of benzo[a]pyrene in many animal species, 
supported by the consistent and coherent mechanistic evidence from experimental and 
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human studies provide biological plausibility to support the overall classification of 
benzo[a]pyrene as a human carcinogen” (IARC, 2012, p. 138). 
Nevertheless, it should be noted that scientific practice sometimes fails to pay 
enough attention to mechanisms. An example of this neglect is the thalidomide disaster 
(Brynner & Stephens, 2001). In contrast to the evaluation of benzo[a]pyrene, in that case 
evidence of mechanisms was not taken into account. In the 1950s, because of the Cold 
War and the psychological sequelae of World War II, anxiety and insomnia were quite 
widespread in Europe and USA. Tranquilisers and sleeping pills became everyday 
products. However, most of the sedatives were dangerous barbiturates and a safer 
alternative was demanded. In that scenario, Chemie Grünenthal, a German 
pharmaceutical company, accidentally produced thalidomide. After testing it in animal 
trials and not observing side effects―no dose was high enough to kill experimental 
animals―the Grünenthal team looked for a disease that thalidomide could cure. They 
soon found that thalidomide had a calming and sleep-inducing effect on patients without 
decreasing motor activity. In October 1957, thalidomide was released as a sedative in 
Germany and, in a few months, it was available in almost fifty countries around the world. 
It was advertised as a completely safe sedative, which was appropriate for children and 
pregnant women. However, thalidomide may produce birth defects (e.g. phocomelia) 
when it is taken by pregnant women. In November 1961, after it was linked to birth 
defects by several reports, thalidomide was withdrawn from the market in Germany. And 
over the next months, it was withdrawn in the remaining countries. Nevertheless, it has 
been estimated that 8.000 to 12.000 infants were deformed by thalidomide during its 
marketing period.  
As Donald Gillies (2017) has argued, it is unlikely to be the case that randomized 
control trials (RCTs) conducted in humans or more animal trials would have reveal 
thalidomide’s potential to cause birth defects if taken by pregnant women. On the one 
hand, pregnant women cannot take part in RCTs and, on the other hand, thalidomide 
hardly produces birth defects in animals other than primates. Nonetheless, considering 
evidence of mechanisms would have revealed the teratogenic potential of thalidomide 
and helped to avoid the disaster (Gillies, 2017). Firstly, analysing thalidomide’s 
mechanism of absorption would have showed that, given its molecular weight, 
thalidomide could cross the placenta and enter the foetus. And secondly, comparing the 
mechanisms operating in animal models and the mechanisms operating in humans would 
have revealed relevant differences between them and undermined the safety claim. 
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In summary, mechanisms have a central role in the scientific enterprise. As the 
above examples evidence, mechanisms are often crucial for achieving goals such as 
explanation and reliability in causal inference. The lack of knowledge about mechanisms 
may severely hamper scientists’ labour. Consequently, an accurate discussion of scientific 
methodology cannot overlook mechanisms and their important contributions.  
 
2. Mechanical philosophies 
The relevance of mechanisms and mechanism-based approaches has not gone unnoticed 
for philosophers. In fact, the first ‘mechanical philosophy’ dates back to the Classical 
Greece (c. 500–c. 323 BCE) (Popa, 2018).1 Democritus of Abdera argued that the world 
is composed of two different kinds of realities: atoms and void. Atoms are invisible, 
ingenerated, unchangeable, and indestructible. They are homogenous and only differ in 
their shape and size. On the other hand, void is characterised as absolute non-being. 
Atoms, which are infinite in number, move in the infinite void and combine into different 
clusters. Macroscopic objects are actually clusters of invisible atoms and their properties 
depend on which atoms constitute them. Changes in those objects are the result of 
rearrangements of atoms. In Democritus’ atomism, it is considered that every worldly 
phenomenon is explicable in terms of atoms, their properties, and their interactions 
(Hankinson, 1998; Popa, 2018). In the Hellenistic period (c. 323–c. 30 BCE), the atomist 
theory was adopted and developed by the Epicureans. They addressed psychological 
aspects like will and desire and offered mechanistic explanations of them in terms of 
interactions between atoms. Furthermore, Epicureans vindicated “the value of atomist 
theory for teaching us how to live the untroubled and tranquil life” (Berryman, 2016).  
In ancient natural philosophy, the atomists’ mechanical approach was criticised by 
advocates of teleological explanations. Those authors consider that natural phenomena 
should be explained by reference to functions, goals, or ends. Nevertheless, artefactual or 
technological analogies are occasionally used by them as explanatory resources 
(Berryman, 2003). For example, Aristotle compares the movement of animals to 
automatic mechanical devices. In animals, like in automata, an initial impetus leads to 
 
1 Berryman (2003) argues that there was no real mechanical approach until the Hellenistic period. She 
defines a mechanical approach as “a method of investigating the natural world through terms and principles 
drawn from the discipline called ‘mechanics’” (Berryman, 2003, p. 344). And according to that 
characterisation, mechanical conceptions were not possible before the development of mechanics, which 
took place during the fourth century BCE. Nevertheless, Berryman’s idea of mechanical approach is too 
narrow and does not suit contemporary understanding of mechanisms.  
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movement. Moreover, after that initial impetus, both of them can continue moving in 
virtue of their internal organisation.  
In the second half of the seventeenth century, the experimentally practiced 
mechanical philosophy became the dominant approach in natural philosophy. It was 
influenced by the contemporary mechanical arts and mathematical sciences, and opposed 
to Aristotelian science and vitalism. The modern mechanical philosophy as a general 
program was introduced by Robert Boyle (Roux, 2018).2 It involves a reductionist 
worldview according to which passive matter and motion are the ultimate constituents of 
the world. There is only one universal matter, which is extended, divisible, and 
impenetrable. Motion, which is always local, divides matter in parts of various sizes and 
shapes. The variety of worldly phenomena results from the different shapes, sizes, 
motions, and relations of parts of matter. Apart from a metaphysical position, the modern 
mechanical philosophy is a thesis about scientific methodology (Nadler, 1998; Psillos & 
Ioannidis, 2019). It argues that phenomena must be explained in terms of matter and 
motion. In a satisfactory explanation, the explanans specifies how certain configuration 
of matter in motion, subject to laws, brings about the phenomenon of interest.  
The seventeenth-century mechanical philosophy, unlike Aristotelian natural 
philosophy and vitalism, rejects a sharp distinction between artificial and natural beings 
(Garber, 2002; Hattab, 2011). It is considered that, although they differ in their cause, 
their nature is very similar. Natural beings are simply more complex machines. There is 
no fundamental difference between the behaviour of natural and artificial phenomena. 
And, consequently, both must be explained in terms of matter and motion. In this sense, 
for instance, mechanistic explanations of the self-movement of living things are 
developed (Des Chene, 2005). Furthermore, artificial devices (e.g. animated apes) are 
often used for explaining natural phenomena. The mechanisms governing natural 
phenomena are rarely visible, but the inner mechanisms of artificial devices are usually 
larger. So artificial devices enable mechanical philosophers to illustrate those invisible 
mechanisms. As de Solla Price argues, their “very existence offered a tangible proof, 
 
2 Boyle introduced the general program of the mechanical philosophy in the preface of Some specimens of 
an attempt to make chymical experiments useful to illustrate the notions of the corpuscular philosophy 
published in his Certain Physiological Essays (1661). The term ‘mechanical philosophy’ had been 
previously used to characterise Descartes’ philosophy (Roux, 2004). For example, in a letter sent to 
Descartes in 1637, Libert Froidmont claimed that his philosophy was too gross and mechanical because of 
its influence of Epicurean physics. However, as Roux (2018) has argued, those occurrences of the term 
should not be equated to the establishment of the mechanical philosophy as a general program. They did 




more impressive than any theory, that the natural universe of physics and biology was 
susceptible to mechanistic explanation” (1964, p. 9). 
Boyle provided a general and broad characterisation of mechanical philosophy. 
Within the mechanical framework, distinct accounts are allowed (Boas, 1952; Psillos, 
2011). Mechanists can have different ideas about the structure of matter, the primary 
properties of matter, the reality of void, etc. Descartes is usually depicted as a 
paradigmatic example of mechanist (Roux, 2004). Descartes holds that matter, which is 
infinitely divisible, and motion are the fundamental constituents of the world. He 
considers that laws of motion are able to explain every worldly phenomenon. In this 
sense, he claims that physics is nothing else than mechanics―i.e., the study of motion. 
Furthermore, his explanations often refer to artificial devices (e.g. automata). 
Nevertheless, other philosophers such as Thomas Hobbes, Pierre Gassendi, or John 
Locke, who disagree in many aspects with the Cartesian approach, would also be 
considered mechanists. In fact, soon the notion of mechanical philosophy was extended 
to include all those who advocated the relevance of mechanistic explanations, regardless 
of whether they endorsed the mechanical ontology (Roux, 2018). In this sense, most of 
the key figures of science and philosophy of the seventeenth century, such as Isaac 
Newton and Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, can be characterised as mechanists. 
Modern mechanical philosophers acknowledged the influence of ancient atomism 
(Buyse, 2013). The seventeenth-century mechanical philosophy is also a reductionist 
worldview in which homogeneous matter is considered one of the main constituents of 
the world. Moreover, it holds that phenomena must be explained in terms of matter, 
motion, position, and other mechanical qualities of bodies. Nevertheless, there are 
relevant differences between ancient atomism and modern mechanical philosophy 
(Bennett, 1986). On the one hand, many mechanists reject central thesis of atomism. For 
example, Descartes considers that there is no void and that matter is infinitely divisible. 
And on the other hand, the modern approach includes many aspects absent in ancient 
philosophy, such as the experimental method, the use of mathematical instruments, and 
the development of mechanistic models. 
In the following centuries, the mechanical approach remained as the main trend in 
the sciences. Scientific research was often related with the development of mechanical 
models that accounted for observable phenomena. Representative examples of those 
models are the kinetic model of gases (James Clerk Maxwell) and the hexagonal model 
of the benzene molecule (August Kekulé). Nonetheless, there was no standard 
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interpretation of the mechanical philosophy shared by all the scientists. The interpretation 
could vary depending on the period, the region, and even the institution (Smith, 1976; 
Baracca, 2005). The plurality of mechanical approaches ranged from those that advocated 
explanations in terms of interactions between non-observable elementary entities to those 
that focused on developing systems of laws on the basis of the fundamental principles of 
dynamics.  
In spite of its prevalence, the mechanical approach was subject of criticism. This 
criticism was especially fierce in biology (Allen, 2005, 2018). Several authors claimed 
that the mechanical philosophy was an over-simplistic way of viewing living organisms 
and raised alternative proposals. Those alternative accounts were usually based on the 
idea that living organisms show emergent properties and must be studied as unified 
wholes. It was considered that they cannot be reduced to its components. In the 1700-
1850 period, most philosophers and scientists critical of the mechanical approach, such 
as Xavier Bichat and Johannes Peter Müller, advocated some form of vitalism. They held 
that some immaterial force, which have no counterpart in the non-living world, 
characterises living organisms. Nevertheless, in the latter nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries, several materialistic alternatives to the mechanical approach were also 
advocated (e.g. dialectical materialism). Holistic materialists considered that, in order to 
understand complex systems, it is necessary to get beyond the individual parts and address 
them as wholes. But they rejected any forces that could not be understood in terms of the 
known physics and chemistry. Holistic materialists aimed to account for complex systems 
in purely physico-chemical terms. 
For most of the twentieth century, the philosophy of science was dominated by the 
logical empiricism and the covering-law model of scientific explanation. According to 
this model, a phenomenon is explained by subsuming it under a law (Hempel, 1965). 
Explanations are characterised as arguments where the premises, which contain 
essentially at least one law, imply (with deductive certainty or high inductive probability) 
the conclusion, which describes the explanandum phenomenon. However, from the early 
1960s, many counterexamples that show that subsumption under laws is unnecessary and 
insufficient for exampling scientific phenomena were raised (see Salmon, 1989). In that 
context, some philosophers such as Peter Railton and Wesley C. Salmon developed 
mechanical accounts as alternatives to the eroded covering-law model.  
Railton (1978) criticised the covering-law account of probabilistic explanations of 
particular phenomena―i.e., the inductive-statistical model. According to that model, a 
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probabilistic explanation is an argument in which the premises, which include essentially 
at least one statistical law, imply with high inductive probability the conclusion, which 
describes the explanandum phenomenon. Railton disputes that probabilistic explanations 
are arguments and that they must render the explanandum highly probable. He considers 
that we understand improbable phenomena just as well as we understand highly probable 
phenomena. Railton argues that probabilistic explanation is not about making the 
explanandum phenomena nomically expectable, but about understanding the stochastic 
mechanisms by which they came to occur. Consequently, he claims that a probabilistic 
explanation of a phenomenon must “give an account of the chance mechanism(s) 
responsible for it” (Railton, 1978, p. 206). He understands a mechanism as “a more or 
less complete filling-in of the links in the causal chains” (Railton, 1978, pp. 208-209). 
In his influential Scientific Explanation and the Causal Structure of the World 
(1984), Salmon argues that “[t]o understand the world and what goes on in it, we must 
expose its inner workings. To the extent that causal mechanisms operate, they explain 
how the world works” (1984, p. 133). He considers that explaining a phenomenon is to 
show how it fits into the causal structure of the world. A phenomenon is satisfactorily 
explained when (some portion of) the causal processes and interactions leading up to it 
are specified. Salmon characterises causal processes and causal interactions in terms of 
the counterfactual criterion of ‘mark transmission’. A causal process is defined as a 
process capable of transmitting a mark (i.e. a modification in its structure), whether or not 
it is actually transmitting one (Salmon, 1984, p. 147). A paradigmatic example of causal 
process is the movement of a free particle. Causal interactions are intersections of two 
causal processes in which both are persistently modified in a way that would not have 
occurred without the intersection (Salmon, 1984, p. 171). A collision of two particles, for 
instance, would constitute a causal interaction. Nevertheless, it was argued that those 
definitions of causal process and causal interaction admit counterexamples and are not 
reliable guides to the discovery of the causal structure of the world (Kitcher, 1989; Dowe, 
1992). In response to those critiques, following Phil Dowe (1992), Salmon redefined 
those concepts in terms of conserved quantities. A causal process is characterised as “a 
world-line of an object that transmits a nonzero amount of an invariant quantity at each 
moment of its history (each spacetime point of its trajectory)” (Salmon, 1994, p. 308). A 
causal interaction occurs when world-lines intersect and a conserved quantity is 
exchanged (Salmon, 1994, p. 303).  
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Salmon’s proposal, like the seventeenth-century mechanical philosophy, is 
ontologically austere (Hitchcock, 1995). The causal structure of the world is reduced to 
physical processes and interactions. Nonetheless, Salmon considers that the causal 
mechanical model can account for most explanations in science. In this sense, he says: “I 
hope that the causal theory of scientific explanation outlined above in this book is 
reasonably adequate for the characterization of explanation in most scientific contexts—
in the physical, biological and social sciences—as long as we do not become involved in 
quantum mechanics” (Salmon, 1984, p. 278). Certainly, it suits most simple physical 
systems, whose behaviour is governed by the principles of classical mechanics and 
electromagnetism. However, as James Woodward (1989) early noted, Salmon’s proposal 
can hardly account for explanations in fields such as biology, psychology, and economics. 
In those fields, systems that significantly differ in their underlying physical structure are 
often treated as similar. For example, consider adaptative situations. When the present 
selective pressures are analogous, two adaptative situations may be considered similar 
even though the actual mechanisms underlying them are quite different. This idea is at 
the basis of the models developed in evolutionary game theory. 
 
3. The new mechanical philosophy 
The new mechanical philosophy emerged between the late 1980s and the early 1990s. 
This emergence was related to the publication of books such as Nuts and Bolts for Social 
Sciences (1989) by Jon Elster and Discovering Complexity: Decomposition and 
Localization as Strategies in Scientific Research (1993) by William Bechtel and Robert 
Richardson. The new mechanical approach opposes to logical empiricism and the ‘laws-
and-theories’ image of science. It is considered that scientific inquiry should not be 
understood as a search for universal laws, but as a search for mechanisms. Those 
mechanisms are represented by mechanistic models, which play the role of theories. 
Scientists use mechanistic models for representing, explaining, predicting, and 
intervening in the world.  
Within the new mechanical philosophy, two strands can be distinguished: the ‘new 
mechanism’ and the ‘social scientific mechanism’ (Glennan & Illari, 2018). The new 
mechanism, which engages with Bechtel and Richardson’s seminal work, has been 
mainly developed by philosophers of science working in the life sciences (biology, 
neuroscience, medicine, etc.). Some crucial early contributions, which partially defined 
it, are “Mechanisms and the Nature of Causation” (1996) by Stuart Glennan and 
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“Thinking about Mechanisms” (2000) by Peter Machamer, Lindley Darden, and Carl F. 
Craver (henceforth MDC). Those papers characterise mechanisms and, taking them as 
reference, address several philosophical problems such as causation and scientific 
explanation. The social scientific mechanism, which engages with Elster’s influential 
work, focuses on the social sciences, especially on sociology and economics. It has been 
developed by social scientists and is intimately related with analytical sociology. 
Analytical sociology is a methodological movement within sociology that underlines the 
relevance of mechanisms. Its fundamental principles have been exposed in books such as 
Social Mechanisms: An Analytical Approach to Social Theory (1998) edited by Peter 
Hedström and Richard Swedberg and Dissecting the Social: On the Principles of 
Analytical Sociology (2005) by Hedström. One of its core ideas, which is shared by all 
analytical sociologists, is that the main aim of sociology should be to explain social 
macro-phenomena by means of the mechanisms that are responsible for them.  
The new mechanism and the social scientific mechanism arose independently and, 
for some years, the discussions within philosophy of science and social sciences 
proceeded separately. Nonetheless, the interaction between both strands has progressively 
grown. For example, notions of mechanism developed by advocates of the new 
mechanism have been adopted by social scientists involved in the social scientific 
mechanism (see, for instance, Hedström, 2005, p. 25). 
Like previous mechanical approaches, such as modern mechanical philosophy and 
Salmon’s proposal, the new mechanical philosophy is both a philosophy of nature and a 
philosophy of science (Glennan, 2016, 2017). On the one hand, it is a philosophical 
inquiry into the constitution and organisation of the world. New mechanists consider that 
mechanisms are one of the main constituents of the world and that most or all worldly 
phenomena depend on them. They investigate the nature of mechanisms as an ontological 
category and how they relate with other ontological categories such as causes, properties, 
and levels of organisation. On the other hand, the new mechanical philosophy is a 
philosophical inquiry into science. It is considered that mechanisms have a central role in 
the scientific enterprise. New mechanists discuss the discovery of mechanisms, their 
representation by means of models, and their use to explain, predict, and control 
phenomena. It should be noted that not all mechanists attach the same importance to those 
projects and are equally involved in them. In fact, some of them focus on one project and 
almost ignore the other. For example, consider Gillies (2017, 2018), to whom I have 
referred in section 1. He carefully analyses how evidence of mechanisms can contribute 
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to causal inference and causal extrapolation, but he devotes little attention to mechanisms 
as an ontological category. 
Nevertheless, unlike previous mechanical approaches, the new mechanical 
philosophy is characterised by a general emphasis on actual scientific practice (Machamer 
et al., 2000; Glennan, 2017; Psillos & Ioannidis, 2019). The new mechanists’ primary 
object of interest is mechanism as a concept-in-use in science, not as an abstract 
metaphysical category. They are concerned about what mechanisms are and what they 
are (or could be) good for in the sciences. The new mechanists focus on scientific practice 
and take it as the main reference for addressing both methodological and ontological 
questions related with mechanisms. It is considered that ontological claims about 
mechanisms as constituents of the world cannot overlook the role of mechanisms in 
science and scientists’ considerations about them (Kaiser, 2018). For example, the 
discussion about what kinds of components make mechanisms up and what is the relation 
between them―i.e., is one kind more fundamental than the others or are they 
ontologically on a par?―is guided by the criterion of descriptive adequacy (see, for 
instance, Machamer et al., 2000). According to it, a satisfactory proposal must suit 
paradigmatic examples of mechanisms studied by scientists. 
The new mechanical philosophy, as the seventeenth-century mechanical 
philosophy, is not a completely homogeneous movement. New mechanists do not have 
identical views and interests. Instead, the new mechanical philosophy is a framework 
within which distinct proposals, which may even conflict with each other, are advocated. 
In fact, although all new mechanists agree on the relevance of mechanisms, they disagree 
regarding the definition of mechanism. Within the new mechanical framework, there have 
been several attempts to offer a satisfactory characterisation of mechanisms (Mahoney, 
2001; Hedström & Ylikoski, 2010). These are the most cited definitions: 
Mechanisms are entities and activities organized such that they are productive of 
regular changes from start or set-up to finish or termination conditions. (Machamer 
et al., 2000, p. 3) 
A mechanism for a behavior is a complex system that produces that behavior by the 
interaction of a number of parts, where the interaction between parts can be 
characterized by direct, invariant, change-relating generalizations. (Glennan, 2002, 
p. S344) 
A mechanism is a structure performing a function in virtue of its component parts, 
component operations, and their organization. The orchestrated functioning of the 
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mechanism is responsible for one or more phenomena. (Bechtel & Abrahamsen, 
2005, p. 423) 
A mechanism for a phenomenon consists of entities and activities organized in such 
a way that they are responsible for the phenomenon. (Illari & Williamson, 2012, p. 
120) 
Nonetheless, despite the disagreements among new mechanists, some general ideas 
are shared by most of them. First, mechanisms are part of the real world (Glennan, 2016, 
2017; Glennan & Illari, 2018). They are conceived as particular things that are located 
somewhere in space and time. New mechanists always discriminate between a 
mechanism, which is a real thing, and a model of it, which is often a piece of scientific 
reasoning. Although there are discrepancies regarding the stability attributed to 
mechanisms. Some new mechanists consider that all mechanisms are complex systems, 
i.e., stable configurations of several components (e.g. Bechtel & Abrahamsen, 2005). But 
others argue that causal processes, which are less stable and cannot be considered objects, 
can also constitute mechanisms (e.g. Illari & Williamson, 2012). Second, mechanisms are 
composed of organised entities (or parts) and activities (or interactions) (Machamer et al., 
2000; Illari & Williamson, 2012; Glennan, 2017). Entities are things that engage in 
activities. They are usually spatiotemporal located, structured, and oriented. Examples of 
entities are neurons, firms, and organs. Activities are productive happenings. They have 
temporal order, rate, and duration. Examples of activities are transporting, radiating, and 
buying. Entities and activities within a mechanism are organised. That organisation can 
have many different aspects, such as temporal, spatial, causal, etc. Third, a mechanism is 
always a mechanism for some phenomenon (Glennan, 1996, 2017; Hedström & Ylikoski, 
2010). For instance, a digestive system is a mechanism that underlies the phenomenon of 
digestion. The identification and delimitation (i.e. the fixation of boundaries) of a 
mechanism depend on the phenomenon for which it is responsible. A mechanism cannot 
even be identified without saying what it is that the mechanism does. And fourth, there 
are significative differences between mechanisms and machines (Glennan, 2017; Craver 
& Tabery, 2019). Although human-made machines (e.g. watches) can often be considered 
mechanisms, most mechanisms studied in science are not machines. Their behaviour 
cannot be reduced to some fundamental mechanical forces. Nevertheless, the machine 




Another core idea shared by all new mechanists is that mechanisms are nested and 
form a hierarchy (Machamer et al., 2000; Glennan, 2017). Mechanisms can be broken 
into lower level mechanisms. A mechanism is composed of organised entities and 
activities, which are responsible for its properties and behaviour. And those components 
are usually mechanisms themselves, whose properties and behaviour also depend on their 
own components. For instance, components of a nervous system (brain, spinal cord, 
nerves, signal transmission, etc.), which are responsible for its properties and behaviour, 
are themselves mechanisms. Nonetheless, unlike previous mechanists, the new 
mechanists do not advocate a reductionist worldview (Andersen, 2014). They reject that 
it is possible to reduce higher level mechanisms to lower level mechanisms. Although 
there are ontological and explanatory relations between higher and lower levels, it does 
not lead to the elimination of the higher levels nor to the reduction of them to the lower 
ones. The new mechanists take seriously the reality of complex things. They hold that 
new and different kinds of entities and activities arise at different levels of organisation. 
Furthermore, the new mechanists consider that higher level explanations can be perfectly 
legitimate (Machamer et al., 2000), so that scientific explanations do not have to be 
grounded in some predetermined fundamental level (e.g. fundamental physics). What 
counts as proper bottom-out components is domain-dependent and methodologically 
motivated. 
In spite of its novelty and originality, the new mechanical philosophy engages in 
the mechanical tradition from which it inherits some of its central ideas. In this sense, 
several important aspects of the new mechanical philosophy were anticipated by Salmon 
(1984, 1994, 1998). In fact, regarding the relationship between Salmon and contemporary 
mechanists, Campaner has claimed that “his work already presents many interesting hints 
at what are now regarded as the crucial steps forward in dealing with mechanistic 
causation” (2013, p. 82). Salmon already stresses the notions of production and 
interaction, which have a central role in the new mechanical approach. New mechanists 
underline the active nature of mechanisms (Machamer, 2004; Glennan, 2017). They 
account for mechanisms as entities engaged in productive activities or interactions. 
Furthermore, in both cases, productive continuity is crucial. As we have seen, Salmon 
(1984, 1994) claims that spatio-temporal continuity characterises causal processes and 
distinguishes it from pseudoprocesses. New mechanists consider that productive 
continuity between stages makes their relations intelligible and is responsible for 
mechanisms’ regularity (Machamer et al., 2000). Another aspect of the new mechanical 
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philosophy that is already present in Salmon’s proposal is the central role of active or 
experimental counterfactuals. In the original version of the causal mechanical model, 
Salmon (1984) appeals to experimental counterfactuals to distinguish genuine causal 
processes and interactions from non-causal ones. And in the new mechanical philosophy, 
interventionist counterfactuals are considered crucial in order to identify relevant 
variables and determine mechanisms’ components (Glennan, 2002; Craver, 2007). 
Regarding scientific explanation, Salmon (1984) also introduces many ideas 
subsequently advocated by the new mechanical philosophy.3 He claims that, in order to 
develop an accurate account of scientific explanation, scientific practice itself must be 
considered and that explanations in most scientific fields are indeed mechanistic. Salmon 
(1984, p. 175) also underlines the etiological and constitutive aspects of mechanism-
based explanations. In order to explain why a given event E occurred, the relevant causal 
processes and interactions belonging to E’s past must be identified. Nevertheless, if one 
wants to explain why E possesses certain characteristics, they have to reveal the internal 
causal mechanisms that account for E’s nature. Another aspect anticipated by Salmon is 
acknowledging the relevance of function and context in a mechanical approach. He 
(1998) argues that functional explanations are legitimate and constitute a subset of 
mechanistic explanations. New mechanists, with respect to functional analysis, claim that 
it can be crucial for delimiting mechanisms and elaborating explanative mechanistic 
models (Bechtel & Abrahamsen, 2005). Regarding context, Salmon (1984, 1989) 
considers that it has a central role in the analysis of mechanisms. He argues that, although 
there is a thoroughly objective causal structure underlying phenomena, the aspects of the 
causal structure we select and the level of description we choose depend on the context. 
Similarly, new mechanists claim that the appropriate level of ‘graininess’ in mechanistic 
models is context-dependent (Craver, 2001; Bogen, 2005). 
Nevertheless, it should be noted that there are significative differences between 
Salmon’s causal mechanical model and the new mechanical philosophy. Although 
Salmon is also concerned about the role of mechanisms in science, his initial object of 
interest are metaphysical categories (Psillos & Ioannidis, 2019). Unlike the new 
mechanical approach, he starts discussing causal processes and interactions as abstract 
metaphysical categories. And subsequently, taking that analysis as the reference frame, 
he addresses methodological questions. Both mechanical approaches also differ in those 
 
3 The new mechanical account of scientific explanation and the central role of those ideas will be discussed 
in section 4. 
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scientific fields that are seen as inspiring. Salmon’s approach is focused on physics, 
particularly, on a subfield of it: classical mechanics. However, new mechanists consider 
several fields such as biology, neuroscience, and sociology. There are also important 
differences regarding the notion of mechanism itself (Glennan, 2002). Firstly, while 
contemporary mechanists carefully discuss the characterisation of mechanisms and their 
current role in science, Salmon pays little attention to those issues. He does not provide 
an explicit definition of mechanism, nor take into account the diverse roles they play in 
science. Secondly, in Salmon’s proposal, it is considered that all mechanisms consist of 
sequences of causal processes and interactions (e.g. a sequence of collisions among 
particles). However, new mechanists hold that mechanisms can be stable configurations 
of entities and activities (e.g. a cell).4 Finally, although causal interactions are important 
in both accounts of mechanisms, they are understood in different ways. In the new 
mechanical approach, interactions are often characterised in terms of invariant change-
relating generalisations (Woodward, 2003). 
 
4. The new mechanical account of scientific explanation  
According to the new mechanical philosophy, the role of mechanisms in science is often 
associated with the scientific objective of explaining. As previous mechanists, new 
mechanists advocate a mechanical account of scientific explanation. They consider that a 
phenomenon is explained by means of specifying the mechanism that is responsible for 
it. In this sense, MDC say: “To give a description of a mechanism for a phenomenon is 
to explain that phenomenon” (Machamer et al., 2000, p. 3). The mechanical approach 
opposes to covering-law and statistical accounts of scientific explanation (Bechtel & 
Abrahamsen, 2005; Hedström, 2005). Covering-law and statistical explanations are 
‘black-box explanations’. They connect initial conditions with final output by means of 
universal laws or statistical generalisations. However, the processes through which 
explanans and explanandum are actually linked are not addressed by them. It is 
considered that the link between explanans and explanandum is devoid of structure or 
that its structure is irrelevant. On the contrary, mechanistic explanations are how-
explanations. They specify “how some phenomenon comes about” (Glennan, 2017, p. 
228). Therefore, mechanistic explanations open the black box between explanans and 
 
4 Although some new mechanists agree that certain causal processes can be considered mechanisms, they 
do not claim that all mechanisms are causal processes. As it has been noted, those authors acknowledge 
that many mechanisms are stable complex systems. 
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explanandum and detail the processes that give rise to the later. A paradigmatic example 
of mechanism-based explanation is Salganik, Dodds, and Watts’ explanation of inequality 
of success in cultural markets (see section 1). The authors specify the social cogs and 
wheels of the causal process through which that social macro-phenomenon is produced. 
They detail how the (non-independent) behaviour of individual consumers brings about 
that successful cultural products are orders of magnitude more successful than average.  
Regarding the relation between mechanisms and phenomena of interest, 
mechanism-based explanations can be causal or constitutive (Ylikoski, 2013). Both 
causation and constitution are relations of dependence, but there are relevant 
metaphysical differences between them. Causation is often a relation between events, 
takes time, and is asymmetric regarding manipulation (i.e. a change in the effect can be 
produced by manipulating the cause, but not the other way around). On the other hand, 
constitution is often a relation between properties, is synchronic, and is symmetric 
regarding manipulation (i.e. a change in the whole can be produced by manipulating a 
part of it, and vice versa). Depending on the relation between the identified mechanism 
and the phenomenon of interest, an explanation is either a causal mechanistic explanation 
or a constitutive mechanistic explanation.  
Among the new mechanists, there is no consensus about the nature of mechanistic 
explanations (Illari, 2013). Following Salmon (1984), some new mechanists consider that 
mechanistic explanations are ontic explanations. They argue that mechanism-based 
explanations explain because they fit the explanandum phenomenon into the causal 
structure of the world. For those authors, explanations are objective portions of the causal 
structure of the world. In this sense, Craver says: “Objective explanations are not texts; 
they are full-bodied things” (2007, p. 27). Nonetheless, other new mechanists consider 
that mechanism-based explanations are epistemic explanations. They hold that 
“[e]xplanation is fundamentally an epistemics activity” (Bechtel, 2008) and that 
mechanism-based explanations explain because they increase our understanding of the 
world. For advocates of the epistemic view, mechanistic explanations are not portions of 
the causal structure of the world, but representations of those portions (e.g. texts). 
Mechanistic explanations are often presented by means of mechanistic models. A 
mechanistic model has two components: a phenomenal description and a mechanistic 
description (Glennan, 2017). The phenomenal description is a model of the phenomenon 
of interest, while the mechanistic description is a model of the mechanism responsible for 
that phenomenon. In mechanism-based explanations, the phenomenal description is 
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related with the explanandum and the mechanistic description is related with the 
explanans. Nevertheless, there is no agreement about the details of those relations. From 
the ontic conception of mechanistic explanations, the phenomenal description would 
represent the explanandum and the mechanistic description would represent the 
explanans. However, from the epistemic conception, the phenomenal and the mechanistic 
descriptions would themselves be the explanandum and the explanans respectively.  
 
5. The aim of generality and the heterogeneity of scientific fields 
A central aspect of the new mechanical philosophy that has not been previously discussed 
and deserves attention is the aim of generality. New mechanists consider that mechanisms 
are relevant in most scientific fields and attempt to provide a general mechanical approach 
that encompasses all of them. The pursuit of generality and broad applicability is 
manifested in most proposals developed within the framework of the new mechanical 
philosophy. When new mechanists address questions such as scientific explanation, 
causal inference, or scientific discovery, they intend to provide an answer that applies to 
all those fields of science where mechanisms are relevant.  
 
5.1. General notions of mechanism  
One aspect of the new mechanical philosophy, especially of the new mechanism, that 
illustrates the aim of generality is the characterisation of mechanisms. The search for 
generality is present in most current notions of mechanism. New mechanists consider that 
an appropriate notion of mechanism should be suitable for most of the fields where 
mechanisms are relevant. And consequently, they aim to develop a general notion that 
encompass the diverse kinds of mechanisms. This aspect of the new mechanical approach 
is discussed in “The Search for Generality in the Notion of Mechanism” (annex 1). 
In spite of the fact that the search for generality is a trait shared by current 
characterisations of mechanisms, it is not always pursued with the same strategy. Within 
the new mechanical philosophy, there are two strategies for developing general notions 
of mechanism: the extrapolation strategy and the across-the-sciences strategy. The 
extrapolation strategy consists of developing a notion of mechanism taking one or a few 
fields of science as reference, and then applying that notion to many other fields. This 
strategy goes from a particular kind of mechanisms to a general notion of mechanisms. 
MDC (2000), for example, follow the extrapolation strategy. Their notion of mechanism 
was developed taking neurobiological and molecular mechanisms as guide. Nevertheless, 
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they consider that that notion suits many other fields of science: “We suspect that this 
analysis is applicable to many other sciences, and maybe even to cognitive or social 
mechanisms” (Machamer et al., 2000, p. 2). The extrapolation strategy has also been 
adopted by other authors such as Glennan (1996, 2002) and Woodward (2002).  
On the other hand, the across-the-sciences strategy consists of thinking about 
mechanisms across all the sciences and developing a notion of mechanism that includes 
their common features. This strategy goes from all mechanisms to a general notion of 
mechanism. The across-the-sciences strategies was introduced by Illari and Williamson 
(2012). Their aim is to consider mechanisms in general and to propose “a characterization 
that gives an understanding of what is common to mechanisms in all fields” (Illari & 
Williamson, 2012, p. 120). The across-the-sciences strategy has recently been adopted by 
Glennan (2017). He has abandoned his previous notion of mechanism (see section 3), and 
proposes a minimal characterisation, which tries to include what all mechanisms share in 
common.  
The search for generality is very reasonable. There are many kinds of mechanisms 
in science (e.g. social mechanisms, neural mechanisms, evolutionary mechanisms, etc.). 
A notion that could account for all of them would be useful for both scientific research 
and philosophical understanding. It would facilitate the collaboration between fields of 
science where mechanisms are relevant. Furthermore, a consensus notion of mechanism 
would help to address several philosophical questions (e.g. scientific explanation). 
Nonetheless, both suggested strategies for pursuing generality face outstanding 
difficulties.  
The main problem of the extrapolation strategy is that those notions of mechanism 
which are developed taking certain kind of mechanisms as reference do not suit many 
other kinds of mechanisms. In order to address the difficulties of the extrapolation 
strategy, MDC’s proposal (see section 3) is taken as reference. As it has been noted, MDC 
consider that their notion of mechanism could be applied to most fields of science. 
However, it is unlikely to be the case. For instance, MDC’s notion is unable to account 
for economic mechanisms. A well-known example of economic mechanism is monetary 
transmission mechanisms. A monetary transmission mechanism is a mechanism 
responsible for the influence of a central bank in output, employment, prices, and inflation 
of a country or a political and economic union (Samuelson & Nordhaus, 2010, p. 484). It 
could seem that MDC’s notion suits them, but it is hardly the case.  
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MDC affirm that mechanisms are regular. Lane DesAutels (2016) has showed that 
in order to meet their requirement of regularity a mechanism has to be process regular 
and not be affected by internal sources of irregularity. Nonetheless, monetary 
transmission mechanisms are not process regular and are affected by internal sources of 
irregularity. Component entities of monetary transmission mechanisms (e.g. central 
banks) do not always behave in the same way. Moreover, changes in their components 
are often the result of internal sources, e.g., changes in decision-making bodies.  
Another aspect of MDC’s proposal that does not suit monetary transmission 
mechanisms is the fixation of mechanisms’ boundaries. Craver (2007) holds that a 
mechanism of certain phenomenon is composed of those entities, activities, and 
organisational features that are part of the system whose behaviour is the phenomenon of 
interest and are relevant for that phenomenon. Nevertheless, that idea does not suit 
monetary transmission mechanisms. A monetary transmission mechanism is a 
mechanism of certain phenomenon, i.e., the influence of a central bank in output, 
employment, prices, and inflation. However, it is not composed of all entities, activities, 
and organisational features that are part of the system (e.g. a country) whose behaviour is 
the phenomenon of interest and are relevant for that phenomenon. 
Regarding the across-the-sciences strategy, the main problem is that notions of 
mechanism are vacuous and overly broad. In order to discuss the difficulties of the across-
the-sciences strategy, Illari and Williamson’s proposal (see section 3) is taken as 
reference. Illari and Williamson’s definition of mechanism relies on the concepts of 
entity, activity, organisation, and being responsible for. However, they do not properly 
characterise those concepts. They offer neither a definition of those concepts nor a set of 
necessary or sufficient conditions to be certain kind of component. Consequently, the 
notion become vacuous. Its scope is increased at the cost of decreasing its precision. 
Moreover, Illari and Williamson’s notion is overly broad. Although they consider that 
their characterisation “is not so broad that it captures non-mechanisms” (Illari & 
Williamson, 2012, p. 129), it subsumes things that could hardly be accepted as 
mechanisms. For instance, their notion would admit a group of babies napping as a 
mechanism. 
The aim of Illari and Williamson is to develop a wide notion of mechanism that 
could encompass mechanisms in all fields. However, even though it seems that they are 
willing to decrease the precision of their notion in order to increase its scope, their notion 
is unhelpful to account for several kinds of mechanisms. It does not avoid the problem of 
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the extrapolation strategy. For example, it cannot account for economic mechanisms. 
Illari and Williamson, as MDC, claim that a mechanism for a phenomenon is composed 
of those components (entities, activities, and organisation features) that are relevant for 
it. However, as it has been noted, this idea does not suit economic mechanisms’ 
boundaries. 
The difficulties faced by the search for generality in the notion of mechanism 
undermine a frequent argument in support of the new mechanical account of scientific 
explanation.5 It is often claimed that the new mechanical account of scientific explanation 
is able to encompass explanations across the sciences (Hedström & Ylikoski, 2011). Since 
mechanisms are relevant in many fields, new mechanists argue that a mechanical 
approach to explanation could be endorsed in most fields of science. This idea also 
favours the mechanical account over other alternatives. For example, a well-known 
problem of the covering-law model is that there are fields of science where only a few 
laws are known, such as evolutionary biology (see Scriven, 1959; Beatty, 1995). A 
nomological account of explanation could hardly be adopted in those fields. However, 
many mechanisms are often known in those fields where laws are not available. The 
mechanical account would be more broadly applicable than nomological alternatives. 
That usual argument relies on the assumption that the same notion of mechanism 
exists in all fields where mechanisms are relevant. Thus, it is considered that the 
mechanical account of scientific explanation could offer a unified account of explanation 
because in several fields of science phenomena could be explained by means of referring 
to mechanisms. But this would be a unified standpoint only if mechanisms are similarly 
understood in all fields. If those fields understood mechanisms in a very different way, 
the mechanical account of scientific explanation would hardly be unifier. Nonetheless, 
that fundamental assumption―i.e., mechanisms are similarly understood in all fields―is 
challenged by the difficulties faced by the search for generality. The search for generality 
constitutes the real attempt of identifying that shared conception of mechanism. New 
mechanists try to propose a notion of mechanism that suits most fields where mechanisms 
are relevant. However, as it has been argued, all strategies for pursuing generality face 
outstanding difficulties. This means that the assumption that the same notion of 
 
5 The non-success of the search for generality also undermines other proposals related with the new 
mechanical philosophy. For example, it challenges the claim that the new mechanical approach can provide 
a framework for interfield integration. See Pérez-González (in press) for a discussion of a particular case, 




mechanism is shared by all fields is not justified and requires additional support. Not only 
that shared notion is unknown, but also many attempts of achieving it have failed. 
 
5.2. Mechanical approaches to evolutionary biology 
A field of science where the mechanical approach and the application of general notions 
of mechanism are especially controverted is evolutionary biology. Evolutionary 
biologists sometimes talk about evolutionary causes as mechanisms. For example, it is 
said that natural selection “is a powerful mechanism of evolution” (Herron & Freeman, 
2014, p. 227) and that it “is an effective mechanism for producing adaptation” (Bell, 2008, 
p. 499). Following this use, new mechanists have tried to develop a mechanical account 
of evolutionary causes. In “Evolutionary causes as mechanisms: a critical analysis” 
(annex 2), Victor J. Luque and I analyse current mechanical approaches to causal 
evolution, which mainly focus on natural selection, and explore their validity for 
accounting for evolutionary causes. We identify and discuss three different approaches: 
the stochastic view, the functional view, and the minimalist view. The former two are 
related to the extrapolation strategy, while the latter exemplifies the across-the-sciences 
strategy. 
The stochastic view is based on the idea that, since natural selection is stochastic, it 
could be possible to account for it as a mechanism by means of a stochastic version of 
current notions of mechanism. It is considered that by lowering the demands of regularity 
it is possible to understand natural selection as mechanism in a sense close to that posed 
by MDC (2000) and Glennan (2002). The main advocate of the stochastic view is 
Benjamin Barros (2008). He distinguishes between biased stochastic mechanisms―i.e., 
stochastic mechanisms that give a result a probability greater than 50%―and unbiased 
stochastic mechanisms. And he considers that natural selection can be understood as a 
biased stochastic mechanism. Nevertheless, Barros’ account of natural selection faces 
relevant difficulties. Some of those difficulties are related with the characterisation of 
natural selection at the population level. Barros considers that natural selection is a two-
level mechanism; it involves both the individual and the population level. And he claims 
that, at the population level, natural selection has populations as component entities. But 
understanding natural selection as a mechanism whose component entities are 
populations gives rise to several problems. Firstly, it identifies the subject of the overall 
phenomenon of the mechanism with the components of the mechanism. And secondly, it 
23 
 
entails accepting that a real concrete system―a mechanism of natural selection―is 
composed of abstract entities―populations―and their relations.  
 It could be thought that a different stochastic approach, which eludes the diverse 
problems of Barros’ proposal, could correctly account for natural selection and the other 
evolutionary causes. However, it is unlikely to be the case. Every attempt of 
understanding evolutionary causes as mechanisms by means of a stochastic approach 
would rely on the assumption that those causes are stochastic. And that idea also seems 
problematic. The stochastic character of natural selection and other evolutionary causes 
(e.g. mutation) is not sufficiently supported, especially from the mathematical apparatus 
of population genetics. In population genetics, most evolutionary causes are usually 
modelled in a deterministic way. Furthermore, biological practice also casts doubt on the 
stochastic interpretation of some evolutionary causes. When biologists deal with real 
populations, they often understand evolutionary causes such as natural selection, 
migration, and mutation in a deterministic way (e.g. Dobzhansky & Pavlovsky, 1957). 
They consider that the stochasticity of populations’ evolutionary paths is mainly a product 
of genetic drift. 
 The functional view, inspired by functional approaches to mechanisms (e.g. 
Bechtel & Abrahamsen, 2005), aims to characterise natural selection as an MDC 
mechanism. It is considered that natural selection performs a function―i.e., to produce 
adaptation―and that it provides the basis for addressing the mechanism of natural 
selection. Illari and Williamson (2010) argue that, insofar as it has a function, natural 
selection can be decomposed into organised entities and activities. They consider that 
components of a mechanism can be identified and individuated on the basis of their 
function, i.e., their contribution to the function of the mechanism as whole. Therefore, 
since natural selection has the function of producing adaptation, it is decomposable into 
entities (e.g. organisms) and activities (e.g. reproduction) that contribute to it. Illari and 
Williamson also consider that by taking as reference the function of a mechanism it is 
possible to attribute organisation to it. They define organisation as “whatever features 
exist by which the activities and entities each do something and do something together to 
produce the phenomenon” (Illari & Williamson, 2010, p. 289). Natural selection, insofar 
as it has a function, is an organised mechanism too. Taking the functional approach to 
natural selection and the theses defended by Illari and Williamson as reference, DesAutels 
(2016) argues that natural selection also meets MDC’s requirement of regularity. Natural 
selection is process regular and its regularity is not threated by internal sources. DesAutels 
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claims that “natural selection only fails to be regular in ways that are unthreatening to its 
status as MDC mechanism” (DesAutels, 2016, p. 16). Not always producing the same 
output and being susceptible to external sources of irregularity do not severely undermine 
its regular nature. 
The main problem of the functional view is related with the function attributed to 
natural selection. Advocates of the functional view consider that producing adaptation is 
the primary function of natural selection. This is the cornerstone of their approach and all 
their arguments ultimately rely on it. Nevertheless, that idea is very problematic. Natural 
selection does not necessary increase adaptation. It is just a potential (but not necessary) 
outcome of the process of natural selection (Gould & Lloyd, 1999). Natural selection 
ultimately acts on reproductive efficacy [fitness], although it may also indirectly influence 
other traits such as the capacity to adjust to a particular environment (Gillsepie, 2004). It 
invariably leads to non-random reproductive success, but not always leads to adaptation. 
The functional view would also face relevant difficulties for accounting for other 
evolutionary causes. It would require assigning functions to those causes. However, each 
evolutionary cause brings about several outcomes and it is difficult to identify one of them 
as its function. For example, migration introduces genetic variation in a population, 
reduces the level of differentiation among populations, favours hybridization, etc. The 
functional view would also have difficulties for identifying and delimiting evolutionary 
mechanisms. As it has been noted, a mechanism is always a mechanism for a phenomenon 
(see section 3). And the defenders of the functional view consider that a mechanism is 
composed of those entities, activities, and organisational features that contribute to the 
phenomenon for which the mechanism is responsible. It means that the mechanism 
responsible for each phenomenon or outcome is different. Consequently, from their 
proposal, the mechanism responsible for each outcome attributed to a particular 
evolutionary cause would be a different one. However, that consideration does not suit 
evolutionary biologists’ ideas; they consider that the same particular evolutionary process 
is responsible for all those outputs.  
Finally, the minimalist view consists of directly applying in evolutionary biology a 
general notion of mechanism developed by means of the across-the-sciences strategy. 
Glennan (2017), for instance, proposes a minimal characterisation which aims to include 
what all mechanisms share in common. He considers that that minimal definition is 
“broad enough to capture most of the wide range of things scientists have called 
mechanisms” (Glennan, 2017, p. 18), including evolutionary mechanisms. Certainly, 
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Glennan’s minimal notion includes general characteristics that are often present in 
mechanisms (e.g. organisation). Nonetheless, his proposal does not take into 
consideration the specific traits of evolutionary mechanisms and can hardly account for 
them. For example, Glennan’s notion of mechanism’s component entity (or part) does not 
suit evolutionary causes’ parts. He claims that entities must be stable. The stability 
required depends on the mechanism in which they are involved. A component entity of a 
mechanism is stable enough if its properties and boundaries remain stable while the 
phenomenon for which that mechanism is responsible is taking place. Nonetheless, the 
application of that requirement to evolutionary causes’ parts would be problematic. 
Firstly, as it has been discussed, evolutionary causes are responsible for several 
phenomena with different timescales. Consequently, it would be very difficult to 
determine which degree of stability must be required to an entity. And secondly, 
properties of parts of evolutionary causes do not always remain stable while those causes 
and phenomena for which they are responsible are taking place. For example, as a result 
of phenotypic plasticity, the colour or the height of an individual organism may change 
during a process of migration (Pigliucci, 2001).  
 
5.3. Mechanistic explanations in social science 
The aim of generality of the new mechanical philosophy faces important difficulties. As 
it has been shown, the new mechanical approach can hardly account for mechanisms and 
their roles in some fields of science. Mechanisms (and the roles they play) differ 
significantly from one field to another. So, general considerations that overlook that 
heterogeneity are often problematic. Given this scenario, it seems that, in order to address 
a methodological question, it is crucial to take into account the specific traits of the 
scientific field (or fields) of interest. This approach is adopted in “Mechanistic 
explanations and components of social mechanisms” (annex 3). In that paper, I discuss 
some aspects of mechanism-based explanations in social science taking social scientists’ 
practice as my main source. In particular, I address the question of what the components 
of social mechanisms in mechanistic explanations of social macro-phenomena must be 
(henceforth, “the question of components”). 
The question of components has been mainly addressed within the framework of 
analytical sociology. A core idea of analytical sociology is the principle of mechanism-
based explanations (Hedström, 2005; Hedström & Bearman, 2009; Hedström & Ylikoski, 
2011). As it has been noted in section 3, analytical sociologists advocate the mechanistic 
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account of scientific explanation. They consider that a social macro-phenomenon is 
explained by specifying the mechanisms by which that phenomenon is brought about. 
The other fundamental principle of analytical sociology is structural individualism 
(Hedström, 2005; Hedström & Ylikoski, 2010; Hedström & Ylikoski, 2011). It is a weak 
version of methodological individualism. Structural individualism considers that social 
macro-phenomena must be explained in terms of interactions of individual agents. 
However, unlike other versions of methodological individualism, it admits that not all 
explanatory facts are about individuals in the strict sense. Relations and relational 
structures can be explanatorily relevant.  
The principles of mechanism-based explanations and structural individualism are 
not considered independent. It is held that the principle of mechanism-based explanations 
implies structural individualism. The main argument in support of that idea is that there 
are social mechanisms only at the individual level (Hedström & Swedberg, 1998b; 
Hedström, 2005). Putting the matter in other words, demanding mechanistic explanations 
in social science means demanding explanations in terms of individuals, their properties, 
actions, and relations. Consequently, supporting a mechanistic account of explanation in 
social science would require a commitment to structural individualism. The adoption of 
structural individualism leads to an answer to the question of components: a social 
mechanism in an explanation of a social macro-phenomenon must be composed of 
individuals, their properties, actions, and relations to one another. This is the initial 
position of analytical sociology regarding the question of components. 
In response to analytical sociology’s initial answer to the question of components, 
several authors have disputed the idea that the principle of mechanism-based explanations 
implies structural individualism (Vromen, 2010; Kaidesoja, 2013). They have argued that 
it is unlikely to be the case that all social mechanisms are at the individual level. There 
are social mechanisms that have components of a higher level, e.g., a coalition between 
political parties. Therefore, analytical sociologists’ main argument in support of the 
implication between both principles would not hold and, consequently, their initial 
position regarding the question of components would not be justified. 
Given the critiques against their initial position regarding the question of 
components, different answers have been raised by analytical sociologists. Michael 
Schmid (2011) presents a new argument in support of analytical sociology’s initial 
position. He also adopts the principle of structural individualism, which leads to that 
position, but his argumentation does not rely on the idea that there are social mechanisms 
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only at the individual level. Firstly, Schmid claims that one aspect of mechanism-based 
explanations in social science is that they require “laws indicating which factors 
ultimately ‘produce’ or ‘generate’ a relevant event” (2011, p. 137). Specifying 
nomological connections is necessary in mechanistic explanations. And secondly, he 
argues that, strictly speaking, we do not know any social law, i.e., a law governing the 
course of social macro-processes. In social science, only laws of individual action are 
available. From those premises, Schmid concludes the principle of structural 
individualism regarding mechanism-based explanations. Structural individualism, as it 
has been noted, leads to the analytical sociology’s initial position. 
Schmid’s new argument is valid. The truth of the premises supports the truth of the 
conclusion. If its premises were true, it would follow the principle of structural 
individualism. Nonetheless, one of the premises of the argument is probably not true. The 
first premise, which is supposed to present a trait of mechanism-based explanations, is 
unlikely to be accurate. Mechanistic explanations are not required to include laws (Halina, 
2018). In a mechanistic explanation, the explanandum is explained by uncovering the 
mechanism that is responsible for it, and specifying laws is not required for that. It is not 
necessary to show that those activities in which its component entities are engaged 
instantiate laws. For instance, consider Mann’s (2004) mechanism-based explanation of 
the property of certain countries (e.g. Britain) in the interwar period of not being 
susceptible to fascists movements seizing power. He refers to a mechanism whose main 
components are the political parties of those countries and some of their properties (e.g. 
being accustomed to relinquishing sovereign powers). However, no nomological 
connection between political parties’ properties and countries’ susceptibility to fascists 
movements seizing power is specified. 
Petri Ylikoski (2012), unlike Schmid, advocates a modified version of analytical 
sociology’s initial position regarding the question of components. Ylikoski (2012, 2013) 
considers that mechanism-based explanations of social macro-phenomena can be causal 
or constitutive. And taking that distinction as reference, he addresses the question of 
components. Firstly, Ylikoski discusses constitutive mechanistic explanations of social 
macro-phenomena. He considers that “[t]he explanantia in constitutive explanations are 
always at the micro level” (Ylikoski 2012, p. 35). Therefore, he claims that the 
components of social mechanisms in constitutive mechanism-based explanations must be 
located at the micro level. Secondly, Ylikoski addresses causal mechanistic explanations 
of social macro-phenomena. He acknowledges that the explanantia in causal explanations 
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are not always at the micro level. Nevertheless, he considers that causal mechanistic 
explanations of social macro-phenomena require “microfoundations”. Appealing to 
micro-level entities, properties, activities, and relations is essential for understanding how 
the causal counterfactual dependencies hold. Consequently, he argues that the 
components of social mechanisms in causal mechanism-based explanations must be 
located at the micro level. Ylikoski concludes that, in (constitutive and causal) 
mechanism-based explanations of social macro-phenomena, social mechanisms must be 
composed of micro-level entities, properties, activities, and relations. 
Ylikoski’s proposal is less rigid that the analytical sociology’s initial position 
regarding the question of components. He holds that components of social mechanisms 
must be micro-level entities, properties, activities, and relations. Nonetheless, he 
considers that there is not a unique and predetermined micro level. The micro-macro 
distinction is understood as a question of scale. What is considered as a micro-level 
component depends on the explanandum phenomenon (and also on the explanatory 
interests). Ylikoski’s perspectival proposal avoids the main difficulties of analytical 
sociology’s initial approach―it is compatible with the fact that not all social mechanisms 
are at the individual level―and Schmid’s argument―it does not require that mechanistic 
explanations include laws. Nevertheless, it also faces some relevant difficulties. 
The main problem of Ylikoski’s proposal is that it is too vague and, consequently, 
does not constitute a proper answer to the question of components. The notion of ‘micro 
level’ is not accurately characterised. The micro-macro relation is defined as a particular 
kind of difference in scale, but the traits that characterise and distinguish it from other 
differences in scale are not clearly specified. Another problematic aspect of Ylikoski’s 
proposal is that it does not provide a guide for building mechanism-based explanations. 
On the one hand, as it has been noted, it is not concrete enough. It is never certain if a 
particular component is at the micro level. And on the other hand, the identification of 
the micro level would require the previous specification of the explanans and the 
explanandum. In order to belong to the micro level, a component must be explanatorily 
relevant for the explanandum macro-phenomenon. Finally, Ylikoski’s proposal does not 
suit many mechanism-based explanations of social macro-phenomena. The fact is that in 
social science, causal mechanistic explanations of social macro-events often include 
entities, properties, activities, or relations that are unlikely to be at the micro level. For 
example, consider McCright and Dunlap’s (2003) mechanism-based explanation of the 
no ratification of the Kyoto Protocol by the United States senate. They specify how 
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conservative think tanks (and their collaboration with climate change sceptics) produced 
the redefinition of global warming as non-problematic, and how that redefinition 
influenced in the policy arena and brought about the no ratification of the protocol. In 
McCright and Dunlap’s explanation, most components of the social mechanism (e.g. 
think tanks) are hardly at the micro level regarding the explanandum, i.e., the no 
ratification of the Kyoto Protocol by the United States senate. 
There is no privileged level to which components of social mechanisms in 
mechanistic explanations of social macro-phenomena must always belong. Neither in 
causal mechanism-based explanations nor in constitutive mechanism-based explanations 
of social macro-phenomena, must components of social mechanisms always belong to a 
certain predetermined level. Given this scenario, it could be considered that a proper 
answer to the question of components is hardly achievable. It seems that proposals that 
account for the diversity of mechanistic explanations (as Ylikoski’s proposal) are too 
vague and unable to provide a guide for building mechanism-based explanations, while 
concrete and operational proposals (as analytical sociology’s initial position) do not suit 
the diversity of mechanistic explanations. Nonetheless, I think that a minimal 
requirement, which is concrete and operational without neglecting the diversity of 
mechanism-based explanations, can be raised regarding the components of social 
mechanisms. Particularly, a component of a social mechanism in a mechanistic 
explanation of a social macro-phenomenon must not have the explanandum phenomenon 
as a part of it.  
The minimal requirement applies to both causal and constitutive mechanistic 
explanations of social macro-phenomena. In causal mechanism-based explanations, 
components of the mechanism must not have the explanandum phenomenon as a part of 
them. To be a component of the mechanism, an entity or an activity (or another kind of 
component) must be causally relevant for the explanandum phenomenon. However, there 
cannot be a relation of causal dependence between them if the entity or activity has the 
explanandum phenomenon as a part of it. A relation of causal dependence between a 
whole and one of its parts is not possible (Hitchcock, 2003; Craver & Bechtel, 2007). 
Likewise, in constitutive mechanism-based explanations, the explanandum phenomenon 
must not be included among the components of the social mechanism. In that kind of 
explanations, components of the mechanism must be proper parts of the system whose 
property or behaviour is the explanandum phenomenon (Craver, 2007). Nevertheless, a 
component cannot be a proper part of the system whose property or behaviour is the 
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explanandum phenomenon if that phenomenon is part of it. If the phenomenon of interest 
is part of a component, the system whose property or behaviour is that phenomenon is 
also part of this component. And if the system is part of the component, the component 
cannot be a proper part of the system. 
 
6. Mechanistic explanations and science denialism 
Science denialism is a well-known form of pseudoscience. Unlike pseudotheory 
promotion, science denialism does not focus on promoting a specific theory (e.g. the 
principle of similars, i.e., like cures like), but on denying certain scientific claim. Science 
denialism consists in the systematic rejection of a claim on which a scientific consensus 
exists (Diethelm & Mckee, 2009; Liu, 2012; Hansson, 2017). It is usually targeted at 
scientific claims that damage people’s lifestyle or worldviews, or that threat corporate 
interests (Lewandowsky et al., 2016). Some prominent examples are tobacco disease 
denialism, evolution denialism, and climate change denialism.  
Although it is hardly a homogeneous movement, there are five epistemological 
traits that characterise every case of science denialism (Liu, 2012; Hansson, 2017, 2018). 
First, cherry-picking of data is systematically employed in the argumentations, so that 
only a small part of the available evidence is considered. Second, denialists are reluctant 
to give up ideas and arguments even if they have been refuted. Third, fake controversies 
are fabricated. It is held that a certain issue is subject to a genuine scientific controversy, 
although an overwhelming consensus exists among scientists. Fourth, deviant criteria of 
assent are introduced. Denialists set unrealistic standards for evidence, which can hardly 
be met by current scientific research. And fifth, the opposition viewpoint is 
misrepresented. The scientific claim is distorted, for instance, by taking quotes out of 
context. There are also several sociological characteristics that are often present in science 
denialism (Diethelm & Mckee, 2009; Liu, 2012; Hansson, 2017, 2018). For example, 
science denialism usually has strong political connections (e.g. evolution denialism is 
related with Christian right wing). Other sociological characteristics that are frequently 
present in science denialism are: being supported mostly by men, addressing laypeople 
instead of scholars, and attacking individual scientists personally and professionally. 
A relevant kind of science denialism, which has not been previously addressed, is 
‘explanatory war’. In “Mechanisms and science denialism: explaining the global lung 
cancer epidemic” (annex 4), that form of pseudoscience is characterised and discussed. 
An explanatory war is a situation in which (i) there is an undisputed phenomenon (e.g. 
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an increasing incidence of a disease), (ii) in the scientific community there is a broad 
consensus on its explanation, and (iii) the standard scientific explanation is systematically 
denied by a group of people. In order to fight down the mainstream science’s explanation, 
two strategies are usually followed by denialists. On the one hand, they directly attack the 
standard explanation. For instance, they claim that the causal link between explanans and 
explanandum has not been proved with one hundred percent certainty (Proctor, 2011; 
Prothero, 2013). On the other hand, denialists propose and promote alternative 
explanations, which are presented as being as legitimate as the standard explanation, to 
increase the controversy and make their case more credible (Proctor, 2004, 2011; Pearl & 
Mackenzie, 2018). For example, they support private research to study every minimally 
plausible alternative explanation. In explanatory wars, the distinctive traits of science 
denialism are present. Strategies such as introducing deviant criteria of assent and 
fabricating fake controversies have a crucial role in the offensive against the standard 
explanation. 
The mechanical account of scientific explanation is helpful to face explanatory 
wars. In an explanatory war, the standard explanation of a phenomenon is denied by a 
group of people. However, if the standard explanation is mechanistic, denialists’ 
offensive is less effective. Mechanism-based explanations are resistant to the arguments 
usually raised by denialists. As it has been noted, in order to fight down the mainstream 
science explanation, two strategies are followed by denialists. First, they directly attack 
the standard explanation. Denialists usually argue that the standard explanation does not 
satisfactorily prove the causal link between explanans and explanandum. Their arguments 
are based on “an extraordinarily narrow and mechanical conception of causation” 
(Proctor, 2011, p. 275). Second, denialists propose and promote alternative explanations 
to increase the controversy. Alternative explanations, which are presented as equally 
legitimate as the standard explanation, usually rely on statistical correlations between the 
explanandum phenomenon and variables not included in the mainstream science 
explanation (Proctor, 2004, 2011). Nevertheless, the strategies followed by denialists are 
hardly effective against mechanistic explanations. On the one hand, mechanistic 
explanations establish the (causal or constitutive) link between explanans and 
explanandum. They show how the phenomenon of interest comes about. On the other 
hand, alternative explanations raised by denialists would not be legitimate explanations 
on the same footing than the standard explanation. They are rarely mechanistic 
explanations, but black-box explanations that do not address the link between explanans 
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and explanandum, and are not supported by the same kind of evidence that supports 
standard mechanistic explanations. 
The relevance of mechanistic explanations and its resistance to denialists’ attacks 
can be illustrated by means of the explanatory war regarding the global lung cancer 
epidemic. At the beginning of the twentieth century, lung cancer was an extraordinarily 
rare disease (Proctor, 2001, 2011, 2012). Only a few hundred cases had been reported in 
the world medical literature. However, during the first decades of the twentieth century, 
an increased incidence of lung cancer was noticed in several countries. This dramatic 
change in the incidence of lung cancer begged for an explanation. During the following 
decades, several possible explanations of the epidemic were discussed. Among the 
diverse factors that were taken into account were atmospheric pollution, occupational 
exposures, and the growing popularity of cigarettes (Proctor, 2004, 2011). Finally, in the 
1950s, the idea that tobacco consumption explained the lung cancer epidemic took the 
lead. The causal link between cigarettes and lung cancer was established by four direct 
lines of evidence: population studies, animal experimentation, cellular pathology, and 
chemical analytics (Proctor, 2012). And, as a result of this causal knowledge, a broad 
consensus emerged among experts that tobacco consumption accounted for the global 
lung cancer epidemic (Proctor, 2011, 2012). 
By the mid-1950s, there was a consensus among scientists that tobacco 
consumption explained the lung cancer epidemic. Nevertheless, the tobacco industry 
systematically denied that explanation. Although they accepted that the frequency of lung 
cancer had increased and that this required an explanation, they rejected the explanation 
that linked the lung cancer epidemic with their product. In order to fight down the 
mainstream science explanation, the tobacco industry followed two strategies. Firstly, 
they attacked the standard explanation (Proctor, 2011). Their main argument was that the 
causal link between tobacco and lung cancer was not conclusively established and more 
research was necessary. Secondly, the tobacco industry promoted alternative explanations 
of the global lung cancer epidemic (Proctor, 2004, 2011). By means of institutions such 
as the Council for Tobacco Research and the Tobacco Institute, they funded and 
publicised research focused on investigating possible causes of lung cancer other than 
tobacco.  
In the early 1990s, the mechanisms that link smoking cigarettes and lung cancer 
were discovered. The standard explanation of the lung cancer epidemic became a 
mechanistic explanation (Russo & Williamson, 2007). It detailed the processes though 
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which smoking brings about lung cancer. As a result, the tobacco industry’s strategies 
lost their effectiveness. On the one hand, the standard scientific explanation conclusively 
stablished the causal link between smoking and lung cancer. It suited the narrow 
mechanical account of causation adopted by denialists and made the ‘more research’ 
argument obsolete. On the other hand, the standard explanation clearly distinguished 
itself from the alternative explanations. It was a causal mechanistic explanation, while the 
alternatives were statistical or non-mechanistic causal explanations. In the 1990s, after 
that loss of effectiveness, the tobacco industry changed its strategy and stopped denying 
the mainstream science explanation of the lung cancer epidemic (Proctor, 2001, 2006, 
2011). They accepted that tobacco was a risk factor in the development of lung cancer 
and that tobacco consumption explained the high incidence of lung cancer. From that 
point on, their legal strategy was to argue “that the risks of smoking have been well-
known for decades, and that people therefore voluntarily assume such risks when they 
take up the habit” (Proctor, 2001, p. 84). 
 
7. Conclusions 
Mechanisms have a central role in the scientific enterprise. From molecular biology to 
sociology, scientists in diverse fields appeal to mechanisms to describe, explain, predict, 
and control worldly phenomena. The relevance of mechanisms and mechanism-based 
approaches has not gone unnoticed for philosophers. As it has been noted, the first 
mechanical philosophy dates back to the Classical Greece. The mechanical philosophy 
enjoyed great popularity during the second half of the seventeenth century. In that period, 
the mechanical philosophy became the dominant approach in natural philosophy and 
philosophy of science. Nevertheless, although less influential, several mechanical 
accounts have subsequently been advocated in philosophy. 
In the current philosophical debate, the new mechanical philosophy is the main 
representative of the mechanical approach. Like the seventeenth-century mechanical 
philosophy, it is both a philosophy of science and a philosophy of nature. The new 
mechanical philosophy is not only concerned about the scientific methodology, but also 
about the constitution and organisation of the world. It is considered that mechanisms are 
one of the main constituents of the world. Nonetheless, as it has been noted, the new 
mechanical philosophy is characterised by a general emphasis on actual scientific 
practice. Its primary object of interest is mechanism as a concept-in-use in science. The 
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new mechanists focus on scientific practice and take it as the main reference for 
addressing both methodological and ontological questions. 
The new mechanical philosophy has proven to be a very fruitful approach in 
philosophy of science. It has led to significative progress in several philosophical 
discussions. Within the framework of the new mechanical philosophy, it has been 
convincingly addressed scientific explanation (Machamer et al., 2000; Bechtel & 
Abrahamsen, 2005), causal inference (Steel, 2004; Russo & Williamson, 2007; Parkkinen 
et al., 2018), extrapolation of causal claims (Steel, 2008; Wilde & Parkkinen, 2019), 
scientific inquiry (Bechtel & Richardson, 1993; Darden, 2018), knowledge growth and 
organization (Hedström & Ylikoski, 2010; Glennan, 2017), and several other questions. 
As it is argued in “Mechanisms and science denialism: explaining the global lung cancer 
epidemic” (annex 4), the new mechanical philosophy could also contribute to combat 
pseudoscience. The new mechanical approach is helpful to deal with some forms of 
science denialism. It is particularly valuable in explanatory wars. The new mechanical 
account of scientific explanation provides explanations resistant to the arguments usually 
raised by denialists. Furthermore, the new mechanical philosophy offers a promising 
approach for addressing other relevant problems such as risk assessment (Rocca, 2017; 
Rocca et al., 2020), public understanding of science (Lewandowsky & Oberauer, 2016), 
and ethical and welfare evaluation (Grüne-Yanoff, 2016). 
Nevertheless, the new mechanical philosophy also has certain problematic aspects. 
Some of those deficiencies are related with its aim of generality and broad applicability. 
Mechanisms are relevant in most scientific fields, and the new mechanical philosophy 
aims to provide a general mechanical approach that encompasses all of them. 
Nonetheless, it faces important difficulties for accounting for mechanisms and their roles 
in some fields. One of those difficulties, which is addressed in “The Search for Generality 
in the Notion of Mechanism” (annex 1), concerns the notion of mechanism itself. New 
mechanists intend to develop a general notion of mechanism appropriate for the whole 
range of mechanisms studied across the sciences. The development of a general notion is 
pursued with diverse strategies―i.e., the extrapolation strategy and the across-the-
sciences strategy. However, all of them have proved unsuccessful. They are unable to 
provide a notion of mechanism able to satisfactorily account for all kinds of mechanisms. 
Moreover, it is doubtful that an appropriate general notion of mechanism could be 
developed. The phenomena, entities, activities, and organisational aspects studied by 
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different sciences are so heterogeneous that a notion of mechanism that is informative 
and covers all the relevant cases seems unattainable.  
One of the main advancements of the new mechanical philosophy is to pay attention 
at current scientific practice. Considering mechanism as a concept-in-use in science has 
been crucial for most of its contributions (e.g. analysing scientific discovery). 
Nevertheless, the new mechanical philosophy seems to fail to acknowledge the relevant 
differences among scientific fields. It does not take into consideration the particularities 
of mechanisms and their roles in each area. Consequently, the new mechanical approach 
faces important difficulties for being broadly applied. For instance, as it is extensively 
discussed in “Evolutionary causes as mechanisms: a critical analysis” (annex 2), ignoring 
the particularities of evolutionary mechanisms render inadequate the mechanical 
approaches to evolutionary biology. To overcome those difficulties, the new mechanical 
philosophy should give up the naïve assumption of sameness and consider the specificity 
of scientific fields. When a methodological question is addressed, a field-specific 
approach should initially be adopted. In each relevant field, the question should be 
addressed taking as the main reference the practice of the involved scientists. Considering 
scientific practice is not enough, it is necessary to consider the pertinent scientific 
practice. This field-specific approach is adopted in “Mechanistic explanations and 
components of social mechanisms” (annex 3). In this paper, taking social scientists’ 
practice as the main source, it is addressed the questions of what the components of social 
mechanisms in mechanistic explanations of social macro-phenomena must be. 
The field-specific approach would facilitate the application of the new mechanical 
philosophy to additional fields of science. There are scientific fields that significantly 
differ from those initially considered by the new mechanists and whose particularities 
should be considered. This is the case, for example, of psychology (Kazdin, 2007; Koch 
& Cratsley, 2020). The mechanisms studied by psychologists are different to biological 
and social mechanisms in many relevant aspects. Furthermore, the field-specific 
orientation would enable the new mechanical approach to successfully address field-
specific problems, such as generalising from case studies in social science (Ylikoski, 
2019).  
Recognising the diversity of scientific fields regarding how mechanisms are 
understood and what roles they (could) play does not mean to renounce to the aim of 
generality. The new mechanical philosophy could develop an encompassing mechanical 
approach that suits all those fields in which mechanisms are relevant. In fact, that kind of 
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approach would be very fruitful for addressing general philosophical questions and 
facilitating collaboration between fields. Admitting the specificity of scientific fields just 
means that general claims cannot overlook how mechanisms and their roles are 
considered in the diverse areas of science. The encompassing mechanical approach must 













1. Mecanismos en la ciencia 
En la literatura científica, frecuentemente se apela a mecanismos. Cientos de artículos 
que hacen referencia a mecanismos son publicados cada año en revistas como Nature, 
Science y The Lancet. La terminología mecanicista se extiende a lo largo de todo el 
espectro científico, no es exclusiva de unas pocas áreas. Los científicos discuten sobre 
“mecanismos reguladores”, “mecanismos de acción”, “mecanismos de asignación”, 
“mecanismos de selección”, “mecanismos de supresión”, etc. en muy diversos campos. 
Ciertamente, parece que los mecanismos juegan un papel importante en la empresa 
científica. No obstante, esto no es excesivamente sorprendente. Los principales objetivos 
de la ciencia son describir, explicar, predecir y controlar fenómenos del mundo. Y los 
mecanismos son relevantes para alcanzar esos objetivos. Ellos revelan como los 
fenómenos del mundo ―el objeto de interés de la investigación científica― son 
constituidos o producidos. 
A fin de ilustrar la relevancia de los mecanismos, considere la desigualdad de éxito 
en los mercados culturales. Los productos culturales exitosos (p. ej. los libros 
superventas) son varias veces más exitosos que la media. Mas de cien millones de copias 
de Harry Potter and the Philosopher’s Stone ―el primer libro de la saga Harry Potter― 
se han vendido desde su publicación en 1997, mientras que la mayoría de los autores solo 
logran vender unos pocos cientos de copias de sus apreciados manuscritos. De modo 
similar, Avatar recaudó 749 millones de dólares en el mercado doméstico, más de 
cuarenta y siete veces la recaudación media en los EUA en 2010. La explicación que el 
sentido común da a esta desigualdad apela a propiedades intrínsecas de los productos 
exitosos (p. ej. la estructura narrativa) (Watts, 2011). Tendemos a considerar que esos 
productos son cualitativamente diferentes a sus pares y que esa diferencia es la 
responsable de su éxito arrollador. Sin embargo, esa explicación se ve socavada por la 
impredecibilidad de los mercados culturales. Incluso los expertos son a menudo incapaces 
de determinar con antelación que productos triunfarán. De hecho, Harry Potter and the 
Philosopher’s Stone fue rechazado por doce editores antes de ser aceptado para su 
publicación (Gunelius, 2008). 
Por tanto, para poder dar adecuadamente cuenta de la desigualdad de éxito en los 
mercados culturales, es crucial identificar el mecanismo responsable de ella. Los 
sociólogos Salganik, Dodds y Watts (Salganik et al., 2006; Salganik & Watts, 2009a, 
2009b) han estudiado como el comportamiento (no independiente) de los consumidores 
individuales conduce a la desigualdad de éxito. La influencia social está presente en los 
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mercados culturales, donde a menudo se dispone de información sobre el éxito de los 
productos ofertados (p. ej. listas de los libros más vendidos). Debido a la gran cantidad 
de productos culturales ofertados, los individuos suelen seguir las elecciones tomadas por 
otros y comprar esos productos que ya son populares. Esta tendencia se ve reforzada por 
rasgos estructurales de muchos mercados culturales, como dar a los libros más vendidos 
un lugar más prominente en la tienda. En consecuencia, la ventaja acumulativa opera. Los 
productos culturales exitosos tienden a ser aún más exitosos. Las pequeñas diferencias 
iniciales se hacen mayores y, como resultado, la desigualdad aumenta. En el trabajo de 
Salganik, Dodds y Watts, la presencia de la influencia social en los mercados culturales 
y su contribución a la desigualdad de éxito son avaladas por estudios experimentales en 
mercados culturales artificiales (véase Salganik et al., 2006; Salganik & Watts, 2009b). 
El rol central de los mecanismos también se manifiesta en la práctica de la 
International Agency for Research on Cancer (IARC). El objetivo de la IARC es preparar 
y publicar revisiones y evaluaciones de la evidencia sobre la carcinogenicidad de 
determinados agentes (p. ej. exposiciones ambientales) (IARC, 2019). En base a la 
evidencia disponible, busca establecer en qué medida esos agentes pueden ser 
considerados cancerígenos para los humanos. La evaluación de los agentes está informada 
por tres tipos de evidencia: evidencia de cáncer en humanos, evidencia de cáncer en 
animales y evidencia de mecanismos. En este contexto, la evidencia de mecanismos 
refiere principalmente a información sobre toxicocinética (p. ej. metabolización) y 
procesos de carcinogénesis (p. ej. inducir alteraciones epigenéticas). Tras analizar 
individualmente cada estudio y abordar separadamente cada tipo de evidencia en su 
conjunto, los tres tipos de evidencia son integrados en una evaluación global de la 
carcinogenicidad del agente. Después, de acuerdo con esa evaluación, el agente es 
clasificado como cancerígeno para los humanos, probablemente cancerígeno para los 
humanos, posiblemente cancerígeno para los humanos o no clasificable de acuerdo con 
su carcinogenicidad para los humanos. 
En la evaluación global de los agentes, el principal rol de la evidencia de 
mecanismos es guiar la extrapolación de relaciones causales de modelos animales a 
humanos (Leuridan & Weber, 2011). Cuando la evidencia de cáncer en humanos es 
limitada o inadecuada, la evidencia de mecanismos es necesaria para determinar si el 
agente es cancerígeno para los humanos. Este rol de la evidencia de mecanismos fue 
crucial en la evaluación del benzo[a]pireno (IARC, 2012), la cual ha sido analizada en 
detalle por Wilde y Parkkinen (2019). Aunque no había evidencia de cáncer en humanos 
40 
 
(p. ej. datos epidemiológicos) disponible, el benzo[a]pireno fue clasificado como 
cancerígeno para los humanos. Las similitudes identificadas entre los mecanismos que 
operan en los modelos animales y los que operan en los humanos permitieron la 
extrapolación de la relación causal. Se consideró que “[t]he strong and extensive 
experimental evidence for the carcinogenicity of benzo[a]pyrene in many animal species, 
supported by the consistent and coherent mechanistic evidence from experimental and 
human studies provide biological plausibility to support the overall classification of 
benzo[a]pyrene as a human carcinogen” (IARC, 2012, p. 138). 
No obstante, es conveniente señalar que la práctica científica a veces no presta 
suficiente atención a los mecanismos. Un ejemplo de esta negligencia es el desastre de la 
talidomida (Brynner & Stephens, 2001). A diferencia de lo sucedido en la evaluación del 
benzo[a]pireno, en este caso la evidencia de mecanismos no fue tenida en cuenta. En la 
década de 1950, debido a la guerra fría y a las secuelas psicológicas de la segunda guerra 
mundial, la ansiedad y el insomnio estaban muy extendidos en Europa y los EUA. Los 
tranquilizantes y las pastillas para dormir se convirtieron en productos de uso diario. Sin 
embargo, la mayoría esos sedantes era barbitúricos peligrosos y se demandaba una 
alternativa más segura. En este contexto, Chemie Grünenthal, una empresa farmacéutica 
alemana, accidentalmente produjo la talidomida. Después de testarla en estudios con 
animales y no observar efectos secundarios ―ninguna dosis era lo suficientemente alta 
como para matar a los animales―, el equipo de Grünenthal buscó una enfermedad que la 
talidomida pudiera curar. Pronto descubrieron que la talidomida tenía un efecto calmante 
e inducía al sueño sin reducir la actividad motora. En octubre de 1957, la talidomida salió 
al mercado como sedante en Alemania y, en unos pocos meses, estaba disponible en casi 
cincuenta países de todo el mundo. Se anunciaba como un sedante completamente seguro, 
el cual era apropiado para niños y mujeres embarazadas. Sin embargo, la talidomida podía 
producir defectos de nacimiento (p. ej. focomelia) cuando era consumida por mujeres 
embarazadas. En noviembre de 1961, después de que varios informes la vincularan a 
defectos de nacimiento, la talidomida fue retirada del mercado en Alemania. En los 
siguientes meses, fue retirada del mercado en los países restantes. No obstante, se estima 
que entre 8.000 y 12.000 bebes fueron deformados por la talidomida durante su periodo 
de comercialización. 
Tal y como Donald Gillies (2017) ha señalado, es poco probable que ensayos 
clínicos aleatorizados (ECA) o más estudios en animales hubieran revelado el potencial 
de la talidomida para causar defectos de nacimiento. Por un lado, las mujeres embarazadas 
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no pueden participar en los ECA y, por otro lado, la talidomida raramente produce 
defectos de nacimiento en animales que no sean primates. Sin embargo, considerar la 
evidencia de mecanismos hubiera revelado el potencial teratogénico de la talidomida y 
ayudado a evitar el desastre (Gillies, 2017). Primero, analizar el mecanismo de absorción 
de la talidomida hubiera mostrado que, dado su peso molecular, puede traspasar la 
placenta y entrar en el feto. Y segundo, comparar los mecanismos que operan en los 
modelos animales y los que operan en los humanos hubiera revelado las relevantes 
diferencias entre ellos y cuestionado la afirmación de seguridad. 
En resumen, los mecanismos tienen un rol central en la empresa científica. Tal y 
como evidencian los ejemplos anteriores, los mecanismos son a menudo cruciales para 
alcanzar objetivos tales como la explicación o la inferencia causal fiable. La ausencia de 
información sobre los mecanismos puede dificultar severamente la labor de los 
científicos. En consecuencia, una discusión rigurosa de la metodología científica no 
puede pasar por alto los mecanismos y sus importantes contribuciones.  
 
2. Filosofías mecanicistas 
La relevancia de los mecanismos y de los enfoques basados en mecanismos no ha pasado 
desapercibida para los filósofos. De hecho, la primera ‘filosofía mecanicista’ se remonta 
a la Grecia clásica (c. 500 – c. 323 a. C.) (Popa, 2018).1 Demócrito de Abdera defendió 
que el mundo está compuesto por dos tipos diferentes de realidades: átomos y vacío. Los 
átomos son invisibles, no generados, invariables e indestructibles. Son homogéneos y solo 
difieren en su forma y tamaño. Por otro lado, el vacío es definido como el absoluto no-
ser. Los átomos, los cuales son infinitos en número, se mueven en el vacío infinito y se 
combinan en diferentes agrupaciones. Los objetos macroscópicos son en realidad 
agrupaciones de átomos invisibles y sus propiedades dependen de qué átomos los 
constituyan. Los cambios en esos objetos son resultado de reagrupaciones de los átomos. 
En el atomismo de Demócrito, se considera que cualquier fenómeno del mundo es 
explicable en términos de átomos, sus propiedades y sus interacciones (Hankinson, 1998; 
Popa, 2018). En el periodo helenístico (c. 323 – c. 30 a. C.), la teoría atomista fue adoptada 
 
1 Berryman (2003) argumenta que no hubo un enfoque verdaderamente mecanicista hasta el periodo 
helenístico. Ella define un enfoque mecanicista como “a method of investigating the natural world through 
terms and principles drawn from the discipline called ‘mechanics’” (Berryman, 2003, p. 344). Y de acuerdo 
con esa caracterización, las propuestas mecanicistas no eran posibles antes del desarrollo de la mecánica, 
el cual tuvo lugar durante el siglo cuarto antes de Cristo. Sin embargo, la idea de Berryman de enfoque 
mecanicista es demasiado restrictiva y no se ajusta a la concepción contemporánea de los mecanismos. 
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y desarrollada por los epicúreos. Los epicúreos abordaron aspectos psicológicos como la 
voluntad o el deseo, y ofrecieron explanaciones mecanicistas de ellos en términos de 
interacciones entre átomos. Además, los epicúreos reivindicaron “the value of atomist 
theory for teaching us how to live the untroubled and tranquil life” (Berryman, 2016).  
En la filosofía natural antigua, el mecanicismo atomista fue criticado por los 
defensores de las explicaciones teleológicas. Estos autores consideran que los fenómenos 
naturales deben ser explicados haciendo referencia a funciones, objetivos o finalidades. 
No obstante, las analogías tecnológicas o de artefactos eran ocasionalmente usadas por 
ellos como recursos explicativos (Berryman, 2003). Por ejemplo, Aristóteles compara el 
movimiento de los animales con artefactos mecánicos automáticos. En los animales, 
como en los autómatas, un ímpetu inicial conduce al movimiento. Además, después de 
ese ímpetu inicial, ambos pueden continuar moviéndose gracias su organización interna. 
En la segunda mitad del siglo diecisiete, la filosofía mecanicista experimental se 
convirtió en el enfoque dominante en la filosofía natural. Estaba influenciada por las artes 
mecánicas y las ciencias matemáticas contemporáneas, y se oponía a la ciencia aristotélica 
y al vitalismo. La filosofía mecanicista moderna, en tanto que programa general, fue 
introducida por Robert Boyle (Roux, 2018).2 Esta filosofía involucra una visión 
reduccionista según la cual la materia pasiva y el movimiento son los constituyentes 
últimos del mundo. Solo existe una materia universal, la cual es extendida, divisible e 
impenetrable. El movimiento, el cual es siempre local, divide la materia en partes de 
diferentes tamaños y formas. La variedad de fenómenos en el mundo es resultado de las 
diversas formas, tamaños, movimientos y relaciones de las partes de la materia. Además 
de una posición metafísica, la filosofía mecanicista moderna es una tesis sobre la 
metodología científica (Nadler, 1998; Psillos & Ioannidis, 2019). Se considera que los 
fenómenos deben ser explicados en términos de materia y movimiento. En una 
explicación satisfactoria, el explanans especifica como cierta configuración de materia en 
movimiento, sujeta a leyes, da lugar al fenómeno de interés. 
 
2 Boyle introdujo el programa general de la filosofía mecanicista en el prefacio de Some specimens of an 
attempt to make chymical experiments useful to illustrate the notions of the corpuscular philosophy 
publicado en sus Certain Physiological Essays (1661). El término ‘filosofía mecanicista’ había sido 
utilizado previamente para caracterizar la filosofía de Descartes (Roux, 2018). Por ejemplo, en una carta 
enviada a Descartes en 1637, Libert Froidmont afirmó que su filosofía era demasiado tosca y mecanicista 
debido a la influencia de la física epicúrea en ella. Sin embargo, como Roux (2018) ha argumentado, esas 
apariciones del término no deben ser equiparadas con el establecimiento de la filosofía mecanicista como 
programa general. No proporcionan un marco dentro del cual diferentes propuestas sean posibles; 
exclusivamente caracterizan la filosofía cartesiana. 
43 
 
La filosofía mecanicista del siglo diecisiete, a diferencia de la filosofía natural 
aristotélica y el vitalismo, rechaza establecer una distinción fuerte entre los seres 
artificiales y los seres naturales (Garber, 2002; Hattab, 2011). Se considera que, aunque 
difieren en su causa, su naturaleza es similar. Los seres naturales son simplemente 
máquinas más complejas. No hay diferencias fundamentales entre el comportamiento de 
los fenómenos naturales y artificiales. Y, consecuentemente, ambos deben ser explicados 
en términos de materia y movimiento. En este sentido, por ejemplo, se desarrollan 
explicaciones mecanicistas del movimiento autónomo de los seres vivos (Des Chene, 
2005). Además, los artefactos (p. ej. simios animados) son frecuentemente utilizados para 
explicar fenómenos naturales. Los mecanismos que gobiernan los fenómenos naturales 
raramente son visibles, pero los mecanismos internos de los artefactos son normalmente 
más grandes. Así que los artefactos permiten a los filósofos mecanicistas ilustrar esos 
mecanismos invisibles. Tal y como de Solla Price argumenta, su existencia misma 
“offered a tangible proof, more impressive than any theory, that the natural universe of 
physics and biology was susceptible to mechanistic explanation” (1964, p. 9). 
Boyle planteó una caracterización general y amplia de la filosofía mecanicista. 
Dentro del marco mecanicista, hay lugar para diferentes propuestas (Boas, 1952; Psillos, 
2011). Los mecanicistas pueden tener ideas distintas respecto a la estructura de la materia, 
las propiedades fundamentales de la materia, la realidad del vacío, etc. Suele señalarse a 
Descartes como ejemplo paradigmático de mecanicista (Roux, 2004). Descartes mantiene 
que la materia, la cual es infinitamente divisible, y el movimiento son los constituyentes 
últimos del mundo. Considera que las leyes del movimiento son capaces de explicar todos 
los fenómenos del mundo. En este sentido, afirma que la física no es nada más que 
mecánica ―el estudio del movimiento―. Además, sus explicaciones frecuentemente 
refieren a artefactos (p. ej. autómatas). Sin embargo, otros filósofos como Thomas 
Hobbes, Pierre Gassendi o John Locke, que están en desacuerdo con muchos aspectos del 
enfoque cartesiano, también serían considerados mecanicistas. De hecho, pronto la 
noción de filosofía mecanicista fue ampliada para incluir a todos aquellos que defendían 
la relevancia de las explicaciones mecanicistas, con independencia de si respaldaban la 
ontología mecanicista (Roux, 2018). En este sentido, la mayoría de las figuras relevantes 
de la ciencia y la filosofía del siglo diecisiete, tales como Isaac Newton y Gottfried 
Wilhelm Leibniz, pueden ser caracterizadas como mecanicistas. 
Los filósofos mecanicistas modernos reconocieron la influencia del atomismo 
antiguo (Buyse, 2013). La filosofía mecanicista del siglo diecisiete es también una visión 
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del mundo reduccionista, en la cual la materia homogénea es considerada uno de sus 
principales constituyentes. Además, mantiene que los fenómenos deben ser explicados en 
términos de materia, movimiento, posición y otras cualidades mecánicas de los cuerpos. 
Sin embargo, hay diferencias relevantes entre el atomismo antiguo y la filosofía 
mecanicista moderna (Bennett, 1986). Por un lado, muchos mecanicistas rechazan tesis 
centrales del atomismo. Por ejemplo, Descartes considera que no hay vacío y que la 
materia es infinitamente divisible. Y, por otro lado, el enfoque moderno incluye muchos 
aspectos ausentes en la filosofía antigua, tales como el método experimental, el uso de 
instrumentos matemáticos y el desarrollo de modelos mecanicistas. 
En los siglos posteriores, el enfoque mecanicista continuó siendo una de las 
principales corrientes dentro de la ciencia. La investigación científica a menudo estaba 
relacionada con el desarrollo de modelos mecanicistas que daban cuenta de fenómenos 
observables. Ejemplos representativos de esos modelos son el modelo cinético de los 
gases de James Clerk Maxwell y el modelo hexagonal de la molécula de benceno de 
August Kekulé. Sin embargo, no había una interpretación estándar de la filosofía 
mecanicista compartida por todos los científicos. La interpretación podía variar 
dependiendo del periodo, la región e incluso la institución (Smith, 1976; Baracca, 2005). 
La pluralidad de enfoques mecanicistas iba desde los que defendían las explicaciones en 
términos de interacciones entre entidades elementales no observables, a los que se 
centraban en desarrollar sistemas de leyes en base a los principios fundamentales de la 
dinámica. 
A pesar de su prevalencia, el enfoque mecanicista fue objeto de críticas. Estas 
críticas fueron especialmente severas en el campo de la biología (Allen, 2005, 2018). 
Varios autores afirmaron que la filosofía mecanicista era un modo demasiado simplista 
de considerar los organismos vivos y plantearon propuestas alternativas. Frecuentemente, 
estas propuestas alternativas se basaban en la idea de que los organismos vivos tienen 
propiedades emergentes y han de ser estudiados en su conjunto. Se consideraba que no 
pueden ser reducidos a sus componentes. Entre 1700 y 1850, la mayoría de los filósofos 
y científicos críticos con el enfoque mecanicista, como Xavier Bichat y Johannes Peter 
Müller, defendían alguna forma de vitalismo. Ellos sostenían que cierta fuerza inmaterial, 
la cual no tiene equivalente en el mundo inanimado, caracteriza a los organismos vivos. 
No obstante, a finales del siglo diecinueve y principios del siglo veinte, varias alternativas 
materialistas al enfoque mecanicista fueron defendidas (p. ej. materialismo dialéctico). 
Los materialistas holistas consideraban que, para entender los sistemas complejos, es 
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necesario ir más allá de las partes individuales y abordarlos como un todo. Pero ellos 
rechazaban cualquier fuerza que no pudiera ser entendida en términos de la física y la 
química conocidas. Los materialistas holistas querían dar cuenta de los sistemas 
complejos en términos puramente fisicoquímicos.  
Durante la mayor parte del siglo veinte, la filosofía de la ciencia estuvo dominada 
por el empirismo lógico y el modelo explicativo de cobertura legal. De acuerdo con este 
modelo, un fenómeno es explicado al ser subsumido bajo una ley (Hempel, 1965). Las 
explicaciones son caracterizadas como argumentos donde las premisas, que incluyen 
esencialmente al menos una ley, implican (con certeza deductiva o con alta probabilidad 
inductiva) la conclusión, la cual describe el fenómeno explanandum. Sin embargo, desde 
principios de la década de 1960, fueron formulados numerosos contraejemplos que 
mostraban que la subsunción bajo leyes es innecesaria e insuficiente para explicar un 
fenómeno (véase Salmon, 1989). En este contexto, algunos filósofos como Peter Railton 
y Wesley C. Salmon desarrollaron propuestas mecanicistas como alternativa al 
erosionado modelo de cobertura legal. 
Railton (1978) criticó la concepción del modelo de cobertura legal de las 
explicaciones probabilísticas de fenómenos particulares ―el modelo estadístico-
inductivo―. De acuerdo con este modelo, una explicación probabilística es un argumento 
en el cual las premisas, que contienen esencialmente al menos una ley estadística, 
implican con alta probabilidad inductiva la conclusión, que describe el fenómeno 
explanandum. Railton cuestiona que las explicaciones probabilísticas sean argumentos y 
que deban hacer muy probable el explanandum. Considera que entendemos los 
fenómenos improbables igual de bien que los fenómenos altamente probables. Railton 
argumenta que la explicación probabilística no consiste en hacer a los fenómenos 
explanantia nómicamente esperables, si no en entender los mecanismos estocásticos que 
les dan lugar. En consecuencia, afirma que la explicación probabilística de un fenómeno 
debe “give an account of the chance mechanism(s) responsible for it” (Railton, 1978, p. 
206). Él entiende un mecanismo como “a more or less complete filling-in of the links in 
the causal chains” (Railton, 1978, pp. 208-209). 
En su influyente Scientific Explanation and the Causal Structure of the World 
(1984), Salmon argumenta que “[t]o understand the world and what goes on in it, we must 
expose its inner workings. To the extent that causal mechanisms operate, they explain 
how the world works” (1984, p. 133). Él considera que explicar un fenómeno es mostrar 
como encaja en la estructura causal del mundo. Un fenómeno es satisfactoriamente 
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explicado cuando se identifican (parte de) los procesos y las interacciones causales que 
le dan lugar. Salmon caracteriza los procesos y las interacciones causales en términos del 
criterio contrafáctico de ‘transmitir una marca’. Un proceso causal es definido como un 
proceso capaz de transmitir una marca (una modificación en su estructura), esté o no 
realmente transmitiéndola (Salmon, 1984, p. 147). Un ejemplo paradigmático de proceso 
causal es el movimiento de una partícula libre. Las interacciones causales son 
intersecciones de dos procesos causales en las cuales ambos son modificados de forma 
persistente de un modo que no hubiera ocurrido sin dicha intersección (Salmon, 1984, p. 
171). Una colisión de dos partículas, por ejemplo, constituiría una interacción causal. Sin 
embargo, se criticó que estas definiciones de proceso e interacción causal admiten 
contraejemplos y no son una guía fiable para descubrir la estructura causal del mundo 
(Kitcher, 1989; Dowe, 1992). En respuesta a esas críticas, siguiendo a Phil Dowe (1992), 
Salmon redefinió esos conceptos en términos de cantidades conservadas. Un proceso 
causal es caracterizado como “a world-line of an object that transmits a nonzero amount 
of an invariant quantity at each moment of its history (each spacetime point of its 
trajectory)” (Salmon, 1994, p. 308). Una interacción causal ocurre cuando líneas de 
mundo intersecan y una cantidad conservada es intercambiada (Salmon, 1994, p. 303).  
La propuesta de Salmon, igual que la filosofía mecanicista del siglo diecisiete, es 
ontológicamente austera (Hitchcock, 1995). La estructura causal del mundo es reducida 
a procesos e interacciones físicas. Sin embargo, Salmon considera que el modelo 
mecánico causal puede dar cuenta de la mayoría de las explicaciones en ciencia. En este 
sentido, afirma: “I hope that the causal theory of scientific explanation outlined above in 
this book is reasonably adequate for the characterization of explanation in most scientific 
contexts—in the physical, biological and social sciences—as long as we do not become 
involved in quantum mechanics” (Salmon, 1984, p. 278). Ciertamente, este modelo se 
ajusta a los sistemas físicos más simples, cuyo comportamiento está gobernado por los 
principios de la mecánica clásica y el electromagnetismo. Sin embargo, como James 
Woodward (1989) pronto señaló, la propuesta de Salmon difícilmente puede dar cuenta 
de la explicación en campos como la biología, la psicología y la economía. En esos 
campos, a menudo se trata como similares a sistemas que difieren significativamente en 
su estructura física subyacente. Por ejemplo, considere las situaciones adaptativas. 
Cuando las presiones selectivas presentes son análogas, dos situaciones adaptativas 
pueden ser consideradas similares, aunque los mecanismos subyacentes sean bastante 
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diferentes. Esta idea se halla a la base de los modelos desarrollados en la teoría evolutiva 
de juegos. 
 
3. La nueva filosofía mecanicista 
La nueva filosofía mecanicista surgió entre finales de la década de 1980 y principios de 
la década de 1990. Este surgimiento estuvo relacionado con la publicación de libros como 
Nuts and Bolts for Social Sciences (1989) de Jon Elster and Discovering Complexity: 
Decomposition and Localization as Strategies in Scientific Research (1993) de William 
Bechtel y Robert Richardson. El nuevo enfoque mecanicista se opone al empirismo lógico 
y a la concepción de la ciencia en términos de leyes y teorías. Se considera que la 
investigación científica no debería entenderse como una búsqueda de leyes universales, 
sino como una búsqueda de mecanismos. Esos mecanismos son representados por 
modelos mecanicistas, los cuales juegan el papel de las teorías. Los científicos usan los 
modelos mecanicistas para representar, explicar, predecir e intervenir en el mundo. 
Dentro de la nueva filosofía mecanicista, pueden distinguirse dos líneas de trabajo: 
el ‘nuevo mecanismo’ y el ‘mecanismo social’ (Glennan & Illari, 2018). El nuevo 
mecanismo, que enlaza con el trabajo seminal de Bechtel y Richardson, ha sido 
desarrollado principalmente por filósofos de la ciencia interesados en las ciencias de la 
vida (biología, neurociencia, medicina, etc.). Algunas contribuciones tempranas 
importantes, las cuales lo definieron parcialmente, son “Mechanisms and the Nature of 
Causation” (1996) de Stuart Glennan y “Thinking about Mechanisms” (2000) de Peter 
Machamer, Lindley Darden y Carl F. Craver (en adelante MDC). Estos artículos 
caracterizan los mecanismos y, tomándolos como referencia, abordan varios problemas 
filosóficos como la causalidad o la explicación científica. El mecanismo social, el cual 
enlaza con el influyente trabajo de Elster, se centra en las ciencias sociales, especialmente 
en la sociología y la economía. Ha sido desarrollado por científicos sociales y está 
íntimamente relacionado con la sociología analítica. La sociología analítica es un 
movimiento metodológico en sociología que reivindica la relevancia de los mecanismos. 
Sus principios fundamentales han sido expuestos en libros como Social Mechanisms: An 
Analytical Approach to Social Theory (1998) editado por Peter Hedström y Richard 
Swedberg y Dissecting the Social: On the Principles of Analytical Sociology (2005) de 
Hedström. Una de sus ideas centrales, la cual es compartida por todos los sociólogos 
analíticos, es que el principal objetivo de la sociología debería ser explicar 
macrofenómenos sociales en base a los mecanismos responsables de ellos. 
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El nuevo mecanismo y el mecanismo social surgieron independientemente y, 
durante varios años, las discusiones en filosofía y en ciencias sociales se han desarrollado 
por separado. Sin embargo, la interacción entre ambas líneas de trabajo ha ido creciendo 
progresivamente. Por ejemplo, nociones de mecanismo desarrolladas por defensores del 
nuevo mecanicismo han sido adoptadas por científicos sociales asociados al mecanismo 
social (véase, por ejemplo, Hedström, 2005, p. 25). 
 Al igual que enfoques mecanicistas previos, tales como la filosofía mecanicista 
moderna o la propuesta de Salmon, la nueva filosofía mecanicista es tanto una filosofía 
natural como una filosofía de la ciencia (Glennan, 2016, 2017). Por un lado, es una 
investigación filosófica sobre la constitución y organización del mundo. Los nuevos 
mecanicistas consideran que los mecanismos son uno de los principales constituyentes 
del mundo y que todos o la mayoría de los fenómenos del mundo dependen de ellos. Ellos 
investigan la naturaleza de los mecanismos en tanto que categoría ontológica y como se 
relacionan con otras categorías ontológicas como las causas, las propiedades y los niveles 
de organización. Por otro lado, la nueva filosofía mecanicista es una investigación 
filosófica sobre la ciencia. Se considera que los mecanismos tienen un rol central en la 
empresa científica. Los nuevos mecanicistas estudian el descubrimiento de mecanismos, 
su representación por medio de modelos y su uso para explicar, predecir y controlar 
fenómenos. Es importante señalar que no todos los mecanicistas conceden la misma 
importancia a estos proyectos y están igualmente implicados en ambos. De hecho, 
algunos de ellos se centran en un proyecto y prácticamente ignoran el otro. Por ejemplo, 
considere a Gillies (2017, 2018), a quien he hecho referencia en la sección 1. Él analiza 
cuidadosamente como la evidencia de mecanismos puede contribuir a las inferencias 
causales y a la extrapolación causal, pero presta poca atención a los mecanismos en tanto 
que categoría ontológica. 
Sin embargo, a diferencia de enfoques mecanicistas previos, la nueva filosofía 
mecanicista se caracteriza por un énfasis generalizado en la práctica científica real 
(Machamer et al., 2000; Glennan, 2017; Psillos & Ioannidis, 2019). El objeto de interés 
primero de los nuevos mecanicistas es el mecanismo en tanto que concepto-en-uso en la 
ciencia, no en tanto que categoría metafísica abstracta. Ellos están interesados en qué son 
los mecanismos y para qué son (o podrían ser) buenos en la ciencia. Los nuevos 
mecanicistas se centran en la práctica científica y la toman como la principal referencia 
para abordar tanto las cuestiones metodológicas como las cuestiones ontológicas 
relacionadas con los mecanismos. Se entiende que las consideraciones ontológicas sobre 
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los mecanismos en tanto que constituyentes del mundo no pueden pasar por alto el rol de 
los mecanismos en la ciencia y las ideas de los científicos sobre ellos (Kaiser, 2018). Por 
ejemplo, el debate sobre qué tipo componentes constituyen los mecanismos y cuál es la 
relación entre ellos ―¿es un tipo más fundamental que el resto o están ontológicamente 
a la par?― está guiado por el criterio de adecuación descriptiva (véase, por ejemplo, 
Machamer et al., 2000). De acuerdo con este criterio, una propuesta satisfactoria ha de 
ajustarse a los ejemplos paradigmáticos de mecanismo estudiados por los científicos. 
La nueva filosofía mecanicista, igual que la filosofía mecanicista del siglo 
diecisiete, no es un movimiento completamente homogéneo. Los nuevos mecanicistas no 
tienen ideas e intereses idénticos. La nueva filosofía mecanicista es un marco dentro del 
cual distintas propuestas, las cuales pueden incluso entrar en conflicto, son defendidas. 
De hecho, aunque los nuevos mecanicistas están de acuerdo en la relevancia de los 
mecanismos, discrepan respecto a su definición. Dentro del nuevo marco mecanicista, ha 
habido diferentes intentos de ofrecer una caracterización satisfactoria de los mecanismos 
(Mahoney, 2001; Hedström & Ylikoski, 2010). Éstas son las definiciones más citadas: 
Mechanisms are entities and activities organized such that they are productive of 
regular changes from start or set-up to finish or termination conditions. (Machamer 
et al., 2000, p. 3) 
A mechanism for a behavior is a complex system that produces that behavior by the 
interaction of a number of parts, where the interaction between parts can be 
characterized by direct, invariant, change-relating generalizations. (Glennan, 2002, 
p. S344) 
A mechanism is a structure performing a function in virtue of its component parts, 
component operations, and their organization. The orchestrated functioning of the 
mechanism is responsible for one or more phenomena. (Bechtel & Abrahamsen, 
2005, p. 423) 
A mechanism for a phenomenon consists of entities and activities organized in such 
a way that they are responsible for the phenomenon. (Illari & Williamson, 2012, p. 
120) 
Sin embargo, a pesar de los desacuerdos entre los nuevos mecanicistas, algunas 
ideas generales son compartidas por la mayoría de ellos. En primer lugar, los mecanismos 
son parte del mundo real (Glennan, 2016, 2017; Glennan & Illari, 2018). Son concebidos 
como cosas particulares ubicadas en cierto punto del espacio y el tiempo. Los nuevos 
mecanicistas siempre diferencian entre un mecanismo, el cual es algo real, y un modelo 
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suyo, el cual es a menudo un fragmento de razonamiento científico. Aunque hay 
discrepancias respecto a la estabilidad atribuida a los mecanismos. Algunos nuevos 
mecanicistas consideran que todos los mecanismos son sistemas complejos, es decir, 
configuraciones estables de varios componentes. (p. ej. Bechtel & Abrahamsen, 2005). 
Pero otros argumentan que los procesos causales, que son menos estables y no pueden ser 
considerados objetos, también pueden constituir mecanismos (p. ej. Illari & Williamson, 
2012). En segundo lugar, los mecanismos están compuestos por entidades (o partes) y 
actividades (o interacciones) (Machamer et al., 2000; Illari & Williamson, 2012; Glennan, 
2017). Las entidades son cosas que toman parte en actividades. Normalmente están 
localizadas espaciotemporalmente, estructuradas y orientadas. Ejemplos de entidades son 
las neuronas, las empresas y los órganos. Las actividades son sucesos productivos. Tienen 
orden temporal, ritmo y duración. Ejemplos de actividades son transportar, irradiar y 
comprar. Las entidades y actividades de un mecanismo están organizadas. Esa 
organización puede tener muchos aspectos diferentes, tales como temporal, espacial, 
causal, etc. En tercer lugar, un mecanismo es siempre un mecanismo para un fenómeno 
(Glennan, 1996, 2017; Hedström & Ylikoski, 2010). Por ejemplo, el sistema digestivo es 
el mecanismo que sustenta el fenómeno de la digestión. La identificación y delimitación 
de un mecanismo dependen del fenómeno del cual es responsable. Un mecanismo no 
puede siquiera ser identificado sin indicar qué es lo que hace. Y, en cuarto lugar, hay 
diferencias significativas entre los mecanismos y las máquinas (Glennan, 2017; Craver & 
Tabery, 2019). Aunque las máquinas hechas por el hombre (p. ej. relojes) a menudo 
pueden considerarse mecanismos, la mayoría de los mecanismos estudiados en la ciencia 
no son máquinas. Su comportamiento no puede ser reducido a ciertas fuerzas mecánicas 
fundamentales. No obstante, la metáfora de la máquina es aún considerada una 
herramienta útil para ilustrar el comportamiento de los sistemas naturales complejos.  
Otra importante idea compartida por todos los nuevos mecanicistas es que los 
mecanismos están anidados y forman una jerarquía (Machamer et al., 2000; Glennan, 
2017). Los mecanismos pueden descomponerse en mecanismos de nivel inferior. Un 
mecanismo está compuesto de entidades y actividades organizadas, las cuales son 
responsables de sus propiedades y comportamiento. Y esos componentes son 
habitualmente ellos mismos mecanismos, cuyas propiedades y comportamiento también 
dependen de sus propios componentes. Por ejemplo, los componentes del sistema 
nervioso (celebro, médula espinal, nervios, transmisión de señales, etc.), los cuales son 
responsables de sus propiedades y comportamiento, son ellos mismos mecanismos. Sin 
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embargo, a diferencia de mecanicistas previos, los nuevos mecanicistas no defienden una 
concepción reduccionista del mundo (Andersen, 2014). Rechazan que sea posible reducir 
mecanismos de nivel superior a mecanismos de nivel inferior. Aunque hay relaciones 
ontológicas y explicativas entre niveles superiores e inferiores, esto no conlleva la 
eliminación de los niveles superiores ni su reducción a los niveles inferiores. Los nuevos 
mecanicistas se toman enserio la existencia de las cosas complejas. Sostienen que nuevos 
y diferentes tipos de entidades y actividades surgen en los diferentes niveles de 
organización. Además, los nuevos mecanicistas consideran que las explicaciones de nivel 
alto pueden ser perfectamente legítimas (Machamer et al., 2000); los científicos no tienen 
que apelar siempre a un nivel fundamental predeterminado (p. ej. la física fundamental). 
Qué se considera como componentes básicos depende del dominio y la motivación.  
A pesar de su novedad y originalidad, la nueva filosofía mecanicista entronca con 
la tradición mecanicista y hereda de ella algunas de sus ideas centrales. En este sentido, 
algunos aspectos importantes de la nueva filosofía mecanicista fueron anticipados por 
Salmon (1984, 1994, 1998). De hecho, respecto a la relación entre Salmon y los 
mecanicistas contemporáneos, Campaner ha afirmado que “his work already presents 
many interesting hints at what are now regarded as the crucial steps forward in dealing 
with mechanistic causation” (2013, p. 82). Salmon ya puso el énfasis en las nociones de 
producción e interacción, las cuales tienen un rol central en el nuevo enfoque mecanicista. 
Los nuevos mecanicistas subrayan la naturaleza activa de los mecanismos (Machamer, 
2004; Glennan, 2017). Dan cuenta de los mecanismos como entidades que toman parte 
en actividades o interacciones productivas. Además, en ambos casos la continuidad 
productiva es crucial. Tal y como se ha señalado, Salmon (1984, 1994) afirma que la 
continuidad espaciotemporal caracteriza a los procesos causales y los distingue de los 
pseudoprocesos. Los nuevos mecanicistas consideran que la continuidad productiva entre 
estadios hace inteligible su relación y es responsable de la regularidad de los mecanismos 
(Machamer et al., 2000). Otro aspecto de la nueva filosofía mecanicista que ya está 
presente en la propuesta de Salmon es el rol central de los contrafácticos activos o 
experimentales. En la versión original de su modelo mecánico causal, Salmon (1984) 
apela a contrafácticos experimentales para distinguir los procesos causales de los no 
causales. Y, en la nueva filosofía mecanicista, se considera que los contrafácticos 
intervencionistas son cruciales para identificar las variables relevantes y determinar los 
componentes de los mecanismos (Glennan, 2002; Craver, 2007). 
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Por lo que respecta a la explicación científica, Salmon (1984) también introduce 
muchas ideas posteriormente defendidas por la nueva filosofía mecanicista.3 Él afirma 
que, para desarrollar una concepción adecuada de la explicación científica, la práctica 
científica ha de ser tenida en cuenta y que en la mayoría de los campos científicos las 
explicaciones son mecanicistas. Salmon (1984, p. 175) también subraya las aspectos 
etiológicos y constitutivos de las explicaciones basadas en mecanismos. Para explicar por 
qué un evento E ocurrió, se han de identificar los procesos e interacciones causales 
relevantes en el pasado de E. Sin embargo, si uno quiere explicar por qué E posee ciertas 
características, ha de revelar los mecanismos causales internos que dan cuenta de la 
naturaleza de E. Otro aspecto anticipado por Salmon es reconocer la relevancia de la 
función y el contexto en los enfoques mecanicistas. Él (1998) argumenta que las 
explicaciones funcionales son explicaciones legítimas y constituyen un subconjunto de 
las explicaciones mecanicistas. Los nuevos mecanicistas, respecto al análisis funcional, 
afirman que puede ser crucial para delimitar los mecanismos y elaborar modelos 
mecanicistas explicativos (Bechtel & Abrahamsen, 2005). Por lo que refiere al contexto, 
Salmon (1984, 1989) considera que éste tiene un rol central en el análisis de los 
mecanismos. Argumenta que, aunque a los fenómenos subyace una estructura causal 
objetiva, los aspectos de la estructura causal que seleccionamos y el nivel de descripción 
que escogemos dependen del contexto. De forma similar, los nuevos mecanicistas 
afirman que el nivel de detalle adecuado en los modelos mecanicistas depende del 
contexto (Craver, 2001; Bogen, 2005). 
Sin embargo, es importante señalar que hay diferencias significativas entre el 
modelo mecánico causal de Salmon y la nueva filosofía mecanicista. Aunque Salmon 
también está preocupado por el rol de los mecanismos en la ciencia, su objeto de interés 
primero son categorías metafísicas (Psillos & Ioannidis, 2019). A diferencia del nuevo 
enfoque mecanicista, él empieza discutiendo los procesos y las interacciones causales 
como categorías metafísicas abstractas. Y, posteriormente, tomando ese análisis como 
marco de referencia, aborda las cuestiones metodológicas. Ambos enfoques mecanicistas 
también difieren en los campos científicos que toman como referencia. La propuesta de 
Salmon se centra en la física, en particular en un subcampo de ella: la mecánica clásica. 
Sin embargo, los nuevos mecanicistas consideran diversos campos, como la biología, la 
neurociencia y la sociología. También hay diferencias importantes respecto a la noción 
 
3 La concepción de la explicación científica de la nueva filosofía mecanicista y el rol central que en ella 
ocupan estas ideas serán discutidos en la sección 4. 
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misma de mecanismo (Glennan, 2002). Primero, mientras que los mecanicistas 
contemporáneos discuten cuidadosamente la caracterización de los mecanismos y su rol 
en la ciencia actual, Salmon presta poca atención a esas cuestiones. Él no proporciona 
una definición explícita de mecanismo, ni tiene en cuenta los diversos roles que juegan 
en la ciencia. Segundo, en la propuesta de Salmon, se considera que todos los mecanismos 
consisten en secuencias de procesos e interacciones causales (p. ej. una secuencia de 
colisiones entre partículas). Sin embargo, los nuevos mecanicistas mantienen que los 
mecanismos pueden ser configuraciones estables de entidades y actividades (p. ej. una 
célula).4 Finalmente, aunque las interacciones causales son importantes en ambas 
propuestas, éstas no son entidades del mismo modo. En el nuevo enfoque mecanicista, 
las interacciones son a menudo caracterizadas en términos de generalizaciones invariantes 
de cambio relativo (Woodward, 2003). 
 
4. La nueva concepción mecanicista de la explicación científica 
De acuerdo con la nueva filosofía mecanicista, el papel de los mecanismos en la ciencia 
está a menudo asociado al objetivo científico de explicar. Al igual que mecanicistas 
previos, los nuevos mecanicistas defienden una concepción mecanicista de la explicación. 
Ellos consideran que un fenómeno se explica por medio de especificar el mecanismo 
responsable de él. En este sentido, MDC afirman: “To give a description of a mechanism 
for a phenomenon is to explain that phenomenon” (Machamer et al., 2000, p. 3). La 
concepción mecanicista de la explicación se opone al modelo de cobertura legal y a los 
acercamientos estadísticos a la explicación científica (Bechtel & Abrahamsen, 2005; 
Hedström, 2005). Las explicaciones nomológicas y las estadísticas son ‘explicaciones de 
caja negra’. Conectan las condiciones iniciales con el resultado final por medio de leyes 
universales o generalizaciones estadísticas. Sin embargo, los procesos a través de los 
cuales el explanans y el explanandum están realmente conectados no son abordados por 
ellas. Se considera que esa conexión carece de estructura o que su estructura es 
irrelevante. Por el contrario, las explicaciones mecanicistas son explicaciones-como. 
Ellas especifican “how some phenomenon comes about” (Glennan, 2017, p. 228). Las 
explicaciones mecanicistas abren la caja negra entre explanans y explanandum, y detallan 
los procesos que dan lugar a este último. Un ejemplo paradigmático de explicación basada 
 
4 Aunque algunos nuevos mecanicistas están de acuerdo en que ciertos procesos causales pueden ser 
considerados mecanismos, ellos no sostienen que todos los mecanismos sean procesos causales. Como se 
ha señalado, reconocen que muchos mecanismos son sistemas complejos estables.  
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en mecanismos es la explicación que Salganik, Dodds y Watts ofrecen de la desigualdad 
de éxito en los mercados culturales (véase la sección 1). Los autores especifican las 
tuercas y los tornillos sociales del proceso causal a través del cual ese macrofenómeno 
social es producido. Detallan como la conducta (no independiente) de los consumidores 
individuales produce que los productos culturales exitosos sean varias veces más exitosos 
que la media. 
Por lo que respecta a la relación entre los mecanismos y los fenómenos de interés, 
las explicaciones basadas en mecanismos pueden ser causales o constitutivas (Ylikoski, 
2013). Tanto la causación como la constitución son relaciones de dependencia, pero hay 
diferencias metafísicas importantes entre ellas. La causación es habitualmente una 
relación entre eventos, requiere tiempo y es asimétrica respecto a la manipulación (se 
puede producir un cambio en el efecto manipulando la causa, pero no al revés). Por otro 
lado, la constitución es frecuentemente una relación entre propiedades, es sincrónica y es 
simétrica respecto a la manipulación (se puede producir un cambio en el todo 
manipulando una parte, y al revés). Dependiendo de la relación entre el mecanismo 
identificado y el fenómeno de interés, una explicación es o una explicación mecanicista 
causal o una explicación mecanicista constitutiva. 
Entre los nuevos mecanicistas, no existe consenso en relación a la naturaleza de las 
explicaciones mecanicistas (Illari, 2013). Siguiendo a Salmon (1984), algunos nuevos 
mecanicistas consideran que las explicaciones mecanicistas son ónticas. Estos 
argumentan que las explicaciones basadas en mecanismos explican porque encajan el 
fenómeno explanandum en la estructura causal del mundo. Para estos autores, las 
explicaciones son porciones objetivas de la estructura causal del mundo. En este sentido, 
Craver afirma: “Objective explanations are not texts; they are full-bodied things” (2007, 
p. 27). Sin embargo, otros nuevos mecanicistas consideran que las explicaciones basadas 
en mecanismos son explicaciones epistémicas. Estos mantienen que “[e]xplanation is 
fundamentally an epistemics activity” (Bechtel, 2008) y que las explicaciones basadas en 
mecanismos explican porque aumentan nuestro entendimiento del mundo. Para los 
defensores de la concepción epistémica, las explicaciones mecanicistas no son porciones 
de la estructura causal del mundo, sino representaciones de esas porciones (p. ej. textos). 
Las explicaciones mecanicistas son habitualmente representadas mediante modelos 
mecanicistas. Un modelo mecanicista consta de dos componentes: una descripción 
fenoménica y una descripción mecanicista (Glennan, 2017). La descripción fenoménica 
es un modelo del fenómeno de interés, mientras que la descripción mecanicista es un 
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modelo del mecanismo responsable de ese fenómeno. En las explicaciones basadas en 
mecanismos, la descripción fenoménica está relacionada con el explanandum y la 
descripción mecanicista con el explanans. Sin embargo, no hay consenso sobre los 
detalles de esas relaciones. Para la concepción óntica de las explicaciones mecanicistas, 
la descripción fenoménica representaría el explanandum y la descripción mecanicista 
representaría el explanans. Sin embargo, para la concepción epistémica, la descripción 
fenoménica y la mecanicista serían ellas mismas el explanandum y el explanans 
respectivamente. 
 
5. La voluntad de generalidad y la heterogeneidad de las áreas científicas 
Un aspecto central de la nueva filosofía mecanicista que no ha sido abordado con 
anterioridad y merece atención es la voluntad de generalidad. Los nuevos mecanicistas 
consideran que los mecanismos son relevantes en la mayoría de las áreas científicas y 
tratan de plantear un enfoque mecanicista que las englobe a todas. La búsqueda de 
generalidad y amplia aplicabilidad se manifiesta en la mayoría de las propuestas 
desarrolladas en el marco de la nueva filosofía mecanicista. Cuando los nuevos 
mecanicistas abordan cuestiones como la explicación, la inferencia causal o el 
descubrimiento científico, tratan de dar una respuesta que se aplique a todos los campos 
de la ciencia donde los mecanismos son relevantes. 
 
5.1. Nociones generales de mecanismo 
Un aspecto de la nueva filosofía mecanicista, especialmente del nuevo mecanismo, que 
ilustra la voluntad de generalidad es la caracterización de los mecanismos. La búsqueda 
de generalidad está presente en la mayoría de las nociones de mecanismo actuales. Los 
nuevos mecanicistas consideran que una noción de mecanismo apropiada debería ser 
adecuada para la mayoría de las áreas donde los mecanismos son relevantes. Y, en 
consecuencia, tratan de desarrollaran una noción general de mecanismo que englobe los 
diversos tipos de mecanismo. Este aspecto del nuevo enfoque mecanicista es discutido en 
“The Search for Generality in the Notion of Mechanism” (anexo 1). 
A pesar de que la búsqueda de generalidad es un rasgo común a las 
caracterizaciones de mecanismo actuales, no siempre es perseguido mediante la misma 
estrategia. Dentro de la nueva filosofía mecanicista, encontramos dos estrategias para 
desarrollar nociones generales de mecanismo: la estrategia de extrapolación y la 
estrategia a-través-de-las-ciencias. La estrategia de extrapolación consiste en desarrollar 
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una noción de mecanismo tomando una o unas pocas áreas de la ciencia como referencia, 
y luego aplicar esa noción a muchas otras áreas. Esta estrategia va de un tipo particular 
de mecanismos a una noción general de mecanismo. MDC (2000), por ejemplo, adoptan 
la estrategia de extrapolación. Su noción de mecanismo fue desarrollada tomando como 
guía los mecanismos neurobiológicos y moleculares. Sin embargo, ellos consideran que 
esa noción se ajusta a muchas otras áreas: “We suspect that this analysis is applicable to 
many other sciences, and maybe even to cognitive or social mechanisms” (Machamer et 
al., 2000, p. 2). La estrategia de extrapolación también ha sido adoptada por otros autores 
como Glennan (1996, 2002) y Woodward (2002). 
Por otro lado, la estrategia a-través-de-las-ciencias consiste en considerar los 
mecanismos de todas las ciencias y desarrollar una noción que incluya sus rasgos 
comunes. Esta estrategia va de todos los mecanismos a una noción general de mecanismo. 
La estrategia a-través-de-las-ciencias fue introducida por Illari y Williamson (2012). Su 
objetivo es considerar los mecanismos en general y proponer “a characterization that 
gives an understanding of what is common to mechanisms in all fields” (Illari & 
Williamson, 2012, p. 120). La estrategia a-través-de-las-ciencias ha sido recientemente 
adoptada por Glennan (2017). Ha abandonado su noción de mecanismo previa (véase la 
sección 3), y propone una caracterización mínima, la cual trata de incluir aquello que es 
común a todos los mecanismos. 
La búsqueda de generalidad es muy razonable. Hay muchos tipos de mecanismos 
en la ciencia (p. ej. mecanismos sociales, mecanismos neuronales, mecanismos 
evolutivos, etc.). Una noción que pudiera dar cuenta de todos ellos sería de utilidad tanto 
para la investigación científica como para la comprensión filosófica. Facilitaría la 
colaboración entre diferentes áreas de la ciencia donde los mecanismos son relevantes. 
Además, una noción general de mecanismo ayudaría a abordar diferentes cuestiones 
filosóficas (p. ej. la explicación científica). Sin embargo, las dos estrategias sugeridas 
para alcanzar la generalidad encuentran importantes dificultades. 
El principal problema de la estrategia de extrapolación es que las nociones de 
mecanismo desarrolladas tomando cierto tipo de mecanismos como referencia no se 
ajustan a muchos otros tipos. Para analizar las dificultades de la estrategia de 
extrapolación, tomo como referencia la propuesta de MDC (véase la sección 3). Tal y 
como se ha señalado, MDC consideran que su noción de mecanismo podría aplicarse en 
la mayoría de las áreas científicas. Sin embargo, es dudoso que sea así. Por ejemplo, la 
noción de MDC es incapaz de dar cuenta de los mecanismos económicos. Un ejemplo 
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bien conocido de mecanismo económico son los mecanismos de transmisión monetaria. 
Un mecanismo de transmisión monetaria es un mecanismo responsable de la influencia 
de un banco central en la producción, el empleo, los precios y la inflación de un país o 
una unión política y económica (Samuelson & Nordhaus, 2010, p. 484). Podría parecer 
que la noción de MDC se ajusta a ellos, pero difícilmente es ese el caso. 
MDC afirman que los mecanismos son regulares. Lane DesAutels (2016) ha 
mostrado que para satisfacer su requisito de regularidad un mecanismo ha de ser regular 
respecto al proceso y no verse afectado por fuentes internas de irregularidad. Sin embargo, 
los mecanismos de transmisión monetaria no son regulares respecto al proceso y se ven 
afectados por fuentes internas de irregularidad. Las entidades componentes de los 
mecanismos de transmisión monetaria (p. ej. los bancos centrales) no se comportan 
siempre de la misma manera. Además, los cambios en sus componentes son a menudo 
resultado de fuentes internas; por ejemplo, cambios en los órganos de decisión. 
Otro aspecto de la propuesta de MDC que no se ajusta a los mecanismos de 
transmisión monetaria es el establecimiento de los límites de los mecanismos. Craver 
(2007) mantiene que el mecanismo de cierto fenómeno está compuesto por las entidades, 
actividades y rasgos organizacionales que son parte del sistema cuyo comportamiento 
constituye ese fenómeno y son relevantes para el fenómeno. Sin embargo, esa idea no se 
ajusta a los mecanismos de transmisión monetaria. Un mecanismo de transmisión 
monetaria es un mecanismo de cierto fenómeno, a saber, la influencia de un banco central 
en la producción, el empleo, los precios y la inflación. Pero no está compuesto por todas 
las entidades, actividades y aspectos organizacionales que son parte del sistema (p. ej. un 
país) cuyo comportamiento es el fenómeno de interés y son relevantes para ese fenómeno. 
Por lo que respecta a la estrategia a-través-de-las-ciencias, el principal problema es 
que las nociones de mecanismo son vacuas y demasiado amplias. Para discutir las 
dificultades de la estrategia a-través-de-las-ciencias, tomo como referencia la propuesta 
de Illari y Williamson (véase la sección 3). La definición de mecanismo de Illari y 
Williamson descansa sobre los conceptos de entidad, actividad, organización y ser 
responsable de. Sin embargo, no ofrecen una caracterización adecuada de esos conceptos. 
No ofrecen ni una definición de ellos, ni un conjunto de condiciones necesarias o 
suficientes para ser cierto tipo de componente. Consecuentemente, la noción se torna 
vacua. Se aumenta su alcance a costa de disminuir su precisión. Además, la noción de 
Illari y Williamson es demasiado amplia. Aunque ellos consideran que su caracterización 
“is not so broad that it captures non-mechanisms” (Illari & Williamson, 2012, p. 129), 
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ésta subsume cosas que difícilmente aceptaríamos como mecanismos. Por ejemplo, su 
noción admitiría como mecanismo a un grupo de bebes durmiendo la siesta. 
El objetivo de Illari y Williamson es desarrollar una noción amplia de mecanismo 
que englobe a los mecanismos de todas las áreas. Sin embargo, a pesar de que parece que 
están dispuestos a disminuir la precisión de la noción de mecanismo para aumentar su 
alcance, su noción no permite dar cuenta de varios tipos de mecanismos. No evita el 
problema de la estrategia de extrapolación. Illari y Williamson, como MDC, afirman que 
el mecanismo de un fenómeno está compuesto por los componentes (entidades, 
actividades y rasgos organizacionales) que son relevantes para tal fenómeno. Sin 
embargo, tal y como se ha señalado, esta idea no se ajusta a los límites de los mecanismos 
económicos. 
Las dificultades enfrentadas por la búsqueda de generalidad en la noción de 
mecanismo socaban un frecuente argumento en favor de la nueva concepción mecanicista 
de la explicación científica.5 A menudo se afirma que la nueva concepción mecanicista 
de la explicación es capaz de englobar las explicaciones de muchas áreas de la ciencia 
(Hedström & Ylikoski, 2011). Dado que los mecanismos son relevantes en muchas áreas, 
los nuevos mecanicistas argumentan que el enfoque mecanicista podría ser adoptado en 
la mayoría de los campos científicos. Esta idea también favorece el enfoque mecanicista 
frente a otras alternativas. Por ejemplo, un conocido problema del modelo de cobertura 
legal es que existen áreas de la ciencia donde solo se conocen unas pocas leyes, como la 
biología evolutiva (véase Scriven, 1959; Beatty, 1995). Una concepción nomológica de 
la explicación difícilmente podría ser adoptada en esos campos. Sin embargo, a menudo 
se conocen muchos mecanismos en esas áreas en las que no hay leyes disponibles. La 
propuesta mecanicista sería más ampliamente aplicable que las alternativas nomológicas. 
Este habitual argumento descansa sobre la asunción de que la misma noción de 
mecanismo existe en todos los campos en que los mecanismos son relevantes. Se 
considera que el enfoque mecanicista podría ofrecer una concepción unificadora de la 
explicación porque en muchos campos los fenómenos podrían ser explicados por medio 
de mecanismos. Pero sería una propuesta unificadora solo si los mecanismos son 
similarmente entendidos en todas las áreas. Si las diversas áreas entendieran los 
 
5 La falta de éxito de la búsqueda de generalidad también socaba otras propuestas relacionadas con la nueva 
filosofía mecanicista. Por ejemplo, cuestiona la idea de que el nuevo enfoque mecanicista pueda 
proporcionar un marco para la integración de diferentes campos. Véase Pérez-González (en prensa) para el 
análisis de un caso partícular; la integración basada en mecanismos de la neurociencia y la ciencia social. 
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mecanismos de modos muy diferentes, la concepción mecanicista difícilmente sería 
unificadora. Sin embargo, esa asunción fundamental ―los mecanismos son similarmente 
entendidos en todas las áreas― es cuestionada por las dificultades a las que se enfrenta 
la búsqueda de generalidad. La búsqueda de generalidad constituye el verdadero intento 
de identificar esa idea compartida de mecanismo. Los nuevos mecanicistas tratan de 
proponer una noción de mecanismo que se ajuste a la mayoría de las áreas en que los 
mecanismos son relevantes. Sin embargo, tal y como se ha argumentado, todas las 
estrategias para alcanzar la generalidad encuentran importantes dificultades. Esto 
significa que la asunción de que la misma noción de mecanismo es compartida por todos 
los campos no está justificada y requiere un mayor apoyo. No solo es que no se conozca 
tal noción, sino que muchos intentos de alcanzarla han fracasado. 
 
5.2. Enfoques mecanicistas en biología evolutiva 
Un campo de la ciencia donde el enfoque mecanicista y la aplicación de las nociones 
generales de mecanismo son especialmente controvertidos es la biología evolutiva. Los 
biólogos evolutivos a veces hablan de las causas evolutivas como mecanismos. Por 
ejemplo, se dice que la selección natural “is a powerful mechanism of evolution” (Herron 
& Freeman, 2014, p. 227) y que ella “is an effective mechanism for producing adaptation” 
(Bell, 2008, p. 499). Siguiendo este uso, algunos nuevos mecanicistas han tratado de 
desarrollar una concepción mecanicista de las causas evolutivas. En “Evolutionary causes 
as mechanisms: a critical analysis” (anexo 2), Victor J. Luque y yo analizamos los 
actuales acercamientos mecanicistas a la evolución causal, los cuales se centran 
principalmente en la selección natural, y exploramos su validez para dar cuenta de las 
causas evolutivas. Identificamos tres tipos diferentes de enfoques: la visión estocástica, 
la visión funcional y la visión minimalista. Los dos primeros están relacionados con la 
estrategia de extrapolación, mientras que el último ejemplifica la estrategia a-través-de-
las-ciencias. 
La visión estocástica se basa en la idea de que, dado que la selección natural es 
estocástica, sería posible dar cuenta de ella por medio de una versión estocástica de las 
actuales nociones de mecanismo. Se considera que rebajando la exigencia de regularidad 
es posible entender la selección natural como un mecanismo en el sentido planteado por 
MDC (2000) y Glennan (2002). El principal defensor de la visión estocástica es Benjamin 
Barros (2008). Barros distingue entre mecanismos estocásticos sesgados ―mecanismos 
estocásticos que conceden a un resultado una probabilidad mayor al 50%― y mecanismos 
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estocásticos no sesgados. Él considera que la selección natural puede ser entendida como 
un mecanismo estocástico sesgado. Sin embargo, su concepción de la selección natural 
encuentra importantes dificultades. Algunas de esas dificultades están relacionadas con 
la caracterización de la selección natural a nivel poblacional. Barros considera que la 
selección natural es un mecanismo de dos niveles; implica tanto el nivel individual como 
el poblacional. Y afirma que, a nivel poblacional, la selección natural tiene poblaciones 
como entidades componentes. Pero entender la selección natural como un mecanismo 
cuyas entidades componentes son poblaciones da lugar a varios problemas.  Primero, 
identifica el objeto del fenómeno global del mecanismo con los componentes del 
mecanismo. Y segundo, implica aceptar que un sistema concreto ―un mecanismo de 
selección natural― está compuesto por entidades abstractas ―poblaciones― y sus 
relaciones.  
Podría pensarse que un enfoque estocástico distinto, que eludiera los diversos 
problemas de la propuesta de Barros, podría dar cuenta de la selección natural y de las 
otras causas evolutivas. Sin embargo, difícilmente sería ese el caso. Cualquier intento de 
entender las causas evolutivas como mecanismos mediante un enfoque estocástico 
descansaría en la asunción de que esas causas son estocásticas. Y esa idea también parece 
problemática. El carácter estocástico de la selección natural y otras causas evolutivas (p. 
ej. la mutación) no está suficientemente respaldado, especialmente por parte del aparato 
matemático de la genética de poblaciones. En genética de poblaciones, la mayoría de las 
causas evolutivas son habitualmente representadas de forma determinista. Además, la 
práctica biológica también arroja dudas sobre la interpretación estocástica de algunas 
causas evolutivas. Cuando los biólogos tratan con poblaciones reales, frecuentemente 
entienden de manera determinista causas evolutivas como la selección natural, la 
migración o la mutación (e.g. Dobzhansky & Pavlovsky, 1957). Consideran que la 
estocasticidad de los caminos evolutivos de las poblaciones es principalmente un efecto 
de la deriva genética. 
La visión funcional, inspirada por los enfoques mecanicistas funcionales (p. ej. 
Bechtel & Abrahamsen, 2005), trata de caracterizar la selección natural como un 
mecanismo MDC. Considera que la selección natural lleva a cabo una función ―producir 
adaptación― y que ella proporciona las bases para abordar el mecanismo de selección 
natural. Illari y Williamson (2010) argumentan que, en la medida en que tiene una 
función, la selección natural puede ser descompuesta en entidades y actividades 
organizadas. Ellos consideran que los componentes de un mecanismo pueden ser 
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identificados e individualizados en base a su función, es decir, su contribución a la 
función del mecanismo en su conjunto. Por lo tanto, dado que la selección natural tiene 
la función de producir adaptación, es descomponible en entidades (p. ej. organismos) y 
actividades (p. ej. reproducción) que contribuyen a ella. Illari y Williamson también 
consideran que tomando como referencia la función de un mecanismo es posible atribuirle 
organización. Ellos definen organización como “whatever features exist by which the 
activities and entities each do something and do something together to produce the 
phenomenon” (Illari & Williamson, 2010, p. 289). La selección natural, en la medida en 
que tiene una función, es un mecanismo organizado. Tomando como referencia la 
concepción funcional de la selección natural y las tesis defendidas por Illari y Williamson, 
DesAutels (2016) argumenta que la selección natural también satisface el requisito de 
regularidad de MDC. La selección natural es regular respecto al proceso y su regularidad 
no se ve amenazada por fuentes internas. DesAutels afirma que “natural selection only 
fails to be regular in ways that are unthreatening to its status as MDC mechanism” 
(DesAutels, 2016, p. 16). No siempre producir el mismo resultado y ser susceptible a 
fuentes externas de irregularidad no amenaza significativamente su naturaleza regular. 
El principal problema de la visión funcional guarda relación con la función 
atribuida a la selección natural. Los defensores de la visión funcional consideran que 
mejorar la adaptación es la función primaria de la selección natural. Ésta es la piedra 
angular de su enfoque y, en última instancia, todos sus argumentos descansan sobre ella. 
No obstante, esta idea es muy problemática. La selección natural no necesariamente 
mejora la adaptación. Se trata de un resultado potencial (pero no necesario) del proceso 
de selección natural (Gould & Lloyd, 1999). La selección natural actúa sobre la eficacia 
reproductiva [fitness], aunque pueda indirectamente influir en otros rasgos como la 
capacidad para adaptarse a un determinado medio (Gillsepie, 2004). Invariablemente 
conduce al éxito reproductivo no arbitrario, pero solo ocasionalmente conduce a la 
adaptación. 
La visión funcional también encontraría dificultades para dar cuenta de otras causas 
evolutivas. Este enfoque requeriría asignar funciones a esas causas. Sin embargo, cada 
causa evolutiva produce numerosos resultados y es difícil identificar uno de ellos como 
su función. Por ejemplo, la migración introduce variación genética en una población, 
reduce el grado de diferencia entre poblaciones, favorece la hibridación, etc. La visión 
funcional también tendría dificultades para identificar y delimitar los mecanismos 
evolutivos. Como se ha señalado, un mecanismo es siempre un mecanismo para un 
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fenómeno (véase la sección 3). Y los defensores de la visión funcional consideran que un 
mecanismo está compuesto por las entidades, actividades y aspectos organizacionales que 
contribuyen al fenómeno del cual el mecanismo es responsable. Esto significa que el 
mecanismo responsable de cada resultado atribuido a una causa evolutiva particular sería 
distinto. Sin embargo, esa consideración no se ajusta a las ideas de los biólogos 
evolutivos; ellos consideran que el mismo proceso evolutivo es responsable de todos esos 
resultados.  
Finalmente, la visión minimalista consiste en aplicar en biología evolutiva una 
noción general de mecanismo desarrollada mediante la estrategia a-través-de-las-
ciencias. Glennan (2017), por ejemplo, propone una caracterización mínima que busca 
incluir aquello que todos los mecanismos tienen en común. Él considera que esa 
definición mínima es “broad enough to capture most of the wide range of things scientists 
have called mechanisms” (Glennan, 2017, p. 18), incluyendo los mecanismos evolutivos. 
Ciertamente, la noción mínima de Glennan incluye aspectos generales que están a 
menudo presentes en los mecanismos (p. ej. organización). Sin embargo, su propuesta no 
tiene en cuenta los rasgos específicos de los mecanismos evolutivos y difícilmente puede 
dar cuenta de ellos. Por ejemplo, la noción de Glennan de entidad (o parte) componente 
de un mecanismo no se ajusta a las partes de las causas evolutivas. Él afirma que las 
entidades deben ser estables. La estabilidad requerida depende del mecanismo en el cual 
están ubicadas. Una entidad componente de un mecanismo es suficientemente estable si 
sus propiedades y límites permanecen estables mientras tiene lugar el fenómeno del cual 
el mecanismo es responsable. Sin embargo, la aplicación de ese requisito a las partes de 
las causas evolutivas sería problemática. En primer lugar, tal y como se ha señalado, las 
causas evolutivas son responsables de varios fenómenos con diferentes duraciones. En 
consecuencia, sería muy difícil determinar que grado de estabilidad debe ser demandado 
a una entidad. Y, en segundo lugar, las propiedades de las partes de las causas evolutivas 
no siempre permanecen estables mientras tales causas y los fenómenos de los que son 
responsables están teniendo lugar. Por ejemplo, como resultado de la plasticidad 
fenotípica, el color o la altura de un organismo individual podría cambiar durante un 
proceso de migración (Pigliucci, 2001). 
 
5.3. Explicaciones mecanicistas en ciencia social 
La voluntad de generalidad de la nueva filosofía mecanicista encuentra importantes 
dificultades. Tal y como se ha mostrado, el nuevo enfoque mecanicista difícilmente puede 
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dar cuenta de los mecanismos y sus roles en algunas áreas de la ciencia. Los mecanismos 
(y los roles que tienen) difieren significativamente de un campo de la ciencia a otro. Por 
lo tanto, las consideraciones generales que pasan por alto esta heterogeneidad son 
habitualmente problemáticas. Dado este escenario, parece que, para dar abordar una 
cuestión metodológica, es crucial tener en cuenta los rasgos específicos del área (o áreas) 
de interés. Este enfoque es adoptado en “Mechanistic explanations and components of 
social mechanisms” (anexo 3). En este artículo, discuto algunos aspectos de las 
explicaciones basadas en mecanismos en ciencia social, tomando la práctica de los 
científicos sociales como referencia. En particular, abordo la cuestión de cuales han de 
ser los componentes de los mecanismos sociales en las explicaciones mecanicistas de 
macrofenómenos sociales (en adelante “la cuestión de los componentes”). 
La cuestión de los componentes ha sido abordada principalmente en el marco de la 
sociología analítica. Una idea central de la sociología analítica es el principio de las 
explicaciones basadas en mecanismos (Hedström, 2005; Hedström & Bearman, 2009; 
Hedström & Ylikoski, 2011). Como se ha señalado en la sección 3, los sociólogos 
analíticos defienden la concepción mecanicista de la explicación. Consideran que un 
macrofenómeno social es explicado por medio de especificar el mecanismo que lo 
produce. El otro principio fundamental de la sociología analítica es el individualismo 
estructural (Hedström, 2005; Hedström & Ylikoski, 2010; Hedström & Ylikoski, 2011). 
Se trata de una versión débil del individualismo metodológico. El individualismo 
estructural considera que los macronfómenos sociales deben ser explicados en términos 
de interacciones entre agentes individuales. Sin embargo, a diferencia de otras versiones 
del individualismo metodológico, admite que no todos los hechos explicativos son sobre 
individuos en un sentido estricto. Las relaciones y las estructuras relacionales pueden ser 
explicativamente relevantes. 
El principio de las explicaciones basadas en mecanismos y el individualismo 
estructural no se consideran independientes. Mantienen que el principio de las 
explicaciones basadas en mecanismos implica el individualismo estructural. El principal 
argumento en respaldo de esta idea es que solo hay mecanismos sociales en el nivel de 
los individuos (Hedström & Swedberg, 1998b; Hedström, 2005). Es decir, demandar 
explicaciones mecanicistas en ciencia social significa demandar explicaciones en 
términos de individuos, sus propiedades, sus acciones y sus relaciones. En consecuencia, 
sostener la concepción mecanicista de la explicación en ciencia social requeriría un 
compromiso con el individualismo estructural. La adopción del individualismo 
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estructural conduce a una determinada respuesta a la cuestión de los componentes: un 
mecanismo social en una explicación mecanicista de un macrofenómeno social debe estar 
compuesto de individuos, sus propiedades, sus interacciones y sus relaciones mutuas. Esta 
es la posición inicial de la sociología analítica respecto de la cuestión de los componentes.  
En respuesta a la posición inicial de los sociólogos analíticos en relación a la 
cuestión de los componentes, varios autores han cuestionado que el principio de las 
explicaciones basadas en mecanismos implique el individualismo estructural (Vromen, 
2010; Kaidesoja, 2013). Han argumentado que no todos los mecanismos sociales se hallan 
en el nivel de los individuos. Hay mecanismos sociales cuyos componentes se encuentran 
en niveles superiores; por ejemplo, una coalición de partidos políticos. Por lo tanto, el 
principal argumento de los sociólogos analíticos en respaldo de la implicación entre 
ambos principios no se sostendría y, en consecuencia, su posición inicial respecto a la 
cuestión de los componentes no estaría justificada. 
Dadas las críticas a su posición inicial respecto a la cuestión de los componentes, 
diferentes respuestas han sido dadas por los sociólogos analíticos. Michael Schmid (2011) 
presenta un nuevo argumento en respaldo de la posición inicial de la sociología analítica. 
Él también adopta el principio del individualismo estructural, el cual conduce a esa 
posición, pero su argumento no se basa en que solo haya mecanismos sociales en el nivel 
de los individuos. Primero, Schmid afirma que un aspecto de las explicaciones basadas 
en mecanismos en ciencia social es que requieren “laws indicating which factors 
ultimately ‘produce’ or ‘generate’ a relevant event” (2011, p. 137). En las explicaciones 
mecanicistas, es necesario especificar conexiones nomológicas. Y segundo, él argumenta 
que, estrictamente hablando, no conocemos ninguna ley social, es decir, una ley que 
gobierne el curso de macroprocesos sociales. En ciencia social, solo hay disponibles leyes 
de acción individual. A partir de esas premisas, Schmid concluye el principio del 
individualismo estructural respecto a las explicaciones basadas en mecanismos. El 
individualismo estructural, tal y como se ha señalado, conduce a la posición inicial de la 
sociología analítica. 
El nuevo argumento planteado por Schmid es válido. La verdad de las premisas 
respalda la verdad de la conclusión. Si las premisas fueran verdaderas, se seguiría el 
principio del individualismo estructural. Sin embargo, una de las premisas del argumento 
es probablemente falsa. La primera premisa, que se supone que presenta un rasgo de las 
explicaciones basadas en mecanismos, es difícilmente correcta. Las explicaciones 
basadas en mecanismos no es necesario que incluyan leyes (Halina, 2018). En una 
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explicación mecanicista, el explanandum es explicado por medio de revelar el mecanismo 
que es responsable de él, y para ello no hace falta especificar leyes. No es necesario 
mostrar que las actividades en las cuales toman parte las entidades están regidas por leyes. 
Por ejemplo, considere la explicación mecanicista de Mann (2004) de la propiedad de 
algunos países (p. ej. Gran Bretaña) en el periodo de entreguerras de no ser susceptibles 
de que los fascistas tomaran el poder. Él refiere a un mecanismo cuyos principales 
componentes son los partidos políticos de esos países y algunas de sus propiedades (p. ej. 
estar acostumbrados a ceder el poder soberano). Sin embargo, no se especifica ninguna 
conexión nomológica entre las propiedades de los partidos políticos y la susceptibilidad 
de los países a que los fascistas tomaran el poder. 
Petri Ylikoski (2012), a diferencia de Schmid, defiende una versión modificada de 
la posición inicial de la sociología analítica respecto a la cuestión de los componentes. 
Ylikoski (2012, 2013) considera que las explicaciones mecanicistas de macrofenómenos 
sociales pueden ser causales o constitutivas. Y tomando esa distinción como referencia, 
aborda la cuestión de los componentes. En primer lugar, discute las explicaciones 
mecanicistas constitutivas de macrofenómenos sociales. Él considera que “[t]he 
explanantia in constitutive explanations are always at the micro level” (Ylikoski 2012, p. 
35). Por lo tanto, afirma que en las explicaciones mecanicistas constitutivas los 
componentes de los mecanismos sociales han de hallarse a nivel micro. En segundo lugar, 
Ylikoski aborda las explicaciones mecanicistas causales de macrofenómenos sociales. Él 
reconoce que, en las explicaciones causales, el explanans no está siempre a nivel micro. 
Sin embargo, considera que las explicaciones mecanicistas causales de macrofenómenos 
sociales requieren “microfundamentos”. Apelar a entidades, propiedades, actividades y 
relaciones de nivel micro es esencial para entender como se mantienen las relaciones 
causales de dependencia contrafáctica. En consecuencia, argumenta que en las 
explicaciones mecanicistas causales los componentes de los mecanismos deben hallarse 
a nivel micro. Ylikoski concluye que, en las explicaciones mecanicistas (constitutivas o 
causales) de macrofenómenos sociales, los mecanismos sociales han de estar compuestos 
de entidades, propiedades, actividades y relaciones de nivel micro. 
La propuesta de Ylikoski es menos rígida que la posición inicial de la sociología 
analítica respecto a la cuestión de los componentes. Él mantiene que los componentes de 
los mecanismos sociales han de ser entidades, propiedades, actividades y relaciones a 
nivel micro. Sin embargo, considera que no hay un único y predeterminado nivel micro. 
La distinción entre micro y macro es entendida como una cuestión de escala. Qué se 
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considera como un microcomponente depende del fenómeno explanandum (y de los 
intereses explicativos). La propuesta perspectivista de Ylikoski evita las principales 
dificultades de la posición inicial de la sociología analítica ―es compatible con el hecho 
de que no todos los mecanismos sociales se hallen al nivel de los individuos― y del 
argumento de Schmid ―no demanda que las explicaciones mecanicistas incluyan 
leyes―. No obstante, su propuesta también tiene problemas relevantes. 
El principal problema de la propuesta de Ylikoski es que es muy vaga y, en 
consecuencia, no constituye una respuesta adecuada a la cuestión de los componentes. La 
noción de ‘nivel micro’ no es caracterizada adecuadamente. La relación micro-macro es 
definida como un tipo particular de diferencia de escala, pero no se especifican con 
claridad los rasgos que la caracterizan y la distinguen de otras diferencias de escala. Otro 
aspecto problemático de la propuesta de Ylikoski es que no proporciona una guía para la 
construcción de explicaciones mecanicistas. Por un lado, tal y como se ha señalado, no es 
lo suficientemente concreta. Nunca es seguro si cierto componente se halla en el nivel 
micro o no. Y, por otro lado, para identificar el nivel micro haría falta especificar 
previamente el explanans y el explanandum. Para pertenecer al nivel micro, un 
componente debe ser explicativamente relevante para el macrofenómeno explanandum. 
Finalmente, la propuesta de Ylikoski no se ajusta a muchas explicaciones de 
macrofenómenos sociales basadas en mecanismos. En ciencia social, las explicaciones 
mecanicistas causales de macroeventos a menudo incluyen entidades, propiedades, 
actividades o relaciones que difícilmente se hallan a nivel micro. Por ejemplo, considere 
la explicación mecanicista que McCright y Dunlap (2003) dan de la no ratificación del 
Protocolo de Kioto por parte del senado de los EUA. Ellos especifican como los think 
tanks conservadores (y su colaboración con los escépticos del cambio climático) 
produjeron la redefinición del calentamiento global como no problemático, y como esta 
redefinición influyó en la arena política y condujo a la no ratificación del protocolo. En 
la explicación de McCright y Dunlap la mayoría de los componentes del mecanismo 
social (p. ej. think tanks) difícilmente se hallan en el nivel micro respecto del 
explanandum (la no ratificación del Protocolo de Kioto por parte del senado de los EUA). 
 No hay un nivel privilegiado al cual deban pertenecer siempre los componentes de 
los mecanismos sociales en las explicaciones mecanicistas de macrofenómenos sociales. 
Ni en las explicaciones mecanicistas causales ni en las explicaciones mecanicistas 
constitutivas, los componentes de los mecanismos sociales deben hallarse siempre en un 
determinado nivel. Dado este escenario, podría pensarse que no es posible dar una 
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respuesta adecuada a la cuestión de los componentes. Parece que las propuestas que dan 
cuenta de la diversidad de las explicaciones mecanicistas (como la propuesta de Ylikoski) 
son demasiado vagas e incapaces de ofrecer una guía para la construcción de 
explicaciones, mientras que las propuestas concretas y operativas (como la posición 
inicial de la sociología analítica) no se ajustan a la diversidad de las explicaciones 
mecanicistas. Sin embargo, considero que puede plantearse un requisito mínimo, el cual 
sea concreto y operacional sin ignorar la diversidad de las explicaciones mecanicistas, 
respecto de los componentes de los mecanismos sociales. En particular, un componente 
de un mecanismo social en una explicación mecanicista de un macrofenómeno social no 
debe tener el fenómeno explanandum como parte. 
El requisito mínimo se aplica tanto a las explicaciones mecanicistas causales como 
constitutivas de macrofenómenos sociales. En las explicaciones mecanicistas causales, 
los componentes del mecanismo no deben tener el fenómeno explanandum como parte. 
Para ser un componente del mecanismo, una entidad o una actividad (u otro tipo de 
componente) debe ser causalmente relevante para el fenómeno explanandum. Sin 
embargo, no puede haber una relación de dependencia causal entre ellos si la entidad o la 
actividad tiene al fenómeno explanandum como parte. No es posible una relación de 
dependencia causal entre un todo y una de sus partes (Hitchcock, 2003; Craver & Bechtel, 
2007). Análogamente, en las explicaciones mecanicistas constitutivas, los componentes 
del mecanismo no deben tener el fenómeno explanandum como parte. En este tipo de 
explicaciones, los componentes del mecanismo deben ser partes propias del sistema cuya 
propiedad o comportamiento es el fenómeno explanandum (Craver, 2007). Sin embargo, 
un componente no puede ser parte propia del sistema cuya propiedad o comportamiento 
es el fenómeno explanandum si ese fenómeno es parte de él. Si el fenómeno de interés es 
parte del componente, el sistema cuya propiedad o comportamiento es tal fenómeno es 
también parte del componente. Y si el sistema es parte del componente, el componente 
no puede ser parte propia del sistema. 
 
6. Explicaciones mecanicistas y negacionismo de la ciencia 
El negacionismo de la ciencia es una forma conocida de pseudociencia. A diferencia de 
la promoción de pseudoteorías, el negacionismo no se centra en promocionar una 
determinada teoría (p. ej. la ley de la similitud), sino en negar cierta afirmación científica. 
El negacionismo de la ciencia consiste en el rechazo sistemático de cierta idea con 
respecto a la cual existe consenso en la comunidad científica (Diethelm & Mckee, 2009; 
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Liu, 2012; Hansson, 2017). Normalmente tiene por objeto afirmaciones que cuestionan 
el estilo de vida de la gente o su visión del mundo, o que amenazan los intereses de las 
grandes corporaciones (Lewandowsky et al., 2016). Algunos ejemplos destacados son el 
negacionismo de las enfermedades asociadas al tabaco, el negacionismo de la evolución 
y el negacionismo del cambio climático. 
Aunque no es un movimiento homogéneo, hay cinco características 
epistemológicas que están presentes en todos los casos de negacionismo de la ciencia 
(Liu, 2012; Hansson, 2017, 2018). Primero, en sus argumentos se emplea constantemente 
la selección interesada de datos; solo se tiene en consideración una pequeña parte de la 
evidencia disponible. Segundo, los negacionistas se muestran reacios a abandonar ideas 
y argumentos, incluso aunque éstos hayan sido refutados. Tercero, se fabrican falsas 
controversias. Se afirma que cierta cuestión es objeto de controversia entre los científicos, 
a pesar de que existe un gran consenso al respecto en la comunidad científica. Cuarto, se 
introducen criterios de aceptación sesgados. Los negacionistas establecen estándares de 
evidencia poco realistas, los cuales difícilmente pueden ser satisfechos por la 
investigación científica actual. Y quinto, se representa inadecuadamente la propuesta 
contraria. La idea científica es distorsionada, por ejemplo, sacando citas fuera de su 
contexto. También hay varias características sociológicas que están a menudo presentes 
en el negacionismo de la ciencia (Diethelm & Mckee, 2009; Liu, 2012; Hansson, 2017, 
2018). Por ejemplo, el negacionismo suele tener fuertes vínculos políticos (p. ej. el 
negacionismo de la evolución está relacionado con el ala conservadora cristiana). Otras 
características sociológicas que están frecuentemente presentes en el negacionismo de la 
ciencia son: estar respaldado principalmente por hombres, dirigiste a la gente común en 
lugar de los investigadores, y atacar personal y profesionalmente a los científicos 
individuales. 
Un tipo relevante de negacionismo de la ciencia, el cual no ha sido abordado con 
anterioridad, son las ‘guerras de explicación’. En “Mechanisms and science denialism: 
explaining the global lung cancer epidemic” (anexo 4), esta forma de pseudociencia es 
caracterizada y discutida. Una guerra de explicación es una situación en la que (i) hay un 
fenómeno que no se cuestiona (p. ej. la creciente incidencia de una enfermedad), (ii) en 
la comunidad científica existe consenso respecto a su explicación y (iii) la explicación 
científica estándar es sistemáticamente negada por un grupo de personas. Con el fin de 
socavar la explicación de la ciencia convencional, los negacionistas suelen seguir dos 
estrategias. Por un lado, atacan directamente la explicación estándar. Por ejemplo, 
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afirman que la relación causal entre explanans y explanandum no ha sido demostrada con 
un cien por cien de seguridad (Proctor, 2011; Prothero, 2013). Por otro lado, los 
negacionistas proponen y promueven explicaciones alternativas, la cuales se presentan 
como igual de legítimas que la estándar, para aumentar la controversia y hacer su posición 
más creíble (Proctor, 2004, 2011; Pearl & Mackenzie, 2018). Por ejemplo, financian la 
investigación privada que estudia alguna explicación alternativa mínimamente plausible. 
En las guerras de explicación, están presentes los rasgos distintivos del negacionismo de 
la ciencia. Estrategias tales como introducir criterios sesgados de aceptación y fabricar 
falsas controversias tienen un papel central en la ofensiva contra la explicación estándar. 
La concepción mecanicista de la explicación es de ayuda para hacer frente a las 
guerras de explicación. En una guerra de explicación, la explicación estándar de un 
fenómeno es negada por un grupo de personas. No obstante, si la explicación estándar es 
mecanicista, la ofensiva de los negacionistas es menos efectiva. Las explicaciones 
basadas en mecanismos son resistentes a los argumentos generalmente utilizados por los 
negacionistas. Como se ha señalado, para socavar la explicación de la ciencia 
convencional, los negacionistas siguen dos estrategias. Primero, atacan directamente la 
explicación estándar. Los negacionistas argumentan que esa explicación no prueba 
satisfactoriamente la conexión causal entre explanans y explanandum. Sus argumentos se 
basan en “an extraordinarily narrow and mechanical conception of causation” (Proctor, 
2011, p. 275). Segundo, los negacionistas proponen y promueven explicaciones 
alternativas para aumentar la controversia. Las explicaciones alternativas, las cuales son 
presentadas como igual de legítimas que la estándar, suelen basarse en correlaciones 
estadísticas entre el fenómeno explanandum y variables no incluidas en la explicación de 
la ciencia convencional (Proctor, 2004, 2011). Sin embargo, las estrategias seguidas por 
los negacionistas son poco efectivas frente a explicaciones mecanicistas. Por un lado, las 
explicaciones mecanicistas establecen el vínculo (causal o constitutivo) entre explanans 
y explanandum. Muestran cómo surge el fenómeno de interés. Por otro lado, las 
explicaciones alternativas planteadas por los negacionistas no son explicaciones legítimas 
al mismo nivel que la explicación estándar. No suelen ser explicaciones mecanicistas, 
sino explicaciones de caja negra que no abordan la conexión entre explanans y 
explanandum, y que no están respaldas por el mismo tipo de evidencia que la explicación 
convencional. 
La relevancia de las explicaciones mecanicistas y su resistencia a los ataques 
negacionistas pueden ilustrarse a través de la guerra de explicación relativa a la epidemia 
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global de cáncer de pulmón. Al principio del siglo veinte, el cáncer de pulmón era una 
enfermedad extraordinariamente rara (Proctor, 2001, 2011, 2012). Solo se habían 
registrado unos pocos cientos de casos en la literatura médica mundial. Sin embargo, 
durante las primeras décadas del siglo veinte se detectó en varios países un incremento 
en la incidencia del cáncer de pulmón. Este dramático cambio demandaba una 
explicación. A lo largo de las siguientes décadas, se discutieron varias explicaciones 
posibles de la epidemia. Entre los diversos factores que fueron tenidos en cuenta estaban 
la contaminación atmosférica, las exposiciones laborales y la creciente popularidad de los 
cigarrillos (Proctor, 2004, 2011). Finalmente, en la década de 1950, la idea de que el 
consumo de tabaco explicaba la epidemia de cáncer de pulmón tomó la delantera. La 
conexión causal entre los cigarrillos y el cáncer de pulmón fue establecida por medio de 
cuatro líneas directas de evidencia: estudios poblacionales, experimentos con animales, 
patología celular y análisis químicos (Proctor, 2012). Y, como resultado de este 
conocimiento causal, se estableció un amplio consenso entre los expertos de que el 
consumo de tabaco daba cuenta de la epidemia global de cáncer de pulmón (Proctor, 
2011, 2012).  
Hacia mediados de la década de 1950, había consenso entre los científicos de que 
el consumo de tabaco explicaba la epidemia global de cáncer de pulmón. Sin embargo, la 
industria tabacalera sistemáticamente negaba esa explicación. Aunque ellos aceptaban 
que la incidencia del cáncer de pulmón había aumentado y que eso demandaba una 
explicación, rechazaban la explicación que vinculaba esa epidemia con su producto. Para 
socavar la explicación estándar, la industria tabacalera siguió dos estrategias. En primer 
lugar, atacó la explicación de la ciencia convencional (Proctor, 2011). Su principal 
argumento era que la conexión causal no había sido establecida de forma conclusiva y 
que hacía falta más investigación. En segundo lugar, la industria tabacalera promovía 
explicaciones alternativas de la epidemia global de cáncer de pulmón (Proctor, 2004, 
2011). Por medio de instituciones como el Council for Tobacco Research y el Tobacco 
Institute, financiaba y publicitaba la investigación orientada a descubrir posibles causas 
del cáncer de pulmón distintas al tabaco. 
A principios de la década de 1990, se descubrieron los mecanismos que vinculan el 
consumo de cigarrillos y el cáncer de pulmón. La explicación estándar de la epidemia 
global de cáncer de pulmón pasó a ser mecanicista (Russo & Williamson, 2007). Ésta 
detallaba los procesos a través de los cuales fumar produce cáncer de pulmón. Como 
consecuencia de ello, las estrategias de la industria tabacalera perdieron su efectividad. 
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Por un lado, la explicación estándar establecía conclusivamente la conexión causal entre 
fumar y el cáncer de pulmón. Se ajustaba a la estrecha concepción mecanicista de la 
causalidad adoptada por los negacionistas y hacía obsoleto el argumento de ‘más 
investigación’. Por otro lado, la explicación estándar se distinguía con claridad de las 
explicaciones alternativas. Era una explicación mecanicista causal, mientras que las 
alternativas eran explicaciones estadísticas o explicaciones causales no mecanicistas. En 
la década de 1990, tras esa pérdida de eficacia, la industria tabacalera cambió su estrategia 
y dejó de negar la explicación que la ciencia convencional daba de la epidemia global de 
cáncer de pulmón (Proctor, 2001, 2006, 2011). Aceptaron que el tabaco era un factor de 
riesgo en el desarrollo de cáncer de pulmón y que su consumo explicaba la alta incidencia 
del cáncer de pulmón. A partir de ese momento, su estrategia legal fue argumentar que 
“the risks of smoking have been well-known for decades, and that people therefore 
voluntarily assume such risks when they take up the habit” (Proctor, 2001, p. 84). 
 
7. Conclusiones 
Los mecanismos tienen un papel central en la empresa científica. Desde la biología 
molecular hasta la sociología, los científicos de diversos campos recurren a mecanismos 
para describir, explicar, predecir y controlar los fenómenos del mundo. La relevancia de 
los mecanismos y de los enfoques que apelan a mecanismos no ha pasado desapercibida 
para los filósofos. Como se ha señalado, la primera filosofía mecanicista se remonta a la 
Grecia clásica. La filosofía mecanicista gozó de gran popularidad durante la segunda 
mitad del siglo diecisiete. En ese periodo, la filosofía mecanicista se convirtió en el 
enfoque dominante en la filosofía natural y la filosofía de la ciencia. No obstante, aunque 
no tan influyentes, numerosas propuestas mecanicistas han sido defendidas 
posteriormente en filosofía. 
En el contexto filosófico actual, la nueva filosofía mecanicista es el principal 
representante del enfoque mecanicista. Igual que la filosofía mecanicista del siglo 
diecisiete, es tanto una filosofía de la ciencia como una filosofía natural. La nueva 
filosofía mecanicista no solo está interesada en la metodología científica, sino también en 
la constitución y organización del mundo. Se considera que los mecanismos son uno de 
los principales constituyentes del mundo. Sin embargo, tal y como se ha indicado, la 
nueva filosofía mecanicista se caracteriza por un énfasis generalizado en la práctica 
científica real. Su objeto de interés primero es el mecanismo como concepto-en-uso en la 
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ciencia. Los nuevos mecanicistas se fijan en la práctica científica y la toman como 
referencia para abordar tanto las cuestiones metodológicas como las ontológicas. 
La nueva filosofía mecanicista ha demostrado ser un enfoque muy fructífero en 
filosofía de la ciencia. Ha dado lugar a un progreso significativo en diferentes discusiones 
filosóficas. Dentro del marco de la nueva filosofía mecanicista, se han abordado 
convincentemente la explicación científica (Machamer et al., 2000; Bechtel & 
Abrahamsen, 2005), la inferencia causal (Steel, 2004; Russo & Williamson, 2007; 
Parkkinen et al., 2018), la extrapolación de relaciones causales (Steel, 2008; Wilde & 
Parkkinen, 2019), la investigación científica (Bechtel & Richardson, 1993; Darden, 
2018), el crecimiento y la organización del conocimiento (Hedström & Ylikoski, 2010; 
Glennan, 2017) y varias otras cuestiones. Como se argumenta en “Mechanisms and 
science denialism: explaining the global lung cancer epidemic” (anexo 4), la nueva 
filosofía mecanicista también podría contribuir a combatir la pseudociencia. El nuevo 
enfoque mecanicista es de ayuda para lidiar con ciertas formas de negacionismo de la 
ciencia. Es especialmente valioso en las guerras de explicación. La nueva concepción 
mecanicista de la explicación científica proporciona explicaciones resistentes a los 
argumentos habitualmente utilizados por los negacionistas. Además, la nueva filosofía 
mecanicista ofrece un enfoque prometedor para abordar otras cuestiones como la 
evaluación de riesgos (Rocca, 2017; Rocca et al., 2020), la comprensión pública de la 
ciencia (Lewandowsky & Oberauer, 2016) y la evaluación ética y de bienestar (Grüne-
Yanoff, 2016).  
No obstante, la nueva filosofía mecanicista también tiene ciertos aspectos 
problemáticos. Algunos de estos problemas guardan relación con la voluntad de 
generalidad y amplia aplicabilidad. Los mecanismos son relevantes en la mayoría de las 
áreas científicas, y la nueva filosofía mecanicista quiere plantear un enfoque mecanicista 
general que las englobe a todas ellas. Sin embargo, encuentra importantes dificultades 
para dar cuenta de los mecanismos y sus roles en algunos campos. Una de esas 
dificultades, la cual es abordada en “The Search for Generality in the Notion of 
Mechanism” (anexo 1), está relacionada con la noción misma de mecanismo. Los nuevos 
mecanicistas tratan de desarrollar una noción general de mecanismo apropiada para toda 
la gama de mecanismos estudiados en las ciencias. El desarrollo de una noción general es 
perseguido con diversas estrategias ―la estrategia de extrapolación y la estrategia a-
través-de-las-ciencias―. Sin embargo, todas ellas han resultado infructuosas. Son 
incapaces de proporcionar una noción de mecanismo que de satisfactoriamente cuenta de 
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todos los tipos de mecanismo. Además, es dudoso que una noción general de mecanismo 
adecuada pueda ser desarrollada. Los fenómenos, las entidades, las actividades y los 
aspectos organizacionales estudiados por las diferentes ciencias son tan heterogéneos que 
una noción de mecanismo que sea informativa y recoja todos los casos relevantes parece 
inalcanzable.  
Uno de los principales avances de la nueva filosofía mecanicista es prestar atención 
a la práctica científica real. Considerar los mecanismos como concepto-en-uso en la 
ciencia ha sido crucial para muchas de sus contribuciones (p. ej. analizar el 
descubrimiento científico). Sin embargo, parece que la nueva filosofía mecanicista no 
advierte las relevantes diferencias entre los campos científicos. No tiene en consideración 
las particularidades de los mecanismos y sus roles en cada área. En consecuencia, el 
enfoque mecanicista encuentra importantes problemas para ser ampliamente aplicado. 
Por ejemplo, como se discute en “Evolutionary causes as mechanisms: a critical analysis” 
(anexo 2), ignorar las particularidades de los mecanismos evolutivos hace inadecuados 
los acercamientos mecanicistas a la biología evolutiva. Para superar estas dificultades, la 
nueva filosofía mecanicista debe abandonar la ingenua asunción de similitud y tener en 
cuenta la especificidad de los diversos campos científicos. Cuando una cuestión 
metodológica es abordada, inicialmente debería adoptarse un enfoque específico de área. 
En cada campo relevante, la cuestión debería ser abordada tomando como principal 
referencia la práctica de los científicos implicados. No basta con tener en cuenta la 
práctica científica, hay que tener en cuenta la práctica científica pertinente. Este enfoque 
específico de área es adoptado en “Mechanistic explanations and components of social 
mechanisms” (anexo 3). En este artículo, tomando la práctica de los científicos sociales 
como referencia, se aborda la cuestión de cuales han de ser los componentes de los 
mecanismos sociales en las explicaciones mecanicistas de macrofenómenos sociales. 
El enfoque específico de área facilitaría la aplicación de la nueva filosofía 
mecanicista a otros campos de la ciencia. Hay campos científicos que difieren 
significativamente de las áreas inicialmente consideradas por los nuevos mecanicistas y 
cuyas particularidades deberían ser consideradas. Este es el caso, por ejemplo, de la 
psicología (Kazdin, 2007; Koch & Cratsley, 2020). Los mecanismos estudiados por los 
psicólogos tienen muchas diferencias importantes con los mecanismos biológicos y 
sociales. Además, la orientación específica de área permitiría al nuevo enfoque 
mecanicista abordar exitosamente problemas específicos de determinadas áreas, como la 
generalización a partir de casos de estudio en ciencia social (Ylikoski, 2019). 
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Reconocer la diversidad de los campos científicos respecto a como son entendidos 
los mecanismos y que roles juegan (o podrían jugar) no significa renunciar a la voluntad 
de generalidad. La nueva filosofía mecanicista podría desarrollar un enfoque mecanicista 
amplio que se ajustara a todos los campos en que los mecanismos son relevantes. De 
hecho, este tipo de enfoque sería muy útil para abordar problemas filosóficos generales y 
facilitar la colaboración entre campos. Admitir la especificidad de los campos científicos 
solo significa que las consideraciones generales no pueden pasar por alto como los 
mecanismos y sus roles son entendidos en las diversas áreas de la ciencia. El enfoque 
mecanicista global debe construirse sobre la base de las discusiones específicas de área 
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En este artículo, introduzco y analizo un principio general compartido por los 
nuevos mecanicistas: la búsqueda de generalidad. Los nuevos mecanicistas consideran que 
una noción de mecanismo aceptable ha de ser adecuada para la mayoría de las áreas cien-
tíficas en que los mecanismos son relevantes. El desarrollo de nociones de mecanismo 
generales se lleva a cabo mediante dos estrategias diferentes y alternativas, a las cuales 
denomino la estrategia de extrapolación y la estrategia a-través-de-las-ciencias. Después de analizar 
ejemplos paradigmáticos de éstas, planteo que ambas estrategias tienen problemas signifi-
cativos y que las posibilidades de superarlos son escasas. Se concluye que sería recomen-
dable abandonar la búsqueda de generalidad. 
 




In this paper, I introduce and discuss a general principle shared by new mecha-
nists: the search for generality. New mechanists agree that an appropriate notion of mecha-
nism has to be suitable for most of the fields of science where mechanisms are relevant. 
The development of general notions of mechanism is pursued with two different and al-
ternative strategies, which I call the extrapolation strategy and the across-the-sciences strategy. Af-
ter analysing paradigmatic examples of them, I argue that both strategies face outstanding 
difficulties and that the prospects for overcoming them are dim. It is concluded that it 
would be advisable to abandon the search for generality. 
 






The new mechanism emerged in the mid-90s.1 Discovering Complexity: 
Decomposition and Localization as Strategies in Scientific Research (1993) by Wil-
liam Bechtel and Robert C. Richardson marked the beginning of this ap-
proach. Although it became much more influent some years later with 
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the publication of “Mechanisms and the Nature of Causation” (1996) by 
Stuart Glennan and “Thinking about Mechanisms” (2000) by Peter 
Machamer, Lindley Darden, and Carl F. Craver (henceforth MDC). The 
new mechanism is both a philosophy of science (i.e. philosophical in-
quiry into science) and a philosophy of nature (i.e. philosophical inquiry 
into the constituents of real things). Not only is it concerned about the 
role of mechanisms in science, but also about the nature of mechanisms, 
which are part of the real world. 
The aim of this paper is to discuss a general principle of the new 
mechanism that I call the search for generality. Its structure is as follows. 
Section II introduces the main features of the new mechanism. Section 
III characterizes the search for generality and the two strategies that are 
adopted in order to achieve that purpose. Section IV argues that both 
strategies for achieving generality face outstanding difficulties. Section V 
shows that the problems of the search for generality undermine some ar-
guments in support of the mechanistic approach (e.g. the mechanistic 
account of explanation). Finally, section VI concludes. 
 
 
II. THE NEW MECHANISM 
 
Within the framework of the new mechanism, several proposals 
have been raised. The most relevant ones are those of Glennan (1996), 
(2002), (2017), MDC (2000), Bechtel and Abrahamsen (2005), (2010), 
and Illari and Williamson (2012). In spite of the disagreements among 
those proposals, some general ideas are shared by all of them. Recent 
books such as The New Mechanical Philosophy (2017) by Glennan and The 
Routledge Handbook of Mechanisms and Mechanical Philosophy (2018) edited by 
Glennan and Illari have underlined the great deal of consensus existing 
within the new mechanism. 
New mechanists consider that a mechanism is an organized com-
pound that is part of the real world. They discriminate between a mecha-
nism, which is a real entity, and a model of it, which is often a piece of 
scientific reasoning. In this sense, Glennan says that “mechanisms and their 
constituents are things in the world that exist independently of the models 
we made of them” [Glennan (2017), p. 10]. They also agree that mecha-
nisms are nested and form a hierarchy [Machamer, Darden, and Craver 
(2000), p. 13]. A component part of a mechanism is often a mechanism it-
self. For instance, a heart is both a mechanism and a component part of a 
mechanism (e.g. a circulatory system). Nevertheless, this idea does not lead 
them to reductionism regarding mechanisms. They reject that it is possible 
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to reduce higher level mechanisms to lower level mechanisms [Andersen 
(2014), p. 281]. Another shared idea is that a mechanism is always a mecha-
nism for some phenomenon [Bechtel and Abrahamsen (2005), p. 42; Crav-
er (2007), p. 123; Glennan (1996), p. 52]. The identification and delimitation 
of a mechanism (i.e. the fixation of a mechanism’s boundaries) depend on 
the phenomenon for which it is responsible [Kaiser (2018)]. In the new 
mechanism, the notion of mechanism is not equivalent to the notion of 
machine. Although human-built machines (e.g. a vending machine) can of-
ten be considered mechanisms, most mechanisms are not machines. 
There are also some general agreements regarding the principles 
that guide new mechanists’ research. All their proposals emerge form a 
focus on scientific practice [Glennan (2017), p. 12]. Scientists’ considera-
tions about mechanisms are the main reference for the development of 
new mechanists’ notions of mechanism. Another shared trait is the inter-
est in how the discovery and decomposition (i.e. the identification of 
components and their organization) of mechanisms works [Bechtel and 
Richardson (1993); Darden (2018)]. They are not only interested in the 
role of mechanisms in science, but also in how scientists discover and 
decompose them. Due to the fact that a mechanism is always a mecha-
nism for some phenomenon, the discovery of a mechanism begins with 
the identification of a puzzling phenomenon. 
According to the new mechanism, the role of mechanisms in science 
is usually associated with the scientific objective of explaining. New mecha-
nists have developed a mechanistic account of scientific explanation. They 
consider that a phenomenon is explained by means of specifying the mech-
anism that is responsible for it.2 In this sense, MDC say: “To give a descrip-
tion of a mechanism for a phenomenon is to explain that phenomenon” 
[Machamer, Darden, and Craver (2000), p. 3]. A well-known example of 
mechanistic explanation is the standard explanation of the phenomenon of 
chemical transmission at synapsis [Machamer, Darden, and Craver (2000)]. 
This phenomenon is explained by the interactions (e.g. transporting, insert-
ing, diffusing…) among cell membrane, vesicles, microtubules, molecules, 
and ions that are responsible for it. The mechanistic approach to scientific 
explanation has been developed as an alternative to the covering-law model 
[Bechtel and Abrahamsen (2005); Craver (2014)].3 The covering-law model, 
which was developed by Carl G. Hempel (1965), is based on the idea that 
to explain a phenomenon is to subsume it under a law. This proposal gave 
rise to a consensus regarding the notion of scientific explanation that lasted 
from the late 1940s to the mid-1960s [Salmon (1989), p. 3]. However, since 
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the early 1960s, several critiques and counterexamples have noted that sub-
suming a phenomenon under a law is neither necessary nor sufficient con-
dition for explaining it. The mechanistic approach, as other current 
approaches (e.g. unificationist account of explanation, pragmatic theories of 
explanation…), try to account for scientific explanation avoiding covering-
law model’s problems.  
New mechanists consider that mechanisms are relevant in science 
and that their relevance is manly associated with explaining. Thus, they 
support a mechanistic account of scientific explanation. According to it, 
a phenomenon is explained by means of specifying the mechanism that 
is responsible for it. In what follows, I will discuss one problematic as-
pect of the new mechanism related to the notion of mechanism, i.e., the 
search for generality. 
 
 
III. THE SEARCH FOR GENERALITY 
 
Through the previous section, several well-known general princi-
ples of the new mechanism have been noted. Nevertheless, there is an-
other one that has not been previously identified and deserves attention. 
It is the search for generality. New mechanists consider that mechanisms are 
relevant in most scientific fields. And they agree that an appropriate no-
tion of mechanism has to be suitable for most of the fields where mech-
anisms are relevant. In this sense, in his foundational “Mechanisms and 
the Nature of Causation”, Glennan [(1996), p. 50] claims that mecha-
nisms are relevant in all scientific fields except fundamental physics. His 
proposal aims to suit those fields. 
Despite the fact that the search for generality is a trait shared by all 
mechanistic proposals, it is not always pursued with the same strategy. 
This difference with respect to the strategies has made difficult to identify 
this common feature. Within the new mechanism, there are two strategies 
for proposing general notions of mechanism. I call them the extrapolation 
strategy and the across-the-sciences strategy. 
The extrapolation strategy consists of developing a notion of 
mechanism taking one or a few fields of science as reference, and then 
applying that notion to many other fields. This strategy goes from certain 
kind of mechanisms to a general notion of mechanism, so that, the no-
tion is applied to kinds of mechanisms that were not taken into account 
for its development. MDC (2000), for instance, follow the extrapolation 
strategy. Their notion of mechanism was developed taking neurobiologi-
cal and molecular mechanisms as reference. The mechanisms of chemi-
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cal transmission at synapsis and protein synthesis are their paradigmatic 
examples of mechanisms. But they consider that their notion of mecha-
nism could be applied to other fields of science. In this sense, they say: 
“We suspect that this analysis is applicable to many other sciences, and 
maybe even to cognitive or social mechanisms” [Machamer, Darden, and 
Craver (2000), p. 2].4 The extrapolation strategy was also adopted by 
Glennan (1996), (2002). He developed his notion of mechanism taking 
physical mechanisms (e.g. a float valve, a voltage switch…) as reference. 
Nevertheless, he considered that it suited many other kinds of mecha-
nisms: “my analysis is in no way limited to mechanisms that are physical 
in nature. It is meant to equally apply to chemical, biological, psychologi-
cal and other higher-level mechanisms” [Glennan (1996), p. 61]. 
James Woodward (2002) also follows the extrapolation strategy in 
his study of mechanisms.5 He focuses on mechanics (e.g. a block sliding 
down an inclined plane), although he takes into account molecular biolo-
gy too. However, he claims that “a notion of mechanism very similar to 
that characterized by MECH is employed in many other fields of sci-
ence — for example, in psychology” [Woodward (2002), p. S376]. 
The across-the-sciences strategy consists of thinking about mecha-
nisms across all the sciences and developing a notion of mechanism that 
includes their common features. This strategy goes from all mechanisms 
to a general notion of mechanism. All kinds of mechanisms to which the 
notion is applied are taken into account for its development. The across-
the-sciences strategy was introduced by Illari and Williamson (2012), 
who underlined its difference from the previous developments of no-
tions of mechanism (i.e. the extrapolation strategy). Their aim is to con-
sider mechanisms in general and to propose “a characterization that 
gives an understanding of what is common to mechanisms in all fields” 
[Illari and Williamson (2012), p. 120]. They underline the need of a con-
sensus account of mechanisms in order to address several philosophical 
issues (e.g. causal explanation, inference, and modelling). The across-the-
sciences strategy has recently been adopted by Glennan (2017). He has 
abandoned his previous notion of mechanism [see Glennan (1996), 
(2002)] and proposes a minimal characterization of it, which tries to in-
clude what all mechanisms share in common. His aim is to develop a no-
tion of mechanism “broad enough to capture most of wide range of 
things scientists have called mechanisms” [Glennan (2017), p. 18]. In the 
next section, I will show that both the extrapolation strategy and the 
across-the-sciences strategy face outstanding difficulties. 
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IV. THE DIFFICULTIES OF THE SEARCH FOR GENERALITY 
 
Generality is a valuable purpose here. There are several kinds of 
mechanisms in science (e.g. molecular mechanisms, social mechanisms, 
computing mechanisms…). A notion that could account for all of them 
would be useful for both scientific research and philosophical under-
standing. It would facilitate collaboration among fields of science where 
mechanisms are relevant. Besides, the will of generality is also present in 
many philosophical issues related with mechanisms. For instance, phi-
losophers of science try to develop a notion of causal explanation that 
suits all explanations where the explanans makes reference to the causes of 
the explanandum phenomenon. A general notion of mechanism would help 
to address these issues. However, I will argue below that both suggested 
strategies for pursuing generality face outstanding difficulties. In order to 
identify and analyse those difficulties, I will focus on MDC’s and Illari and 
Williamson’s proposals, which are paradigmatic examples of the extrapola-
tion strategy and the across-the-sciences strategy respectively.  
 
IV.1. The Difficulties of the Extrapolation Strategy 
MDC’s proposal, one of the most relevant ones in the current de-
bate, follows the extrapolation strategy for developing a general notion 
of mechanism. However, their notion of mechanism, which is developed 
taking certain kind of mechanisms as reference, does not suit many other 
kinds of mechanisms. MDC define mechanism as follows: 
 
Mechanisms are entities and activities organized such that they are pro-
ductive of regular changes from start or set-up to finish or termination 
conditions [Machamer, Darden, and Craver (2000), p. 3]. 
 
A mechanism is an organized collection of entities (with their properties) 
and activities. Entities are things that engage in activities. They are usual-
ly spatiotemporal located, structured, and oriented. Examples of entities 
are neurotransmitters, neurons, DNA bases… Activities are productive 
happenings. They have temporal order, rate, and duration. Examples of 
activities are transporting, neuromodulating, recycling… Mechanisms’ 
components are organized. Their organization has temporal, spatial, and 
active aspects [Craver and Darden (2013), p. 20]. MDC hold that mecha-
nisms are regular and “work always or for the most part in the same way 
under the same conditions” [Machamer, Darden, and Craver (2000), p. 3]. 
Although MDC consider that their notion of mechanism could be 
applied to most fields of science (see section III), it is unlikely the case. For 
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instance, the application of MDC’s notion of mechanism to evolutionary 
biology would be very problematic. Evolutionary biologists often refer to 
evolutionary causes (e.g. natural selection, mutation, migration…) as mech-
anisms that bring about changes in populations. In this sense, Graham Bell 
says: “Selection is an effective mechanism for producing adaptation” [Bell 
(2008), p. 499]. Other evolutionary biologists who refer to several evolu-
tionary causes as mechanisms are Jon C. Herron and Scott Freeman (2014). 
However, MDC’s notion of mechanism is not able to account for evolu-
tionary causes as mechanisms. Robert A. Skipper and Roberta L. Millstein 
(2005) have argued that natural selection does not meet MDC’s characteri-
zation of mechanisms.6 For instance, relevant productive relationships 
among component entities of natural selection cannot always be under-
stood as activities. Natural selection often depends on passive selection 
processes (e.g. being poisonous, having certain colour…) that can hardly be 
considered activities. Skipper and Millstein also say that natural selection 
does not satisfy the requirement of regularity.7 
MDC’s notion of mechanism is also unable to account for econom-
ic mechanisms. Economists often refer to economic mechanisms (e.g. 
markets, price mechanisms…). Well-known examples of economic 
mechanisms are monetary transmission mechanisms. A monetary trans-
mission mechanism is a mechanism responsible for the influence of a 
central bank in output, employment, prices, and inflation of a country or 
a political and economic union (e.g. European Union) [Samuelson and 
Nordhaus (2010), p. 484]. It is an organized collection of entities (e.g. 
banks, central banks, securities broker-dealers…) and activities (e.g. buy-
ing and selling government securities, trading reserve balances at a cen-
tral bank, changing the legal reserve-ratio requirements…). It could seem 
that MDC’s notion of mechanism suits monetary transmission mecha-
nisms, but it is unlikely the case.  
MDC consider that mechanisms are regular. Lane DesAutels (2016) 
has recently showed that in order to meet MDC’s requirement of regularity 
a mechanism has to be process regular and not be affected by internal 
sources of irregularity. However, monetary transmission mechanisms are 
not process regular and are affected by internal sources of irregularity. 
Process regularity consists in that “the constituent entities and activities 
of a mechanism behave in roughly the same way each time the mecha-
nism operates” [DesAutels (2016), p. 16]. But, component entities of 
monetary transmission mechanisms do not always behave in the same 
way. For instance, given an undesirably low level of inflation, a central 
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bank (e.g. European Central Bank, U.S. Federal Reserve System…) does 
not always behave in the same way in order to influence in it. Central 
banks often buy government securities for increasing the level of infla-
tion. But sometimes they also modify the reverse-ratio requirements or 
borrow money with a discount rate. Monetary transmission mechanisms 
are affected by internal sources of irregularity too. For example, a change 
in the behaviour of the U.S. Federal Reserve System can be the result of 
a change in which presidents of regional Federal Reserve Banks are vot-
ing members of the Federal Open Market Committee. 
Other aspect of MDC’s proposal that does not suit monetary trans-
mission mechanisms is the fixation of mechanisms’ boundaries. It is con-
sidered that “mechanisms are always mechanisms of a given phenomenon” 
[Craver (2007), p. 123]. Regarding boundaries, Craver says: “The bounda-
ries of mechanisms ––what is in the mechanism and what is not–– are fixed 
by reference to the phenomenon that the mechanism explains” [Craver 
(2007), p. 123]. A mechanism of certain phenomenon is composed of those 
entities, activities, and organizational features that are part of the system 
whose behaviour is the phenomenon of interest and are relevant for that 
phenomenon. A part is relevant for a phenomenon if it meets the require-
ment of mutual manipulability [Craver (2007)]. Therefore, a part X is a 
component of the mechanism of phenomenon Y if some interventions on 
X bring about changes in Y, and vice versa. Craver appeals to the notion of 
intervention developed by Woodward (2003). Woodward claims that “an 
intervention on some variable X with respect to some second variable Y is 
a causal process that changes the value of X in an appropriately exogenous 
way, so that if a change in the value of Y occurs, it occurs only in virtue of 
the change in the value of X” [Woodward (2003), p. 94]. Nevertheless, this 
proposal does not suit monetary transmission mechanisms. A monetary 
transmission mechanism is a mechanism of a phenomenon (i.e. the influ-
ence of a central bank in output, employment, prices, and inflation). But it 
is not composed of all entities, activities, and organizational features that are 
part of the system whose behaviour is the phenomenon of interest and are 
relevant for that phenomenon. Consider the South Korean monetary 
transmission mechanism. That mechanism is responsible for the influence 
of the Bank of Korea in the South Korean output, employment, prices, and 
inflation. Samsung Electronics, which is the largest South Korean firm, is 
part of the system whose behaviour is the phenomenon of interest (South 
Korea). It also meets the requirement of mutual manipulability and is rele-
vant for the phenomenon. Some interventions on Samsung Electronics 
produce changes in the influence of the Bank of Korea in the South Kore-
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an economy, and vice versa. However, it is not part of the South Korean 
monetary transmission mechanism. In sum, MDC’s proposal does not 
properly fix monetary transmission mechanisms’ boundaries.8  
MDC follow the extrapolation strategy for developing a general no-
tion of mechanism. However, as it has been argued, their notion does not 
suit many kinds of mechanisms. It introduces certain requirements that are 
not met by those kinds of mechanisms. This also seems to be the case for 
the other proposals that follow the extrapolation strategy. For instance, 
Glennan’s (2002) and Woodward’s (2002) proposals do not suit neither 
economic mechanisms nor evolutionary mechanisms. They consider that 
properties of mechanisms’ parts must remain stable in absence of interven-
tions. However, properties of economic mechanism’s parts (e.g. firms) and 
evolutionary mechanisms’ parts (e.g. populations) may change even if no 
intervention has been done [Skipper and Millstein (2005)]. Consider the fol-
lowing hypothetical example of a firm. During a lunch at the office, there is 
a strong discussion between the CEO of firm X and the director of its de-
partment of publicity. As a consequence of this event, the CEO decreases 
the budget of the department of publicity. Due to the reduction of the 
budget, the department of publicity has to introduce changes in the adver-
tising strategy of the firm (e.g. the number of ads on TV is decreased, while 
the number of ads on radio is increased). In this example, different proper-
ties of firm X (e.g. budget of its departments, number of ads on TV…) 
changed without any exogenous intervention. 
 
IV.2. The Difficulties of the Across-the-Sciences Strategy 
Illari and Williamson, who introduced the across-the-sciences strate-
gy, follow it for developing a general notion of mechanism. Nevertheless, 
on my view they propose a vacuous and overly broad notion of mecha-
nism. Illari and Williamson offer the following definition of mechanism: 
 
A mechanism for a phenomenon consists of entities and activities orga-
nized in such a way that they are responsible for the phenomenon. [Illari 
and Williamson (2012), p. 120] 
 
A mechanism is an organized collection of entities and activities. No re-
strictions on regularity, internal structure, size, boundaries or robustness 
are imposed on them. Examples of entities are electrons, stars, black 
holes, x-rays… While examples of activities are colliding, relaxing, col-
lapsing, radiating… Mechanisms’ organization is merely defined as 
“whatever relations between the entities and activities discovered pro-
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duce the phenomenon of interest” [Illari and Williamson (2012), p. 128]. 
There are several possible forms of organization (e.g. spatial, temporal, 
equilibrium, self-organization, feedback…). What forms of organization 
are relevant in a particular mechanism is an empirical question. 
My main objection here is that Illari and Williamson’s notion of 
mechanism is vacuous.9 Their definition of mechanism relies on the con-
cepts of entity, activity, organization, and being responsible for. Never-
theless, they do not properly characterize those concepts. For instance, 
consider the concept of entity. They offer neither a definition of entity 
nor a set of necessary conditions to be an entity nor a set of sufficient 
conditions to be an entity. Besides, they refuse to introduce restrictions 
on entities. They certainly present some examples of component entities 
of astrophysical and molecular mechanisms. Nevertheless, those exam-
ples are not numerous and diverse enough to properly characterize enti-
ties across the sciences. It could be argued that the concept of entity is 
too general, and a proper characterization of entities is not possible. 
However, other authors have already raised more concrete characteriza-
tions of component entities [see Machamer, Darden, and Craver (2000)]. 
Illari and Williamson’s notion of mechanism is not precise enough. It is 
not clear what features would characterize mechanisms. They increase 
the scope of their notion of mechanism (i.e. the number of mechanisms 
that it subsumes) at the cost of decreasing its precision. 
Another problem for Illari and Williamson’s notion of mechanism is 
that it is overly broad. Although they consider that their characterization “is 
not so broad that it captures non-mechanisms” [Illari and Williamson 
(2012), p. 129], it subsumes things that could hardly be accepted as mecha-
nisms. For instance, their notion would admit a group of cows grazing in a 
field as a mechanism. It is an organized collection of entities (e.g. cows) and 
activities (e.g. grazing) that are responsible for a phenomenon (i.e. the re-
moval of the grass of the field). However, it could hardly be considered a 
proper mechanism. It is actually a mere aggregate, whose components are 
not actively organized [Craver and Darden (2013), p. 20]. Cows do not in-
teract and make a difference to each other in order to remove the grass. 
Other examples of things that Illari and Williamson’s notion would wrongly 
admit as mechanisms are a traffic jam and a group of babies napping. 
The aim of Illari and Williamson is to develop a wide notion of 
mechanism that could encompass mechanisms of all fields. As it has 
been noted, they decrease the precision of their characterization in order 
to increase its scope. Nevertheless, Illari and Williamson’s notion of 
mechanism does not suit many kinds of mechanisms. For instance, it 
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would not fit evolutionary mechanisms. Illari and Williamson, as MDC, 
consider that mechanisms are collections of entities and activities. 
Hence, their notion of mechanism cannot account for those cases of 
evolution in which natural selection depends on passive selection pro-
cesses that can hardly be considered activities. Their notion of mecha-
nism would also be unable to account for economic mechanisms. Like 
MDC, they consider that a mechanism for a phenomenon is composed 
of those parts (e.g. entities, activities…) that are relevant for it. In this 
sense, they claim: “mechanisms are functionally individuated by their 
phenomena” [Illari and Williamson (2012), pp. 123-124]. But, as it has 
been argued, this idea does not suit economic mechanisms’ (e.g. mone-
tary transmission mechanisms) boundaries. In conclusion, despite of the 
fact that the across-the-sciences strategy is developed as an alternative to 
the extrapolation strategy, Illari and Williamson do not avoid the prob-
lem of the latter (see subsection IV.1). 
Illari and Williamson follow the across-the-sciences strategy for de-
veloping a general notion of mechanism. Nevertheless, they do not satis-
factorily achieve that purpose. The main problems of their notion of 
mechanism are that it is vacuous and overly broad. The other proposals 
that follow the across-the-sciences strategy seem to face the same kind of 
problems. For example, Glennan’s (2017) recent proposal is overly broad 
too. It subsumes things that could hardly be accepted as mechanisms 
(e.g. a group of cows grazing, a traffic jam…). In addition, Glennan’s no-
tion is also unable to account for many kinds of mechanisms. As Illari 
and Williamson, he considers that mechanisms are collections of entities 
and activities, and that a mechanism for a phenomenon is composed of 
those parts that are relevant for it. Therefore, it does not suit evolution-
ary mechanisms and economic mechanisms either. 
 
 
V. THE SEARCH FOR GENERALITY AND THE ARGUMENTS IN SUPPORT 
OF THE MECHANISTIC APPROACH 
 
Mechanisms are relevant in several fields of science. In most of 
those fields (e.g. neuroscience, cognitive science, molecular biology…), a 
mechanistic stance has been adopted. From this fact, new mechanists 
have raised an argument in support of the mechanistic approach. They 
argue that the adoption of the mechanistic approach in a field of science 
would improve its relationship with the numerous fields in which this 
approach has already been adopted. Mechanisms would be the subject of 
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study of all of them. The fields would only differ in which kind of mech-
anisms they study. Different fields of science would just study different 
parts of the hierarchy of mechanisms. In this sense, Craver and Alexan-
drova say that one reason why neuroeconomics should be a mechanistic 
science is that “the rest of neuroscience, cognitive science, and biology 
have adopted a largely mechanistic stance […] The search for mecha-
nisms provides a common goal toward which researchers in different 
fields can contribute” [Craver and Alexandrova (2008), p. 398].  
A related argument can be raised in favour of the mechanistic ac-
count of scientific explanation [Hedström and Ylikoski (2011)]. As it has 
been said (see section II), supporting a mechanistic account of scientific 
explanation is a trait of the new mechanism. New mechanists consider 
that a phenomenon is explained by means of specifying the mechanism 
that is responsible for it. The explanation of a phenomenon is often pre-
sented by means of a mechanistic model. A mechanistic model has two 
components: phenomenal description and mechanistic description 
[Glennan (2017), p. 66]. The phenomenal description is a model of the 
phenomenon and the mechanistic description is a model of the mecha-
nism responsible for it. In a mechanistic model, the phenomenal descrip-
tion is (or represents) the explanandum and the mechanistic description is 
(or represents) the explanans [Glennan (2005), p. 448]. Due to the fact 
that mechanisms are relevant in several fields, new mechanists argue that 
a mechanistic account of scientific explanation could be adopted in most 
fields of science. Hence, it would be an all-encompassing account of sci-
entific explanation. This can be presented as an argument in favour of it. 
As it was pointed at the beginning of this paper, the mechanistic ac-
count of scientific explanation has been developed as an alternative to the 
covering-law model. A well-known problem of the covering-law model is 
that there are fields of science where only a few laws are known, such as 
evolutionary biology [see Beatty (1995); Scriven (1959)]. A nomological ac-
count of explanation can hardly be defended for those fields. Nevertheless, 
several mechanisms are often known in those fields where laws are not 
available. A mechanistic account of explanation could be adopted for 
them. The broad applicability of the mechanistic account of scientific ex-
planation would be an argument to prefer it rather than other options.  
Both previously presented arguments rely on the same assumption. 
They assume that the same notion of mechanism exists in all the fields 
where mechanisms are relevant. It is considered that the adoption of the 
mechanistic approach in various fields would improve the relationships 
among them because their subjects of study would be very similar. But 
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they would be similar only if mechanisms are understood in a similar way 
in all fields. If those fields understood mechanisms in a very different 
way, the adoption of the mechanistic approach would not imply similar 
subjects of study. Likewise, it is considered that the mechanistic account of 
scientific explanation could offer a unified account of explanation because 
in several fields of science phenomena could be explained by means of re-
ferring to mechanisms. But it would be a unified standpoint only if mech-
anisms are similarly understood in all fields. If those fields understood 
mechanisms in a very different way, the mechanistic account of scientific 
explanation would not be unifier. Although several fields could refer to 
mechanisms, they would not refer to the same kind of things.  
The assumption on which both arguments rely is challenged by the 
difficulties faced by the search for generality. It is considered that the 
same notion of mechanism is shared by all fields of science where mech-
anisms are relevant. The search for generality constitutes the real attempt 
of identifying that shared notion. New mechanists try to propose a no-
tion of mechanism that suits most of the fields where mechanisms are 
relevant. Nevertheless, as it has been argued, both strategies for pursuing 
generality (i.e. the extrapolation strategy and the across-the-sciences 
strategy) face outstanding difficulties. This means that the assumption 
that the same notion of mechanism is shared by all fields is not justified 
and requires additional support. Not only is that shared notion unknown, 
but also several attempts of achieving it have failed. Therefore, both pre-
viously presented arguments in support of the mechanistic approach are 
not acceptable in their current form. They should not be used for en-





The search for generality is a general principle of the new mecha-
nism. New mechanists consider that an appropriate notion of mecha-
nism must be suitable for most of the fields of science where 
mechanisms are relevant. In order to propose a general notion of mech-
anism, two strategies have been adopted: the extrapolation strategy and 
the across-the-sciences strategy. As it has been argued, both of them face 
outstanding difficulties. The problems of the search for generality un-
dermine some arguments in support of the mechanistic approach, which 
rely on the assumption that the same notion of mechanism exists in all 
fields where mechanisms are relevant.  
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It seems that current notions of mechanism are unable to properly 
account for all kinds of mechanisms. Moreover, it is doubtful that a gen-
eral notion of mechanism could be developed. As Petri Ylikoski argues, 
“[t]he entities and processes studied by different sciences are quite heter-
ogeneous, and it is probably impossible to propose a mechanism defini-
tion that would be both informative and cover all the prominent 
examples of mechanisms” [Ylikoski (2012), p. 22]. Giving this scenario, 
it would be advisable to abandon the search for generality. In each field 
of science, a notion of mechanism must be developed taking the activity 
of the scientists of that field as the main reference. How mechanisms are 
understood in other fields should not heavily influence in that develop-
ment. It does not mean that philosophers of science must not think 
about similarities among mechanisms across the sciences. It could be 
very useful, after the development of the field-specific notions of mech-
anism, to compare the different notions of mechanism and identify their 
common features. Nevertheless, the output of that comparison would 
not be a proper notion of mechanism in general. In the same way that a 
list of the common features of English laboratories would not be a gen-
eral definition of English laboratory. It would just be a list of traits that 
are shared by mechanisms across the sciences. It is an open question if, 
in spite of not being a definition, some of those shared traits may be 
necessary or sufficient conditions to be a mechanism. But that question 
exceeds the scope of this paper. 
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1 Several classifications of the proposals raised within the new mechanical 
(or mechanistic) philosophy have been proposed [see Kuorikoski (2009); Reiss 
(2008)]. A particularly useful classification has been recently offered by Stuart 
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Glennan and Phyllis Illari (2018). They have distinguished two trends within the 
new mechanical philosophy: the new mechanism and the social scientific mech-
anism. In this paper, I will focus on what they call the new mechanism. It in-
volves the senses of the term ‘mechanism’ that Holly Andersen (2014) has 
named as mechanism1 and mechanism2. The main ideas of the social scientific 
mechanism can be found in the works of Jon Elster (1989), (1999) and Peter 
Hedström (2005). 
2 There is a disagreement among new mechanists about whether mecha-
nistic explanations are ontic (i.e. they explain because they fit the explanandum 
phenomenon into the causal structure of the world) or epistemic (i.e. they ex-
plain because they successfully increase our understanding of the world) [see Il-
lari (2013)]. Nevertheless, all of them agree that mechanistic explanations refer 
to the mechanism responsible for the explanandum phenomenon. 
3 Bert Leuridan (2010) has claimed that mechanistic accounts are not 
genuine alternatives to nomologic accounts. Taking the pragmatic account of 
laws by Sandra Mitchell (1997) as his starting point, he argues that mechanistic 
models epistemologically depend on laws and cannot replace them as a model of 
explanation in science. However, Andersen (2011) shows that mechanistic mod-
els are not dependent on laws, but on regularities, which are not synonymous 
with laws. 
4 Peter Hedström [(2005), p. 25] has developed the application of MDC’s 
notion of mechanism to sociology. 
5 Although Woodward is not properly a new mechanist, his work has 
strongly influenced many new mechanists [see Craver (2007); Glennan (2002); 
Woodward (2002), (2011)]. 
6 Since the publication of Skipper and Millstein’s paper, there has been a 
debate about how natural selection could be understood as a mechanism [see 
Barros (2008); DesAutels (2016); Illari and Williamson (2010); Pérez-González 
and Luque (2019)]. 
7 Lane DesAutels (2016) has recently argued that natural selection is only 
irregular in aspects that are not relevant in order to meet MDC’s requirement 
(e.g. product regularity, regularity regarding external sources of irregularity…). 
8 For other critiques against the mutual manipulability account of constitu-
tive relevance see Leuridan (2012). 
9 Rosenberg (2018) has underlined the strategic vagueness of some mech-
anistic proposals. He claims that mechanists are often cagey in order to avoid 
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Abstract In this paper, we address the question whether a mechanistic approach 
can account for evolutionary causes. The last decade has seen a major attempt to 
account for natural selection as a mechanism. Nevertheless, we stress the relevance 
of broadening the debate by including the other evolutionary causes inside the 
mechanistic approach, in order to be a legitimate conceptual framework on the same 
footing as other approaches to evolutionary theory. We analyse the current debate 
on natural selection as a mechanism, and extend it to the rest of the evolutionary 
causes. We focus on three approaches that we call the stochastic view, the functional 
view, and the minimalist view. We argue that all of them are unable to account for 
evolutionary causes as mechanisms. It is concluded that the current mechanistic pro-
posals cannot be accepted as a common framework for evolutionary causes. Finally, 
we outline some guidelines and requirements that any mechanistic proposal should 
meet in order to be applied to evolutionary theory.
Keywords Mechanism · Natural selection · Evolutionary cause · Function · 
Stochastic
1 Introduction
Evolutionary biologists sometimes talk about evolutionary causes as mechanisms 
acting upon populations. For example, it is said that natural selection “is a powerful 
mechanism of evolution” (Herron and Freeman 2014, 227), that it “is an effective 
mechanism for producing adaptation” (Bell 2008, 499), but at the same time there 
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are other “mechanisms [that] might overcome the limitations of natural selection” 
(Hamilton 2009, 368). Following this use, some philosophers have tried to develop 
a mechanistic approach for those causes, mainly focusing on natural selection. This 
could be a promising strategy for addressing some traditional topics in philosophy of 
biology. For instance, biologists and philosophers have argued for years on the (lack 
of) existence of biological laws and how this affects the scope of evolutionary expla-
nations (Beatty 1995; Elgin 2006), since the traditional notion of scientific explana-
tion (Hempel 1965) required laws as part of the explanans. The mechanistic account 
instead does not demand to appeal to laws in order to explain a phenomenon. It 
would also underline the link between evolutionary biology and other fields of sci-
ence where the mechanistic approach is generally accepted (e.g. molecular biology).
Following the mechanistic approach to causal evolution, there has been a dis-
cussion about whether mechanistic proposals can account for evolutionary causes 
as mechanisms. This debate was introduced by Skipper and Millstein (2005), who 
claimed that the main notions of mechanism [those of Glennan (2002) and Macha-
mer, Darden, and Craver (henceforth MDC) (2000)]1 did not suit natural selection. 
They identified three kinds of problems of those notions of mechanism in order to 
account for natural selection: problems related with parts or organization (i.e. their 
characterizations of mechanisms’ parts or organization do not suit natural selection’s 
parts or organization), problems related with productive relationships (i.e. they can-
not account for some productive relationships that occur in natural selection), and 
problems related with regularity (i.e. natural selection does not meet MDC require-
ment of regularity).2 Although Skipper and Millstein focused exclusively on natu-
ral selection, the same kind of problems would be found by Glennan’s and MDC’s 
proposals in order to account for other evolutionary causes (DesAutels 2018). For 
instance, evolutionary causes such as migration or genetic drift often depend on pas-
sive processes (e.g. lack of rainfall) that do not suit their accounts of productive rela-
tionships in mechanisms.
Our aim in this paper is to analyse current mechanistic approaches to causal evo-
lution (those that have been developed after Skipper and Millstein’s initial critique), 
which mainly focus on natural selection, and explore their validity for accounting for 
evolutionary causes. We argue that those approaches have to face important difficul-
ties, and therefore in their current formulation are unsuitable for evolutionary theory. 
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 presents the four main causes of 
evolution. Sections  3–5 analyse the three main current mechanistic approaches to 
1 These notions of mechanism, which were analysed by Skipper and Millstein, are ontic. They are based 
on the idea that mechanisms are part of reality and exist independently of us. However, Daniel J. Nichol-
son (2012) has proposed an epistemic notion of mechanism for biology and claimed that it can account 
for natural selection. Nicholson defines mechanisms as “epistemic models that enable the explanation of 
how phenomena are causally brought about” (Nicholson 2012, 161). Although Nicholson considers that 
his notion of mechanism allows us to understand natural selection as a mechanism, understanding natural 
selection (or another evolutionary cause) as a mechanism in this sense is problematic and does not suit 
biologists’ ideas.
2 Skipper and Millstein (2005) consider that only MDC’s proposal faces problems related with regular-
ity. Regarding Glennan’s proposal, they argue that it “holds promise for capturing the way in which natu-
ral selection is regular” (Skipper and Millstein 2005, 342).
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evolutionary causes. They respectively address what we call the “stochastic view”, 
the “functional view”, and the “minimalist view”. We offer reasons why none of 
them can account neither for natural selection, nor for evolutionary causes in gen-
eral. Finally, Sect. 6 concludes by underlying the potential benefits of the mecha-
nistic proposal and noting some requirements that should be met by a mechanistic 
approach for evolutionary causes.
2  Evolutionary causes
Evolutionary theory usually establishes four main causes of evolution: mutation, 
migration, natural selection, and genetic drift.3 Traditionally, the term mutation refers 
to an error in the replication of a nucleotide sequence. Nevertheless, currently “muta-
tion” includes any alteration of the DNA molecule or any alteration of the genome 
such as inversions, deletions, translocations, duplications, etc. (Futuyma 2013). 
Migration refers to the movement of individuals between populations. These move-
ments incorporate new genes to the gene pool of one population from one or other 
populations –technically, this incorporation is called gene flow, which requires not 
only migration but also mating in order to establish those new genes in the population 
(Conner and Hartl 2004). On the other hand, modern formulations of evolution by 
natural selection usually require three conditions: variation, heredity, and fitness differ-
ences. These are the so-called Lewontin’s conditions for evolution by natural selection, 
heritable variation in fitness (Lewontin 1970). Although this formulation is not perfect 
(see Godfrey-Smith 2007), it is sufficiently general and used by researchers. Thus, we 
can use Lewtonin’s conditions as a starting point. If in a population we have organ-
isms that differ in their traits (variation), some of these organisms have more offspring 
than others due to these trait differences (fitness differences), and these traits are trans-
mitted to the next generation (heredity), then evolution by natural selection occurs. 
Finally, allele and trait frequencies are also influenced by several factors that affect 
their trajectories in a stochastic way as a result of sampling process (Conner and Hartl 
2004). This sort of randomness is called “genetic drift”, an indiscriminate sampling 
process that produces specific effects on a population (Millstein 2002).
Unfortunately, there is no consensus among philosophers about how we should 
understand these different causes of evolution. Thus, a great number of different 
interpretations of causal evolution have been postulated: (1) the force interpreta-
tion, championed by Sober (1984); (2) the manipulationist approach based on the 
work of Woodward (2003) (see Reisman and Forber 2005; Shapiro and Sober 2007; 
Clatterbuck 2015); (3) the causal process approach, specially defended by Millstein 
(2006, 2013); (4) the counterfactual approach, developed by Glennan (2009) and 
Huneman (2012); (5) the probabilistic approach, elaborated in different ways by 
Abrams (2015), Razeto-Barry and Frick (2011), and Otsuka (2016); (6) and finally 
the mechanistic approach.
3 There is disagreement among some philosophers on this causal view, arguing instead for a “statistical 
view” of evolution (Matthen and Ariew 2002, Walsh et al. 2002). In as much we accept that these phe-
nomena are all causal, then we ask whether there can be a mechanistic account for them.
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Until now, the mechanistic approach has mainly focused on natural selection (Bar-
ros 2008; DesAutels 2016; Illari and Williamson 2010). New mechanists have been 
arguing about how that approach suits natural selection, almost without devoting 
attention to the other evolutionary causes. However, the alternative approaches (e.g. 
the force interpretation, the counterfactual approach, etc.) aspire to locate the differ-
ent evolutionary causes in a single framework. Thus, for example, the force inter-
pretation conceptualizes the causes of evolution as forces, interacting analogously as 
Newtonian forces do in physical systems. This single framework aspiration results 
from the fact that biologists consider that all evolutionary causes are processes of the 
same kind (i.e. processes capable of producing changes in allele or trait frequencies, 
and whose (combined) effects are mathematically tractable), and that a common con-
ceptual framework allows researchers to deal with those causes, their dynamics, and 
their relationships in a more effective way. Given this situation, we consider that the 
mechanistic approach must take on the challenge of conceptualizing all evolutionary 
causes as mechanisms, in order to be a legitimate conceptual framework on the same 
footing than the other approaches. In fact, the will of generality is already present 
in the new mechanistic philosophy itself (see Machamer et al. 2000; Illari and Wil-
liamson 2012; Glennan 2017). Moreover, Lane DesAutels (2018) has recently advo-
cate the viability of the mechanistic approach as a common framework for some evo-
lutionary causes –although this interesting first tentative does not address the issue 
in an extensive way. In what follows, we will analyse the current debate regarding 
the mechanistic interpretation of natural selection and extend it to all evolutionary 
causes. We will consider the main mechanistic proposals that have been developed 
after Skipper and Millstein’s initial critique to the mechanistic approach.
3  Mechanistic proposals based on a stochastic view of mechanisms
After the initial critique by Skipper and Millstein on the mechanistic approach to 
natural selection, different kinds of mechanistic proposals have been raised. One sort 
of proposal is based on the idea that, due to the fact that natural selection is not 
regular, it could be possible to account for it as a mechanism by means of a notion 
of stochastic mechanism. This idea is proposed by Skipper and Millstein themselves 
after presenting their critique. In this sense, they said:
In the context of natural selection, the most general statement we can make 
concerning directions for further work on the new mechanistic philosophy is 
this: to capture natural selection, a main evolutionary mechanism, a concep-
tion of stochastic mechanism as a non-unique causal chain is required in which 
change is produced by virtue of the ways in which property differences among 
members of a population in the context of some environment affect properties 
of that population. (Skipper and Millstein 2005, 345)
Barros (2008) has followed this advice and has developed a notion of stochas-
tic mechanism in order to account for natural selection. Barros considers that by 
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lowering the demands for regularity it is possible to understand natural selection as 
a mechanism in a sense close to that posed by Glennan and MDC. He defends that 
the regularity that must be demanded of a mechanism depends on the type of expla-
nation in which it is integrated. He argues that “[t]he degree of regularity needed to 
make a satisfactory scientific explanation depends in part on whether the explana-
tion is being made ex post or ex ante” (Barros 2008, 309). He divides mechanistic 
explanations between ex post, which just explain the occurrence of a phenomenon 
after its occurrence, and ex ante, which “seek to explain both how a phenomenon has 
occurred in the past and to predict how it will occur in the future” (Barros 2008, 309). 
Barros claims that ex post explanations are always deterministic and make reference 
only to deterministic mechanisms. However, within ex ante explanations, he distin-
guishes between deterministic and stochastic explanations, depending on what kinds 
of predictions they support. Ex ante deterministic explanations are ex ante explana-
tions which appeal to a deterministic mechanism and which support predictions with 
certainty. Ex ante stochastic explanations are ex ante explanations which appeal to a 
stochastic mechanism and where the “outcome can be predicted in advance in terms 
that are probabilistic” (Barros 2008, 311). Stochastic mechanisms can be biased, if 
they give the result a probability greater than 50%, or unbiased, if they give the result 
a probability equal to or less than 50%. It would be possible to distinguish between 
ex ante biased stochastic explanations and ex ante unbiased stochastic explanations. 
Natural selection would be a biased stochastic mechanism and would be involved in 
ex ante biased stochastic explanations. As a biased stochastic mechanism, which is 
present in ex ante biased stochastic explanations, natural selection just has to work 
more than half of the time in the same way under the same conditions.
The main problematic aspect of Barros’ proposal is the idea that populations are 
component entities of natural selection. Barros considers that natural selection is a 
two-level mechanism. In order to understand natural selection in mechanistic terms 
it is necessary to appeal to both individual level and population level mechanisms. 
At the population level, natural selection is a mechanism that has populations as 
components. Barros understands a population as “an abstract entity that describes 
a group of individual organisms” (Barros 2008, 316). Understanding natural selec-
tion as a mechanism whose component entities are populations gives rise to differ-
ent problems. Firstly, it would produce an identification between the subject of the 
overall phenomenon of the mechanism and the components of the mechanism. The 
mechanism would connect initial population-level conditions with final population-
level conditions, through different states at the population level. This goes against 
the idea, which underlies the mechanistic approach, that a mechanism builds a 
link between a phenomenon of certain level and lower-level entities and activities 
(Machamer et al. 2000, 19). Presenting a mechanism means to open a black-box (a 
connection between an input and an output whose structure is considered inexist-
ent or irrelevant) and the aim of a mechanism is to provide “a fine-grained as well 
as tight coupling” (Hedström and Swedberg 1998, 25) between the input and the 
output. Actually, a population-level mechanism of natural selection would not be a 
mechanism, but a succession of causal relations at a certain fixed level.
Secondly, it would mean accepting that a real concrete system can be entirely com-
posed of abstract entities and their relations. We can divide the notions of mechanism 
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between ontic notions, which consider that mechanisms are concrete things in the 
real world and exist independently of us, and epistemic notions, which consider that 
mechanisms are pieces of scientific reasoning. Barros is aligned, like Glennan and 
MDC, with the ontic conception of mechanisms and considers that mechanisms are 
concrete things. His idea that a mechanism could be composed of populations, which 
he defines as abstract entities, and their relations implies assuming that a real con-
crete system could be entirely composed of abstract entities and their relations. It 
would create several problems regarding mechanisms’ ontological status.
It could be though that a different notion of stochastic mechanism, which eludes 
the diverse problems of Barros’ proposal,4 could correctly account for natural selec-
tion and the other evolutionary causes. However, it is not at all clear if it is the case. 
Every attempt at understanding evolutionary causes as mechanisms by means of a 
notion of stochastic mechanism would be built on the assumption that they are sto-
chastic, but we consider that this idea could be problematic too. Certainly, genetic 
drift is traditionally portrayed as a stochastic factor of evolution, producing unpre-
dictable fluctuations in allele frequency (Gillespie 2004; Rice 2004). However, the 
stochastic character of other evolutionary causes such as natural selection, migration 
or mutation is at least dubious.
Several authors in this debate (Barros, Skipper, Millstein…) have accepted the sto-
chastic nature of natural selection. However, we think that defenders of the mechanistic 
view should consider that the stochastic character of natural selection and other evo-
lutionary causes is not sufficiently supported, especially from the mathematical appa-
ratus of Population Genetics. Population Genetics textbooks usually start formulating 
the Hardy–Weinberg law. This law assumes: random mating, discrete generations, 
no mutation, no migration, no random genetic drift (infinite population size), and no 
natural selection. Therefore, by relaxing these assumptions we can elaborate dynamic 
models in order to predict the allele frequencies provided that one or more evolution-
ary causes are acting on populations. For differences in fitness –natural selection– one 
of the simplest examples is one locus with two alleles, A and a, with frequency p and 
q (respectively), non-overlapping generations, and with constant genotypic fitnesses 
wAA, wAa, waa. The model deals with viability selection, where w is the average prob-
ability of survival from zygote to reproductive age. Assuming Hardy–Weinberg equi-
librium before selection, the frequency of A in the next generation is
where w̄ is the mean population fitness (wAAp2 + 2wAapq + waaq2). The expected 





4 Joyce C. Havstad (2011) has also raised some other problems of Barros’ proposal. She noted that the 
model of the mechanism of generalized natural selection proposed by Barros is too general and due to this 
fact is unable to distinctively characterize natural selection. The model proposed by Barros is not a model 
of generalized natural selection but a model of selection in general, which fits any selective process.
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We can reduce the portion of the brackets as
where w* is the marginal fitness of allele A, i.e., a measure of its average fitness, tak-
ing into account the frequencies of the other alleles present in the genotypes in which 
A is present (Charlesworth and Charlesworth 2010). This model of natural selection 
is a deterministic one. That is, the changes in allele frequencies must be viewed as 
part of a deterministic process. Although this is one of the simplest models, it shows 
that natural selection is modelled deterministically in Population Genetics. This is 
also the case for migration and mutation. Mutation is introduced by specifying the 
rate at which each allele (A and a) mutates to the other. In the same way, migration is 
introduced by specifying the rate at which a proportion of individuals immigrates or 
emigrates. Thus, we can combine all these different evolutionary causes, elaborating 
more deterministic models. For example, the mutation-selection equilibrium model
where µ is the mutation rate and s is the strength of selection, shows how the action of 
natural selection against a deleterious allele is compensated by a high mutation rate of 
change from the normal allele to the deleterious, the population being in equilibrium 
(Rice 2004). Similarly, the effects of selection and migration can be represented as
where p1 and p2 are the frequency of the allele in each population, aA is the average 
excess of fitness of the allele A, and m is the migration rate (Templeton 2006). How-
ever, when drift is introduced, the effects of these evolutionary causes are repre-
sented as a stochastic model calculating the probability distribution of populations. 
Thus, for the equilibrium probability distribution of allele frequency under selection, 
mutation, migration, and drift we obtain
where C is a constant, and Ne the effective population size, u is the mutation rate, 
and mpI is the migration rate times the frequency of the allele A among immigrants 
(Rice 2004). This is standard in any Population Genetics textbook (Charlesworth 
and Charlesworth 2010; Ewens 2004; Rice 2004). We start with a deterministic the-
ory, which includes models of selection, mutation, and migration. Thereafter, we 
construct a stochastic theory including random genetic drift by postulating a finite 
Δp = p
































?̂? = Cw̄2Ne (1 − p)4Ne(u1+m−mpI )−1p4Ne(u2+mpI )−1
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population size, and now evolution is considered as a stochastic process, where 
deterministic models are replaced by stochastic models, like Markov chain theory 
and Diffusion theory, combining deterministic and stochastic processes.
Certainly, it could be argued that the fact that some evolutionary causes (natu-
ral selection, migration, and mutation) are modelled deterministically in Population 
Genetics does not refute by itself their stochastic interpretation. That deterministic 
character could be an idealizing assumption of the models that belies biological real-
ity. Furthermore, not every theoretical work models those evolutionary causes in a 
deterministic way.5 As Millstein et al. (2009) claim, although mathematical models 
are relevant for understanding biological concepts, “models themselves are not the 
ultimate resource” (Millstein et al. 2009, 6). In order to accurately understand evo-
lutionary causes is necessary to also take into account the historical and contempo-
rary biological practice. Nevertheless, we consider that biological practice also casts 
doubt on the stochastic interpretation of some evolutionary causes. When biologists 
deal with real populations in their day-to-day practice, they often understand evolu-
tionary causes such as natural selection, migration, and mutation in a deterministic 
way. They consider that those causes are deterministic processes that influence the 
change in trait frequencies, and that the stochasticity of populations’ evolutionary 
path is mainly a product of genetic drift. In this sense, evolutionary biologist Gra-
ham Bell says: “Drift and selection are not alternatives. All populations are finite, 
and few are completely devoid of variation in fitness, so both drift and selection will 
almost always occur together. The most important effect of drift is that it makes the 
outcome of selection less predictable. The expected response to selection per gener-
ation in a finite population is sp(1 − p), its deterministic value, but through sampling 
error it will deviate from this precise value, the variance of this deviation being 
p(1 − p)/N” (Bell 2008, 69).6 Actually, this deterministic conceptualization7 was 
already present in some classical works regarding evolutionary theory. For example, 
6 It is necessary to point out that we are not claiming that any deviation from fitness expectations should 
be attributed to drift. That deviation could be the result of other elements (selective pressures and/or 
other evolutionary causes that were not taken into account, a spurious statistical correlation, etc.).
7 Another remarkable example of this deterministic conceptualization is provided by Brian Charles-
worth: “In the era of multi-species comparisons of genome sequences and genome-wide surveys of DNA 
sequence variability, there is more need than ever before to understand the evolutionary role of genetic 
5 There are some theoretical works where multiple evolutionary causes, and not only genetic drift, are 
modelled stochastically. For example, Rice and collaborators (Rice 2008; Rice and Papadopoulos 2009; 
Rice et  al. 2011) have developed a stochastic version of the Price equation that can deal with random 
variables as stochastic fitness and stochastic migration, and therefore allowing to model selection and 
migration as stochastic processes. However, we consider that those theoretical works do not accurately 
represent biologists’ ideas about the nature of evolutionary causes. Biologists often understand evolution-
ary causes other than drift as deterministic processes. From our point of view, modelling stochastically 
those evolutionary causes is probably just a result of epistemological limitations. This seems the case of 
Rice and collaborators, inasmuch they talk repeatedly about our epistemic problems to study evolution-
ary systems and the necessity to construct stochastic models to supply those shortcomings. For example, 
they say that “we can not know with certainty how many descendants an individual will leave or what 
they will look like until after reproduction has taken place” (Rice and Papadopoulos 2009, 2); and that 
“[b]ecause we can not know with certainty how many descendants each individual in a population will 
have, we need to treat fitness as a random variable -having a distribution of possible values” (Rice et al. 
2011).
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in the well-known experiment by Dobzhansky and Pavlovsky (1957), it is argued 
that the apparent stochasticity of natural selection is a consequence of the finite size 
of populations (i.e. genetic drift). Dobzhansky and Pavlovsky tracked the frequen-
cies of two genetic types, PP and AR, which are different inversions on the third 
chromosome in Drosophila pseudoobscura. They replicated twenty populations, ten 
with a large initial population (of about 4000 flies) and ten with a small initial popu-
lation (of about 20 flies). They found that the outcome of natural selection in the 
studied populations was conditioned by genetic drift. Although, “the environments 
being reasonably uniform in all experimental populations, the outcome of the selec-
tion processes in the replicate experiments should also be uniform” (Dobzhansky 
and Pavlovsky 1957, 316), the finite size of the populations (i.e. genetic drift) pre-
vent the outcomes from being uniform. They also showed that, as the population 
size decreases and the influence of genetic drift increases, the deviations become 
greater, increasing the fluctuations across generations.
Defenders of the stochastic view of evolutionary causes could argue, as Skip-
per and Millstein (2005) do regarding natural selection, that several identical real 
populations under the influence of the same evolutionary cause would, in all likeli-
hood, differ in their evolutionary outcomes. The structure of the argument would 
be as follows. Imagine that we have one hundred populations of an organism (like 
finches), with the same population size, the same distribution of beak lengths, and 
all located in the same environment, and that one evolutionary cause such as natural 
selection, mutation, or migration acts upon them. It would be expected that, despite 
the fact that the evolutionary cause is equally acting in all of them, the evolution-
ary outcomes of the various populations would not be equal (i.e. the distribution of 
break lengths in the next generation will differ). It could seem that this kind of argu-
ment supports the idea that those evolutionary causes are stochastic processes whose 
outcomes are not fully predictable. However, we think that it is inaccurate. From 
biologists’ point of view, that difference in populations’ outcomes would not be a 
consequence of the stochastic nature of those evolutionary causes, but an effect of 
genetic drift (Hansen 2017). The populations’ evolutionary outcomes would differ 
just because, since those populations are finite, genetic drift affects them.
On balance, to claim that natural selection and other evolutionary causes such 
as migration and mutation are stochastic processes needs more support and deal 
with the theoretical mathematical models developed in the last century. The sto-
chastic view, in order to become a common framework and account for evolutionary 
causes as stochastic mechanisms, requires conceptualizing evolutionary causes as 
stochastic processes. A process can only be understood as a stochastic mechanism 
if it is stochastic. Although some evolutionary causes –like genetic drift– fit into 
that framework, others –like migration or natural selection– are less clear. There-
fore, we argue that both parts, defenders and critics of the mechanistic approach, 
must do not take for granted the stochastic nature of some evolutionary causes and 
drift, and its interactions with the deterministic forces of mutation, migration, recombination and selec-
tion.” (Charlesworth 2009, 195).
Footnote 7 (continued)
 S. Pérez-González, V. J. Luque 
1 3
13 Page 10 of 23
discuss more deeply on it. This also undermines Skipper and Millstein’s argument 
that natural selection is not regular enough and does not meet MDC’s requirement of 
regularity. Their critique, which motivates Barros’ proposal, is not justified enough. 
Although this gives new chances for the mechanistic approach, it still has to han-
dle with other evolutionary causes (essentially, genetic drift) that are unquestionably 
considered stochastic. A defender of the mechanistic view could answer that it is 
possible, as Barros shows, to hold a pluralistic mechanistic framework and consider 
that mechanisms could be deterministic or stochastic. Following this line of argu-
mentation, it could be argued that all evolutionary causes are mechanisms, although 
some are deterministic mechanisms and other are stochastic mechanisms. However, 
if this position was taken, the question would be whether in that scenario evolution-
ary causes would actually be allocated in a single framework. There would be some 
relevant differences among them (e.g. grade of regularity, type of connection among 
its components, predictability, etc.), and it is not clear which similarities would be 
underlined by this framework.
4  Mechanistic proposals based on a functional view of mechanisms
There is a strong connection between the notion of mechanism and the notion of 
function. Several definitions of mechanism have been elaborated on the basis that 
a mechanism is something that performs a function. The most relevant of them 
is the notion of mechanism proposed by Bechtel and Abrahamsen (2005). They 
define a mechanism as a “structure performing a function in virtue of its compo-
nent parts, component operations, and their organization” (Bechtel and Abrahamsen 
2005, 423). More recently, Garson (2013) has also defended a functional notion of 
mechanism.
Recently some authors have tried, inspired by functional notions of mechanism 
and based on the consideration that natural selection performs a function, to respond 
to the Skipper and Millstein’s initial critique and defend the possibility of under-
standing natural selection as an MDC mechanism. Illari and Williamson (2010) 
have argued that natural selection is decomposable into parts (entities and activities) 
and has organization. In a similar line of argumentation, Lane DesAutels (2016) has 
argued that natural selection meets the requirement of regularity imposed by MDC.
Illari and Williamson argue that for a complex system to be a mechanism it has 
to perform a function. In this sense they affirm: “mechanisms are mechanisms for 
a phenomenon. In that sense, mechanisms have functions” (Illari and Williamson 
2010, 283). If the mechanism is integrated into a system, “function” must be under-
stood as “causal-role” function (Cummins 1975). If the mechanism does not refer to 
a system that integrates it, then “function” has to be understood on the basis of the 
notion of Craver (2001) of “isolated description”. In the case of natural selection, 
they consider that it does not refer to a system that integrates it and “function” must 
be understood on the basis of the notion of “isolated description”.
Craver (2001) considers that there are three ways to describe the activity 
of a mechanism: contextual description, isolated description, and constitutive 
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description. Isolated description consists of describing the activity of the mechanism 
regardless of context (Craver 2001, 64). From this perspective the activity of the 
mechanism: (1) does not refer to a context, (2) does not refer to objects beyond the 
limits of the mechanism, (3) it is something that the mechanism produces by itself, 
and (4) allows setting the active, spatial and temporal limits of the mechanism. Illari 
and Williamson appeal to a notion of function derived from this type of descrip-
tion. According to this notion, which is not made explicit by Craver, the function 
of a mechanism is the activity assigned to it by means of an isolated description. 
They refer to this activity as the “characteristic activity” of the mechanism. From 
this approach the function of the heart would be to contract. In the case of natural 
selection, they consider that its function –characteristic activity—is the production 
of adaptations.
Illari and Williamson argue that by taking the function of a mechanism as a refer-
ence it is possible to decompose it into entities and activities. They consider that the 
components of a mechanism have to be identified and individualized on the basis 
of their functions. In this sense they say: “successful structural decomposition is 
into functionally relevant parts” (Illari and Williamson 2010, 284). In relation to the 
components of the mechanisms “function” must be understood as a “causal-role” 
function. Regarding the function of the entities they affirm: “The function of an 
entity is the role it plays in the overall behaviour of the mechanism” (Illari and Wil-
liamson 2010, 285). Besides, regarding the activities, they maintain a similar posi-
tion and affirm: “[a]ctivities are individuated in a similar way to entities in the hier-
archy of mechanisms. Activities are identified in terms of their contribution to the 
behaviour of the phenomenon to be explained” (Illari and Williamson 2010, 285). 
The function of a component is always dependent on the function of the mechanism, 
since the function of the component is characterized on the basis of its contribution 
to the function of the mechanism. Therefore, since the individualization of the com-
ponents depends on their function, the individualization of the components depends 
on the function of the mechanism.
They consider that insofar as natural selection has a function, it is decomposable 
into parts. In the case of natural selection, the components would be sub-mecha-
nisms that are integrated into it and contribute to its function. Examples of such 
component entities of natural selection would be populations, organisms, cells, etc. 
Examples of activities would be reproduction, recombination, and so on.
Illari and Williamson also defend that by taking as a reference the function of a 
mechanism it is possible to attribute organization to it. They define the organization 
of a mechanism as “whatever features exist by which the activities and entities each 
do something and do something together to produce the phenomenon” (Illari and 
Williamson 2010, 289). The organization can be of different types: spatiotemporal 
organization, feedback, control systems, part-whole, etc. They consider that natural 
selection, insofar as it has a function, is an organized mechanism. With regard to 
the type of organization that occurs in natural selection, they point out that “no one 
form of organization is present in all cases of natural selection but only organiza-
tion understood at a certain level of abstraction” (Illari and Williamson 2010, 290). 
However, with regard to the concrete cases of natural selection they affirm: “natural 
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selection in the concrete case does show spatiotemporal organization” (Illari and 
Williamson 2010, 290).
DesAutels takes as his starting point the thesis defended by Illari and William-
son. His argument assumes the following considerations: (1) mechanisms have a 
function, (2) natural selection has a function (to produce adaptation), and (3) natural 
selection is decomposable into entities and activities. On the basis of these consider-
ations he argues “natural selection only fails to be regular in ways that are unthreat-
ening to its status as MDC mechanism” (DesAutels 2016, 16). Firstly, DesAutels 
considers that the regularity demanded can be understood as process regularity or 
as product regularity. The process regularity consists in that “the constituent entities 
and activities of a mechanism behave in roughly the same way each time the mech-
anism operates” (DesAutels 2016, 16) and product regularity consists in that “the 
output of a mechanism is roughly the same” (DesAutels 2016, 16). He considers that 
the relevant regularity to be an MDC mechanism must be the process regularity, due 
to the fact that the paradigmatic example of an MDC mechanism (protein synthesis) 
is process regular but not product regular. Natural selection is not product regular, 
as noted by Skipper and Millstein (2005, 343). However, natural selection is process 
regular.
Secondly, DesAutels distinguishes between internal and external sources of irreg-
ularity. The irregularity of a mechanism may be due to elements internal to it or 
elements external to it. The delimitation of a mechanism (to establish what is inter-
nal and what is external to it) depends on its function. In this respect he says: “enti-
ties and activities are constitutive of a given mechanism just in case the mechanism 
could not serve its function without them” (DesAutels 2016, 18). In order to be an 
MDC mechanism the relevant aspect is not to be irregular due to internal sources. 
The criterion for being regular cannot be regularity regarding external sources 
because even the most regular mechanisms (e.g. synaptic transmission, protein syn-
thesis, DNA replication, etc.) may be affected by external sources of irregularity.8 
Skipper and Millstein (2005, 343) reveal the irregularity of natural selection over 
external sources of regularity, but not over internal sources.9
The authors whose proposal is based on a functional view of mechanisms con-
sider that natural selection has a primary function: producing adaptations. As we 
have seen, this idea is the cornerstone of their approach and all their arguments 
ultimately rely on it. Nevertheless, we consider that producing adaptations is not 
the function of natural selection. Illari and Williamson say: “Natural selection hav-
ing an isolated description is no problem. Natural selection explains adaptation, 
because natural selection characteristically produces adaptation. So natural selec-
tion is a mechanism for adaptation” (2010, 283). DesAutels agrees: “Quite clearly, 
8 We think that, in the case of natural selection, those external sources of irregularity identified by 
DesAutels –i.e. “non-critical environmental features which are not constitutive of the token mechanism 
[selection]” (2016, 19)– are very likely to be just instantiations of drift processes.
9 DesAutels also proposed a third distinction. He distinguishes between abstract and concrete regular-
ity. Abstract regularity is the ability of a type mechanism to subsume different token mechanisms. On 
the other hand, concrete regularity is the capacity of a type mechanism to give a detailed account of the 
token mechanisms that it subsumes.
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natural selection is a system for something: it is that which brings about adaptation” 
(2016, 14). This move is quite natural. Organisms appear to be designed for their 
environments. This apparent design, attributed to a supernatural designer for centu-
ries, needed a naturalistic explanation. Darwin gave us that naturalistic explanation 
where the process of natural selection progressively improves organism’s suitabil-
ity to their environment, and therefore giving them the appearance of design. Since 
Darwin published his theory, natural selection has been strongly connected to the 
concept of adaptation. Nevertheless, our aim in this part of the section is to chal-
lenge this deep connection, and thus partially undermining the functional argument 
of natural selection as a mechanism for adaptation.
The original formulation of natural selection by Darwin was strongly influenced 
by William Paley’s “argument from design” (Darwin 1958; Ayala 2004) and the 
demographic works of Robert Malthus (Darwin 1958; Eldredge 2005). Thus, Dar-
win focused on explaining how highly functional organs like the human eye (Paley) 
could have emerged from the struggle for existence. This struggle would be an ine-
ludible result of lack of resources in nature due to the geometrical growth of popula-
tions (Malthus). Following this line of argumentation, some authors (for instance 
Dennett 1995) proposed to define fitness as an individual’s capacity to solve 
“design-problems” set by the environment, i.e. its capacity to fit in that environment. 
This engineering approach has been very successful in some areas (like behavioral 
ecology), and especially in popular explanations of the theory of natural selection. 
This engineering view is based on the idea that organisms evolve traits that maxi-
mize the ability of a population of those organisms to increase in size, i.e. traits that 
increase overall population growth rate (Rice 2004).
However, theoretical and experimental advances over the last century show a sub-
tle but critical distinction between the efficiency of an individual and its capacity to 
fit or adjust in a particular environment, i.e. to solve the “design-problems”. Imagine 
a female lion –a type of lion– with the best possible characteristics to deal with all 
the challenges of its environment: a short, thin coat to carry high temperatures; a 
strong and robust body structure capable of dealing with all kinds of blows, falls, 
and collisions; sharp fangs to tear flesh; strong claws to catch prey; sexually attrac-
tive to seduce male lions; etc. This (type of) lion is perfectly adapted to its environ-
ment. Nevertheless, imagine that this (type of) lion is sterile. If that is so, then its fit-
ness (i.e. its reproductive efficacy) would be null because it does not leave offspring 
and therefore its genes do not pass to the next generation. Natural selection would 
act against this type of lions –against the infertile trait–, although their suitability 
to the environment is impressive.10 It is necessary to understand that, ultimately, 
natural selection acts on one trait –fitness, i.e. reproductive success– and it may act 
indirectly on other traits.11 The idea is that natural selection does not necessarily 
10 Certainly, there are examples of sterile organisms with positive fitness, like in eusocial insect colonies, 
where some individuals forego their reproductive capacity in order to support the reproduction of their 
relatives. These types of organisms successfully pass their genes to the next generation. In our example, 
there is no such behavior.
11 As Gillespie says: “To a geneticist, fitness is just another trait with a genetic component. To an evolu-
tionist, it is the ultimate trait because it is the one upon which natural selection acts” (Gillespie 2004, 59).
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lead to adaptation, as Darwin thought, but always leads to non-random reproduc-
tive success.12 That is, adaptation is a potential (but not necessary) outcome of the 
process of natural selection (Gould and Lloyd 1999). Here is an example by Richard 
Lewontin:
A mutation that doubled the egg-laying rate in an insect, limited by the amount 
of food available to the immature stages, would be very rapidly spread through 
the population. Yet, the end result would be a population with the same adult 
density as before but twice the density of early immatures and much greater 
competition among larvae stages. Periodic server shortages of food would 
make the probability of extinction of the population greater than it was when 
larvae competition was less. Moreover, predators may switch their search 
images to the larvae of this species now that they are more abundant, and epi-
demic diseases may more easily spread. It would be difficult to say precisely 
what environmental problem the increase of fecundity was a solution to. (Lev-
ins and Lewontin 1985, 81)
Those mutant insects mentioned by Lewontin are not better adapted because there 
is no improvement in their performance regarding environmental challenges. That 
is, there is no better fit to their environment because they have double offspring but 
also double mortality. Now imagine that some of those mutant insects suffer another 
mutation that doubled the efficiency for metabolizing food. That would be an adap-
tive improvement and it would be reflected in the population census, increasing the 
population size. This is what Darwin had in mind and why the term fitness was used, 
since to fit makes reference to the grade of adaptedness of an individual to its envi-
ronment. In other words, natural selection does not necessarily optimize any indi-
vidual trait—i.e. an optimal trait value that maximizes the fitness associated with 
that trait–, and when it does it is under rare circumstances such as when the trait has 
no phenotypic variance at equilibrium, and there is nonlinearity between the trait 
and fitness at equilibrium (see Crow and Nagylaki 1976; Templeton 2006, for math-
ematical details).
In summary: “The point here is that the dynamics of selection depend on the 
dynamics of population growth, and this critically affects the outcome of selec-
tion. Survival of the fittest is just one of many possible outcomes. There is more to 
selection and evolutionary success that increase of the better-designed phenotypes” 
(Michod 1999, 27). Of course, there are in the literature definitions of adaptation 
where the most adapted phenotype is always chosen by natural selection (see Reeve 
and Sherman 1993). Nevertheless, we think that they are misleading, since there are 
conditions where natural selection operates and the best-adapted organisms do not 
succeed.13 Therefore, one might say that that undermines the functional argument 
12 De Jong endorses a similar claim: “Differences in adaptation will lead to fitness differences, but fit-
ness differences are not necessarily associated with differences in adaptation” (De Jong 1994, 20).
13 Another example of this is a particular type of selection, the so-called called “survival of the first”, 
where a best adapted type cannot invade a population because the population growth is superexponential 
(see Michod 1999, chap. 3; Nowak 2006, chap. 2, for mathematical details). It could be argued that the 
fact that natural selection does not always produce adaptation, does not imply that adaptation is not the 
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of natural selection as a mechanism for adaptation. In our opinion it is true that a 
mechanism always needs the same function, but it certainly isn’t true that if there is 
a different function, there is no mechanism. We have tried to show that the function 
of natural selection is not what Illari, Williamson and DesAutels thought it was, but 
this is quite different to there not being any function at all. It could be argued that 
the proper function of natural selection is to increase the reproductive success. How-
ever, this change has a cost for the functional view, because changing the function 
implies changes in the entities and activities that compose the mechanism, as well as 
its organization and boundaries, inasmuch all those elements rely upon the assumed 
function of the mechanism.
Illari and Williamson—and DesAutels to the extent that he probably follows 
them in this aspect–, are not only wrong when they claim that the function of natu-
ral selection is the production of adaptation, they are also wrong when they con-
sider that, if we defined the function of a mechanism as the activity assigned to it by 
means of an isolated description (characteristic activity), then the function of natural 
selection would be the production of adaptation. Often, when an isolated description 
of a process of natural selection is presented, the activity assigned to it is not the 
production of adaptation, but the increase of reproductive success.
The functional view, in order to be applied to evolutionary causes, needs to assign 
functions to them. The problem is that each evolutionary cause brings about several 
outcomes and it is difficult to identify one of them as its function. Mutation is usu-
ally considered the ultimate source of genetic variation. So, a defender of the func-
tional view may claim that the function of mutation is to provide genetic variation. 
However, a crucial problem arises very quickly when we try to assign functionality 
to particular outcomes of migration and drift: there are too many. Migration and 
drift have several impacts on populations. Migration introduces genetic variation in 
a population. It also reduces the level of differentiation among populations, homog-
enizing the populations of a species. In addition, migration is crucial for hybridiza-
tion and for the process of speciation. Meanwhile, drift plays a major role in the 
survival of new mutations and their possible fixation in a population. It removes 
genetic variation in a population, but at the same time increases the level of dif-
ferentiation among populations. It also, as a random process, affects the predictabil-
ity of a population. In addition, it should be recalled that all evolutionary causes 
affect gene frequencies (another outcome). Therefore, migration and drift produce 
several outcomes upon populations, and this is also true for mutation and selection. 
Mutation alters the change in gene frequency, but also increase variation within sub-
populations and decreases the variation among subpopulations. Likewise, natural 
function of natural selection. In order for a mechanism to have a function it does not have to always suc-
ceed at implementing that function. For example, heart’s function is to pump blood at a specific rate, but 
sometimes it does not pump blood at that rate. Nevertheless, it does not seem the case for natural selec-
tion and adaptation. When a heart does not pump blood at a proper rate, doctors consider that it is not 
producing its function in a correct matter. However, when natural selection is acting but it does not pro-
duce adaptation, evolutionary biologists do not consider that it is not producing its function in a correct 
matter, as long as there is non-random differential reproductive success.
Footnote 13 (continued)
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selection alters the variation within and among subpopulations, as well as chang-
ing the gene frequencies. Thus, the functional view must contend with the problem 
of attributing a particular function for each evolutionary cause in spite of the great 
variability of outcomes. This problem could not be resolved by means of consider-
ing that the function of an evolutionary cause is its characteristic activity (i.e. the 
activity assigned to it by means of an isolated description), because the production 
of all the outcomes noted above is assigned to the causes precisely when they are 
described in isolation.
The fact that several phenomena or outcomes are attributed to each evolutionary 
cause is also problematic for the functional view in another related sense. A mecha-
nism is always a mechanism for some phenomenon (Glennan 1996, 52; Bechtel and 
Abrahamsen 2005, 422; Craver 2007, 123). The defenders of the functional view 
consider that the identification and delimitation of a mechanism depends on the phe-
nomenon for which it is responsible. A mechanism is composed of those entities, 
activities, and organizational features that contribute to the phenomenon for which 
it is responsible. It implies that the mechanism responsible for each phenomenon or 
output is different. Hence, from their proposal, the mechanism responsible for each 
outcome attributed to a particular evolutionary cause would be a different one. But 
it does not suit evolutionary biologist ideas. They consider that the same particular 
evolutionary process is responsible for all those outputs. Figure 1 shows a particular 
model of migration, a circular stepping-stone model, where migration occurs only 
between adjacent demes. In this case, the entities and activities that contribute to 
each output attributed to a particular case of migration are not the same. Therefore, 
Fig. 1  This image represents a circular stepping-stone model, where migration occurs only between 
adjacent demes. A particular phenomenon of migration generates two different outcomes (i.e. changes in 
two demes). The entities and activities responsible for those outcomes are not exactly the same
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from the functional approach’s point of view, the mechanism responsible for each 
outcome would be different. On the contrary, evolutionary biologists consider just 
one evolutionary cause for all outputs attributed to a particular case of migration.
In order to avoid those problems, the defenders of the functional view could 
answer that the phenomenon for which a particular evolutionary mechanism is 
responsible is the conjunction of the outputs attributed to it by biologists. In that 
case, the mechanism would be composed of every entity, activity, and organizational 
feature that contribute to any of that outcomes. However, this approach does not 
suit biologists’ ideas and in our view it seems an artificial and ad hoc construction. 
Biologists consider those outcomes as different phenomena produced by the same 
cause, not as parts of the same phenomenon.
5  Mechanistic proposals based on a minimalist view of mechanisms
Glennan (2017) has recently adopted a new approach in order to account for the 
diverse kinds of mechanisms (including evolutionary mechanisms). He has assumed 
a minimalist view. Glennan has abandoned his previous notion of mechanism (see 
Glennan 1996, 2002) and developed a minimal characterization which aims to be 
“broad enough to capture most of the wide range of things scientists have called 
mechanisms” (Glennan 2017, 18). Thus, he defines a mechanism for a phenomenon 
as follows:
A mechanism for a phenomenon consists of entities (or parts) whose activi-
ties and interactions are organized so as to be responsible for the phenomenon. 
(Glennan 2017, 17)
Glennan considers that a mechanism is composed of organised entities and their 
activities. Entities are “objects—things that have reasonably stable properties and 
boundaries” (Glennan 2017, 20) while activities are “a kind of process—essen-
tially involving change through time” (Glennan 2017, 20). Activities that involve 
more than one entity (pushing, eating, hitting…) are called interactions. Regarding 
mechanisms’ organization, Glennan considers that it has a horizontal dimension (i.e. 
spatio-temporal and causal organization among the mechanism’s components) and a 
vertical dimension (i.e. relation between the mechanism as a whole and its compo-
nent activities).
Although Glennan’s new minimal notion of mechanism aims to account for 
mechanisms across the sciences, it does not suit evolutionary mechanisms. Glen-
nan considers mechanisms in general and his notion include general characteristics 
that are often present in mechanisms. Nevertheless, his proposal does not take into 
account the specific traits of evolutionary causes. In fact, this new version of Glen-
nan’s proposal faces the same kinds of problems (i.e. problems related with parts or 
organization, and problems related with productive relationships) that the previous 
version of it (see Sect. 1). In the first place, Glennan’s notion of mechanism’s com-
ponent entity (or part) does not suit evolutionary causes’ parts. Glennan character-
izes mechanisms’ component entities as “stable bearers of causal powers” (Glen-
nan 2017, 35). He considers that entities must have reasonable stable properties and 
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boundaries. The stability required to entities depends on the mechanism in which 
they are involved. A component entity of a mechanism is stable enough if its prop-
erties and boundaries remain stable while the phenomenon for which that mecha-
nism is responsible is taking place. For example, component entities of a circulatory 
system (heart, lungs, veins…) are stable enough. Their properties and boundaries 
remain stable while blood circulates and transports blood cells, carbon dioxide, 
hormones, nutrients, and oxygen. However, the application of this requirement of 
stability to evolutionary causes’ parts would be problematic. Firstly, it would be 
very difficult to determine which degree of stability must be required to a part of an 
evolutionary cause. Evolutionary causes are often responsible for several phenom-
ena with different timescales. As it has been argued (see Sect. 4), each evolution-
ary cause is responsible for several phenomena or outcomes. For instance, genetic 
drift is responsible for the fixation of certain new mutations, the removal of genetic 
variation in populations, the increment of differentiation among populations, etc. 
Likewise, mutation is responsible for the change in gene frequency, the increment 
of variation within subpopulations, the decrease of variation among subpopulations, 
etc. Phenomena for which an evolutionary cause is responsible often do not have the 
same duration. Frequently, one phenomenon for which the cause is responsible has 
finished while others are still taking place. For example, a new mutation may have 
already been fixated in a population by drift while the increment of differentiation 
among populations is still taking place. This plurality of phenomena and timescales 
means that there is not a unique phenomenon’s timescale associated to each particu-
lar evolutionary process. Therefore, it would not be clear which timescale should be 
the reference for the requirement of stability and which degree of stability should 
be demanded. Secondly, properties of parts of evolutionary causes do not always 
remain stable while those causes and phenomena for which they are responsible 
are taking place. Evolutionary causes’ parts often undergo changes during the evo-
lutionary processes. For example, consider genetic drift and migration. Individual 
organisms are component parts of those processes. In genetic drift, individual organ-
isms are subject to environmental influences which do not depend on their physical 
characteristics. Likewise, migration involves individual organisms that move from 
one population to another. However, individual organisms’ properties do not always 
remain stable while drift or migration processes are taking place. In this manner, 
phenotypic plasticity (Pigliucci 2001) may change some individual organisms’ prop-
erties such as colour skin, height, or even reproduction mode during a process of 
drift or migration. This is also the case for natural selection. At the present time, 
there is a debate about which are the parts of natural selection (see Glennan 2009; 
Millstein 2006; Otsuka 2016). Some authors consider that parts of natural selec-
tion are individual organisms while other authors argue that they are populations. 
Nevertheless, in both cases parts of natural selection would not be stable enough. 
Individual organisms’ properties may change while a process of natural selection is 
taking place. Those changes may be produced by phenotypic plasticity, but they may 
also be a consequence of certain circumstances during organisms’ lifespan. Imag-
ine an individual male organism that, during a process of sexual selection, loses 
an eye fighting against a competing male. Although that wound may not affect its 
reproductive fitness, some of its properties would have significantly changed during 
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the evolutionary process. Likewise, populations’ properties and boundaries change 
while a process of natural selection is taking place. There is always a change in 
the mean (or higher moments) distribution of certain traits in populations during 
processes of natural selection. Besides, populations’ boundaries change because of 
births and deaths.
Regarding problems related with productive aspects, Glennan’s notion of activity 
does not account for many productive relationships that occur in evolutionary pro-
cesses. Glennan characterizes productive relationships within mechanisms as activi-
ties. Activities are processes that involve change through time, in which at least one 
entity (or part) is engaged. One trait of activities is that they “require entities (parts, 
components) to act and be acted upon” (Glennan 2017, 31). However, this charac-
terization of activities does not fit many productive relationships within evolutionary 
processes. Productive relationships among parts of evolutionary causes are possible 
even if none of them has been acted upon. For example, consider a process of fre-
quency-dependent selection. Imagine a population of birds composed by two types: 
green and blue. Predators see much better green organisms than blue ones, mak-
ing them decrease their frequency, and increasing blue organisms’ frequency. In this 
example, there is a productive relationship between both bird types. Blue type has 
increased its frequency because green types are easier to see by predators. Neverthe-
less, blue types have not been acted upon by green types. This productive relation-
ship within a process of natural selection does not suit Glennan’s notion of activity.
In addition to the previously outlined difficulties, Glennan’s proposal would also 
face the functional view’s problem regarding the identification and delimitation of 
evolutionary causes (see Sect. 4). As functional view’s advocates, Glennan argues 
that a mechanism is always a mechanism for a phenomenon and that “[a] phenom-
enon is what is used to identify and delimit its mechanism” (Glennan 2017, 23). 
He considers that a mechanism is composed of those entities, activities, and organi-
zational features that contribute to the phenomenon for which it is responsible. It 
would mean that the mechanism responsible for each phenomenon or outcome is 
different. However, as it has been noted, this approach does not suit evolutionary 
biologists’ ideas about the identification and delimitation of evolutionary causes. 
They do not consider that for each outcome of causal evolution there is a different 
evolutionary cause which is responsible for it. For them, a particular evolutionary 
cause may be responsible for several outcomes.
6  Conclusion
As we have noted, there is no consensus about how the causes of evolution should 
be understood (see Sect. 2). Thus, we consider that it is relevant to study whether a 
mechanistic framework can account for evolutionary causes. If it were successful, 
it would bring us some benefits. Some of those would be (1) it would make pos-
sible to explain without laws (which are not present in some cases of evolution); 
(2) it would offer helpful possibilities of representation (e.g. spatial representation, 
colours, etc.) which are not available in other frameworks (e.g. probabilistic, coun-
terfactual, etc.); (3) the appellation to mechanisms may be used to support causal 
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claims; (4) mechanisms would connect different ontological levels; and (5) it would 
reveal an underlying link between evolutionary biology and other fields of biology 
where the mechanistic framework is generally accepted (e.g. molecular biology, bio-
chemistry, etc.).
However, as we have showed through the present article, the mechanistic frame-
work is faced with outstanding difficulties. Current mechanistic approaches to causal 
evolution have problems for accounting for natural selection and the other evolution-
ary causes as mechanisms. The stochastic view, in addition to unjustifiably assume 
the stochastic character of natural selection, must admit either that not all evolution-
ary causes are mechanisms or that evolutionary causes are mechanisms of very dif-
ferent types—which would make difficult to account for their relations and dynam-
ics. Likewise, the functional view erroneously postulates that natural selection’s 
function is to produce adaptation and faces the problem that evolutionary causes 
produce several outcomes and it is not clear which would be their function. Finally, 
the minimalist view, which considers mechanisms in general, does not take into 
account the specific traits of evolutionary causes and cannot account for their parts 
and productive relationships.
Given the issues above noted, it is possible to raise some requirements that a 
fruitful and encompassing mechanistic approach for evolutionary theory should 
meet. Firstly, it should account for all evolutionary causes as similar processes in 
order to satisfy biologists’ considerations, and therefore it should not accept exces-
sive heterogeneity on what is considered an evolutionary mechanism. Secondly, it 
should find out common characteristics not based in regularity. A particular kind of 
regularity (to be stochastic, to be deterministic, etc.) cannot be among the require-
ments for defining evolutionary mechanisms. Thirdly, it should take into account the 
interactions between different evolutionary causes. This is something that no one 
has faced, since almost all discussions have been around natural selection. A mecha-
nistic common framework demands specifying how interactions among evolutionary 
mechanisms are, using a common measure for all mechanisms, etc. Related to this, 
evolutionary mechanisms should be conceptualized in an operative way, allowing 
us to build tractable (mathematical) models. Thus, these models would show the 
dynamics among evolutionary mechanisms, underline relationships, etc., offering 
the kind of things that a common framework does. Therefore, an excessive hetero-
geneity would violate that feature. Finally, a mechanistic approach could take into 
account several hierarchical or ontological levels. This is important because there is 
no consensus about whether the causes of evolutionary change belong to the level 
of individuals (Bouchard and Rosenberg 2004), or whether the causes of evolu-
tion should be better understood as population-level causes that act on the entire 
population (Millstein 2006). In contrast, mechanisms are able to deal with different 
hierarchical levels, showing at the same time individual and population-level inter-
actions. Nevertheless, this is conditional upon the satisfaction of previous points. 
That is, taking into account different levels could lead to a proliferation of varia-
bles –because you are explicitly exposing individual and population interactions of 
several mechanisms–, potentially producing an inoperative framework (for instance, 
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mathematically intractable, requirements of too much data, etc.). This unpleasant 
result would reduce its attractiveness as a common framework for biologists.14
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Abstract: The past two decades have witnessed an increase in interest in social mechanisms and 
mechanistic explanations of social macro-phenomena. This paper addresses the question of what the 
components of social mechanisms in mechanistic explanations of social macro-phenomena must be. 
Analytical sociology’s initial position and the main new proposals by analytical sociologists are discussed. 
It is argued that all of them are faced with outstanding difficulties. Subsequently, a minimal requirement 
regarding the components of social mechanisms is introduced. It is held that a component of a social 
mechanism in a mechanistic explanation of a social macro-phenomenon must not have the explanandum 
phenomenon as a part of it.  
Keywords: mechanism; scientific explanation; analytical sociology; structural individualism. 
 
1. Introduction  
The past two decades have witnessed an increase in interest in social mechanisms (i.e. mechanisms for 
social macro-phenomena) and mechanistic explanations of social macro-phenomena. This increase has 
been related with the development of analytical sociology.1 Analytical sociology is a methodological 
movement within sociology that underlines the relevance of social mechanisms (Elster 1989, 2007; 
Hedström 2005; Hedström and Bearman 2009b; Hedström and Ylikoski 2010).2 Analytical sociologists 
claim that the main aim of sociology should be to explain social macro-phenomena (e.g. racial segregated 
neighbourhoods) by means of the mechanisms that are responsible for them (Hedström 2005). They also 
consider that the notion of mechanism is helpful for addressing other issues such as causation and scientific 
knowledge growth (Hedström and Ylikoski 2011). 
The aim of this paper is to address the question of what the components of social mechanisms in 
mechanistic explanations of social macro-phenomena must be (henceforth, “the question of components”). 
Addressing this question is crucial for the development of the mechanistic account of scientific explanation 
in social science. Mechanistic explanations must specify the mechanisms responsible for the explanandum 
phenomena, which requires identifying their components. In that kind of explanations, it is fundamental to 
detail how the components of the mechanism together give rise to the phenomenon. Consequently, knowing 
what the components of social mechanisms in mechanistic explanations of social macro-phenomena must 
be is essential for building mechanistic explanations. Throughout the paper, in order to address the question 
of components, legitimate mechanism-based explanations of social macro-phenomena will usually be taken 
as reference. Those explanations are one of the main guidelines for developing and evaluating potential 
 
1 In this paper, I will focus on analytical sociology, which is the main approach in the discourse on social mechanisms 
and mechanistic explanations in social science. Nevertheless, it should be noted that there are several authors who have 
addressed those issues from alternative perspectives (see Bunge 1997, 2004; Tilly 2000, 2001, 2004; Abbott 2007; 
Gross 2009). 
2 For an exhaustive exposition of the emergence of analytical sociology and its relationship with previous proposals 
see (Manzo 2010). 
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answers to that question (see, for instance, Hedström and Bearman 2009a). The structure of the paper is as 
follows. Section 2 presents the fundamental principles of analytical sociology, its initial position with 
respect to the question of components, and the main critique against that position. Sections 3 and 4 analyse 
the main proposals regarding the question of components that have been raised by analytical sociologists 
after the critiques against their initial position. It is argued that they are faced with outstanding difficulties. 
Section 5 introduces a minimal requirement that must be fulfilled by components of social mechanisms in 
mechanistic explanations of social macro-phenomena. It is held that a component of a social mechanism in 
a mechanistic explanation of a social macro-phenomenon must not have the explanandum phenomenon as 
a part of it. Finally, section 6 concludes. 
 
2. The fundamental principles of analytical sociology 
A core idea of analytical sociology is the principle of mechanism-based explanations. Although analytical 
sociology is not a completely homogenous movement, all analytical sociologists support the mechanistic 
account of scientific explanation. Mechanistic explanations in sociology are proposed as an alternative to 
covering-law explanations and statistical explanations (Hedström 2005). Both covering-law and statistical 
explanations are black-box explanations.3 This kind of explanations is characterized by considering that 
either the link between explanans and explanandum is devoid of structure or its structure has no explanatory 
interest (Hedström and Swedberg 1998). They do not address the processes that would allow us to 
understand how explanans and explanandum are actually linked. 
Analytical sociologists consider that a social macro-phenomenon is explained by specifying the 
mechanism by which that phenomenon is brought about (Hedström 2005; Hedström and Bearman 2009b; 
Hedström and Ylikoski 2011). Mechanism-based explanations open up the black box that connects 
explanans and explanandum and detail the social cogs and wheels of the causal process through which the 
explanandum is produced. They oppose black-box explanations, “the mechanism should not include any 
glaring black boxes which simply give raise to additional why-questions” (Hedström 2005, p. 26). 
Unfortunately, there is no consensus on the notion of mechanism. Within the framework of analytical 
sociology, several notions of mechanism have been adopted (see Mahoney 2001; Hedström 2005). 
Nevertheless, all notions share some basic aspects (Hedström and Ylikoski 2010). First, a mechanism is 
always a mechanism for a phenomenon. It is identified and delimited by reference to the phenomenon for 
which it is responsible. Second, a mechanism involves causal aspects. It refers to causal processes in which 
its component entities are engaged. Third, a mechanism has a structure. A mechanism consists of a 
structured constellation of entities and activities. Fourth, mechanisms are nested and form a hierarchy. A 
mechanism at one level presupposes or takes for granted certain entities and activities, but there are often 
lower-level mechanisms that account for them.  
An example of a mechanistic explanation of a social macro-phenomenon is Matthew J. Salganik, 
Peter Sheridan Dodds, and Duncan J. Watts’ explanation of why successful cultural products (e.g. best-
 




selling books, hit songs…) are orders of magnitude more successful than average (Salganik et al. 2006; 
Salganik and Watts 2009). The authors explain this social macro-phenomenon by specifying how the 
behaviour of individuals produces it. Social influence is present in cultural markets, where information 
about the success of offered products is often available (e.g. best sellers lists). Due to the huge amount of 
offered cultural products, individuals are likely to follow others’ choices and buy those products that are 
already successful. This tendency is also reinforced by structural features of many cultural markets, such 
as giving best-selling books more prominent in-store placement. Therefore, cumulative advantage operates. 
Cultural products that are successful tend to become still more successful. Initially small differences 
become large differences and, consequently, inequality increases. In cultural markets, social influence at 
the level of individuals leads to inequality of success at the macro level. In Salganik, Dodds, and Watts’ 
work, the presence of social influence in cultural markets and its contribution to inequality of success are 
supported by an experimental study in an artificial cultural market (Salganik et al. 2006). They created a 
website in which participants listened and downloaded previously unknown songs with or without 
knowledge of previous participants’ downloads. That experiment strongly suggested that individuals’ 
behaviour was influenced by others’ choices and that social influence contributed to inequality of success. 
When knowledge of previous participants’ choices (and songs’ popularity) was available, individuals were 
more likely to download popular songs (i.e. the most previously downloaded songs) than when that 
information was not available. Moreover, inequality of success was greater in the social-influence condition 
(i.e. when knowledge of previous participants’ choices was available) than in the independent condition. 
The other fundamental principle of analytical sociology is structural individualism (Hedström 2005; 
Hedström and Ylikoski 2010, 2011). It is “a doctrine according to which all social facts, their structure and 
change, are in principle explicable in terms of individuals, their properties, actions, and relations to one 
another.” (Hedström and Ylikoski 2010, p. 60). Structural individualism is a weak version of 
methodological individualism (Udehn 2001). It considers that social macro-phenomena must be explained 
in terms of interactions of individual agents. Individuals are the main entities and their actions are the main 
activities that give rise to social macro-phenomena. However, structural individualism admits that not all 
explanatory facts are about individuals in the strict sense. Relations and relational structures (e.g. topologies 
of social networks) may be explanatorily relevant. They influence in individuals’ behaviour and in social 
outcomes brought about. Salganik, Dodds, and Watts’ (2006) explanation of inequality of success in 
cultural markets meets the requirements of structural individualism. The explanandum social macro-
phenomenon is explained in terms of individuals, their properties, actions, and relations. The authors refer 
to a social mechanism whose components are individual consumers, their properties (e.g. having certain 
taste, being influenced by others’ choices…), activities (e.g. listening, buying, downloading…), and 
relations. It should be particularly noted that their explanation includes references to relations among 
individuals and relational structures, which is the main aspect that distinguishes structural individualism 
from other versions of methodological individualism. For instance, it is specified how individuals’ choices 
are influenced by the way in which other individuals’ behaviour is showed. It is claimed that the more 
highlighted is the previous behaviour of individuals, the stronger is the effect of social influence. 
The principles of mechanism-based explanations and structural individualism are not considered 
independent. Analytical sociologists hold that the principle of mechanism-based explanations implies 
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structural individualism.4 In this sense, Hedström and Ylikoski say: “The methodological individualism of 
analytical sociology [i.e. structural individualism] is a consequence of its account of scientific explanation, 
not an independent metaphysical doctrine” (2011, p. 393). Their main argument in support of that idea is 
that there are social mechanisms only at the individual level (Hedström and Swedberg 1998; Hedström 
2005). Due to the discipline-specific relevance criteria, social mechanisms are always at the individual 
level. All social mechanisms are composed of individuals, their properties, actions, and relations. Higher 
level mechanisms, which would include glaring black-boxes, and lower level mechanisms, which would 
entail an excessive decomposition of their parts, would hardly be considered relevant by social scientists. 
Consequently, demanding mechanistic explanations would mean demanding explanations in terms of 
individuals, their properties, actions, and relations. Structural individualism would be an unavoidable 
consequence of the principle of mechanism-based explanations. According to analytical sociologists, one 
could not adopt the principle of mechanism-based explanations in sociology without accepting structural 
individualism. Supporting a mechanistic account of scientific explanation in sociology would require a 
commitment to the idea that a social macro-phenomenon must be explained in terms of interactions of 
individual agents. The commitment to structural individualism leads to an answer to the question of 
components: a social mechanism in an explanation of a social macro-phenomenon must be composed of 
individuals, their properties, actions, and relations to one another. This is the analytical sociology’s initial 
position regarding the question of components. 
In response to the analytical sociology’s initial answer to the question of components, several 
authors have disputed the idea that the principle of mechanism-based explanations implies structural 
individualism (Kincaid 2004; Mayntz 2004; Vromen 2010; Wan 2012; Kaidesoja 2013). They have argued 
that it is unlikely to be the case that all social mechanisms are at the individual level.5 Therefore, analytical 
sociologists’ main argument in support of the implication between both principles would not hold and, 
consequently, their initial position regarding the question of components would not be justified. Those 
authors claim that a mechanism for a social macro-phenomenon does not have to be exclusively composed 
of individuals, their properties, actions, and relations. It must be composed of organized entities and 
activities, but those need not be only individuals, their properties, actions, and relations. Macro social 
mechanisms (i.e. social mechanisms that have components of a level higher than the individual level) are 
possible. Their component entities are either collective agents (e.g. firms, political parties, universities…) 
and individuals or just collective agents. A paradigmatic example of macro social mechanism is firms 
competing for market shares in a competitive market. It is composed of firms, their properties (e.g. 
reputation), activities (e.g. launching an advertising campaign), and relations (e.g. trade partnership). Other 
illustrative examples of macro social mechanisms would be a coalition of political parties, a conflict 
between trade unions, or states allied against an environmental problem.  
 
4 It is generally accepted that structural individualism does not imply the principle of mechanism-based explanations 
(Ylikoski 2011). Explanations of social macro-phenomena in terms of individuals’ interactions are possible even if the 
mechanisms responsible for them are not specified. 
5 This idea was originally introduced by Stinchcombe (1991) (although he understood mechanisms as abstract entities). 
Stinchcombe held that, in social mechanisms, units of analysis can be individuals, social actors, situations, or patterns 
of information. He argued that, while units of analysis are generally at a lower level than the explanandum, they do not 
need to be individuals.  
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The previously analysed discussion could be briefly summarized as follows. The two fundamental 
principles of analytical sociology are the principle of mechanism-based explanations and the structural 
individualism. Analytical sociologists consider that the principle of mechanistic explanations implies 
structural individualism because there are social mechanisms only at the individual level. The commitment 
to structural individualism leads to their initial position regarding the question of components: a social 
mechanism in an explanation of a social macro-phenomenon must be composed of individuals, their 
properties, actions, and relations to one another. However, as it has been argued, not all social mechanisms 
are at the level of individuals and, consequently, the principle of mechanistic explanations hardly implies 
by itself structural individualism. Therefore, the analytical sociology’s initial position would not be 
properly supported. 
Given the critiques against the analytical sociology’s initial position regarding the question of 
components, different answers have been raised by analytical sociologists. In the next two sections, I will 
analyse the main responses: the proposal of Michael Schmid (2011), who supports the analytical 
sociology’s initial position by means of a new argument, and the proposal of Petri Ylikoski (2012), who 
defends a perspectival version of that position. It will be argued that both of them are unable to offer a 
proper answer to the question of components. 
 
3. The new argument by Schmid 
Schmid (2011) maintains the analytical sociology’s initial position regarding the question of components. 
He claims that a social mechanism in an explanation of a social macro-phenomenon must be composed of 
individuals, their properties, actions, and relations to one another. He also adopts the principle of structural 
individualism regarding mechanism-based explanations, which leads to that position in relation to the 
question of components. However, his argument in support of that principle is not based on the idea that 
there are social mechanisms only at the individual level. He considers that mechanistic explanations of 
social macro-phenomena require mechanisms at the individual level, but he does not explicitly deny the 
existence of social mechanisms at other levels. 
Firstly, Schmid claims that one aspect of mechanism-based explanations in social science is that 
they require “laws indicating which factors ultimately ‘produce’ or ‘generate’ a relevant event” (2011, p. 
137). Specifying nomological connections is necessary in mechanistic explanations. Following the 
covering-law theory of explanation (Hempel 1965), he argues that the explanandum social macro-
phenomenon must be deduced from the explanans by means of laws. Although Schmid does not make it 
explicit, the acknowledged influence of the Hempelian approach suggests that he is understanding laws in 
a similar way as Hempel does, i.e., as true lawlike statements. And secondly, Schmid argues that we do not 
know any social law, i.e., a law governing the course of social macro-processes (e.g. a developmental law 
of society). All candidates to social laws have been proved to be false. In social sciences, only laws of 
individual action are available. Those laws address how individuals determine their actions in view of their 
established goals and subjective information. From those ideas, Schmid concludes the principle of structural 
individualism regarding mechanism-based explanations. He claims that “social phenomena may be 
regarded as having been explained only when their genesis, operation and reorganization (in the last 
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instance) is accounted for on the basis of the individual adaptive actions of individual actors” (Schmid 
2011, p. 144). Structural individualism, as it has been noted, leads to the analytical sociology’s initial 
position regarding the question of components.  
Schmid’s argument in support of the principle of structural individualism in relation to mechanism-
based explanations may be reconstructed as follows: 
(1) Mechanism-based explanations of social macro-phenomena must include laws. 
(2) In social science, the only laws available range over individuals, their properties, actions, and 
relations. 
Mechanistic explanations of social macro-phenomena must refer to individuals, their properties, 
actions, and relations. 
It is a valid argument. The truth of the premises supports the truth of the conclusion. If its premises were 
true, it would follow the principle of structural individualism regarding mechanism-based explanations. 
However, I think that one of the premises of the argument is probably not true. The first premise, which is 
supposed to present a trait of mechanism-based explanations, is likely to be inaccurate. Although 
subsumption under laws is a requirement in the traditional covering-law model of scientific explanation, 
mechanistic explanations are not required to include laws (Halina 2018).6 In fact, the mechanistic account 
of scientific explanation has been developed as an alternative to those accounts that require to specify laws 
(Betchel and Abrahamsen 2005; Hedström 2005). One of the main critiques against the covering-law model 
was that few or no laws are known in several fields of science (Scriven 1959). That model focuses on certain 
domains of physics, where many laws are known, and ignores the absence of laws in fields such as biology, 
sociology, economics, psychology, neuroscience, etc. The mechanistic account of scientific explanation 
aims to account for explanations in those fields where laws are not available. Therefore, not requiring to 
indicate laws is a characteristic trait of mechanism-based explanations. In a mechanistic explanation, the 
explanandum is explained by uncovering the mechanism that is responsible for it, and specifying laws is 
not required for that. It is not necessary to demonstrate that activities in which mechanisms’ component 
entities engage are according to laws.7 Those activities are often characterized just as processes that involve 
change through time (Glennan 2017) or happenings that produce changes (Machamer 2004). In fact, most 
mechanism-based explanations do not include laws. For instance, consider Michael Mann’s (2004) analysis 
of the success of European fascism in the interwar period. In his analysis, Mann addresses the property of 
certain countries (e.g. Britain, France, Sweden…) of not being susceptible to fascist movements seizing 
power. He offers a mechanism-based explanation of this social macro-property. That explanation refers to 
a mechanism whose main components are the political parties of those countries and some of their 
properties, such as subscribing “an instrumental rationality of means not ends” (Mann 2004, p. 90) and 
 
6 Karl-Dieter Opp (2005) has argued that mechanistic explanations must include laws because “[o]nly a law provides 
a selection criterion for the factors that have caused a phenomenon” (2005, p. 174) and without them the election of 
explanatorily relevant factors is arbitrary. Nevertheless, new mechanists have raised several alternative criteria of 
explanatory relevance in mechanistic explanations. For instance, Carl Craver (2007, p. 153) has introduced the 
requirement of mutual manipulability and Stuart Glennan (2017, p. 43) has proposed the requirement of contributing 
to the activity of the mechanism as a whole. 
7 In the first version of his notion of mechanism, Glennan (1996) considered that interactions among parts of 
mechanisms must be according to direct causal laws. Nevertheless, Glennan (2002, 2017) has later modified his 
characterization of interactions among mechanisms’ parts and removed that requirement. 
7 
 
being accustomed to “[c]eding sovereign powers to the opponent if electorally defeated” (Mann 2004, p. 
90). Mann shows that those properties were relevant with respect to the countries’ property of not being 
susceptible to fascist movements seizing power. Nonetheless, Mann’s explanation does not include any 
law. He does not specify a nomological connection between political parties’ properties and countries’ 
susceptibility to fascist movements seizing power. The absence of laws in mechanistic explanations is 
common to most fields of science. Paradigmatic examples of neuroscientific mechanistic explanations (e.g. 
explanation of neurotransmitter release), for example, do not include laws either (Craver 2007). 
As a matter of fact, the idea that mechanism-based explanations must include laws would not even 
be accepted by most analytical sociologists. They consider that mechanistic explanations are an alternative 
to covering-law explanations (see section 2) and do not require specifying laws. In this sense, Hedström 
and Ylikoski say: “Of course, mechanism-based explanations still rely on causal generalizations about the 
properties, activities, and relations of underlying entities, but they do not have to satisfy the traditional 
criteria for laws” (2010, p. 55). 
Summing up, Schmid adopts a conservative strategy in response to the critiques against the 
analytical sociology’s initial position regarding the question of components. He presents a new reasoning 
in support of that position, which is also based on the adoption of the principle of structural individualism. 
His proposal avoids the previously criticized idea that there are social mechanisms only at the individual 
level. However, his new argument in support of structural individualism is built on a very problematic 
premise: mechanistic explanations must include laws. As it has been noted, it is unlikely to be the case that 
mechanism-based explanations are required to specify laws. Schmid fails to justify the principle of 
structural individualism regarding mechanism-based explanations. Therefore, his proposal does not 
properly support the analytical sociology’s initial position regarding the question of components. Schmid 
does not offer a justified answer to the question of components. 
 
4. The perspectival version by Ylikoski 
Unlike Schmid, Ylikoski (2012) advocates a modified version of the analytical sociology’s initial position 
regarding the question of components. In his proposal, the initial demand of individual-level components 
is replaced by a demand of micro-level components. Micro-level components can but not need to be at the 
level of individuals. The micro level is perspectival in the sense that it is dependent on the explanatory 
target.  
Analytical sociologists usually consider that all mechanistic explanations of social macro-
phenomena are causal explanations (Hedström 2005; Hedström and Ylikoski 2010; Demeulenaere 2011). 
In this sense, Hedström claims that “[t]he core idea behind the mechanism approach is that we explain […] 
by specifying mechanisms that show how phenomena are brought about” (2005, p. 24). However, Ylikoski 
(2012, 2013) has recently argued that mechanistic explanations of social macro-phenomena may be 
constitutive explanations too. Ylikoski considers that both causal and constitutive explanations “track 
networks of counterfactual dependence” (Ylikoski 2012, p. 34). The explanans must be a difference-maker 
with respect to the explanandum. X explains Y if Y depends on X in the sense that if X had not happened, 
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Y would have not happened either (Woodward 2003; Ylikoski 2013). Nevertheless, causal and constitutive 
explanations track different sort of counterfactual dependencies: “[c]ausal explanations appeal to 
etiological counterfactuals, while constitutive counterfactuals are the material for constitutive explanations” 
(Ylikoski 2013, p. 290). Although both causation and constitution are relations of dependence, there are 
relevant metaphysical differences between them. Causation is often a relation between events (i.e. changes 
in the properties of entities), takes time, and is asymmetric regarding manipulation (i.e. a change in the 
effect can be produced by manipulating the cause, but not the other way around). Constitution is often a 
relation between causal capacities (i.e. properties of entities), is synchronic, and is symmetric regarding 
manipulation (i.e. a change in the whole can be produced by manipulating a part of it, and vice versa). 
Causal explanations include parts of the causal history of the explanandum event that are causally relevant 
for it (i.e. there are causal counterfactuals that relate them), while constitutive explanations include parts of 
the system whose property is the explanandum that are constitutively relevant for it (i.e. there are 
constitutive counterfactuals that relate them). Ylikoski (2013, p. 291) considers that both causal and 
constitutive explanations can be mechanistic if they tell why and how the counterfactual dependencies hold. 
Causal mechanism-based explanations must specify the mechanism that brings about the explanandum 
event, whose components are causally relevant for it, and constitutive mechanism-based explanations must 
specify the mechanism that gives rise to the explanandum property, whose components are constitutively 
relevant for it.8 
Taking the distinction between constitutive and causal mechanism-based explanations as reference, 
Ylikoski addresses the question of components. Firstly, he focuses on constitutive mechanistic explanations 
of social macro-phenomena. Ylikoski considers that “[t]he explanantia in constitutive explanations are 
always at the micro level” (Ylikoski 2012, p. 35). Constitutive explanations aim to show how explanandum 
macro-phenomena “are constituted by micro-level entities, activities and relations” (Ylikoski 2012, p. 35). 
Consequently, he claims that the components of social mechanisms in constitutive mechanism-based 
explanations of social macro-phenomena must be located at the micro level. Secondly, Ylikoski addresses 
causal mechanistic explanations of social macro-phenomena. He acknowledges that the explanantia in 
causal explanations are not always at the micro level. Unlike the notion of composition, “nothing in the 
notion of causation implies that the real causal work is always to be found at the micro level” (Ylikoski 
2012, p. 36). Causally relevant entities, properties, activities, and relations do not need to be at the micro 
level. For example, the marketing strategy of a courier firm is causally relevant (i.e. there are causal 
counterfactuals that relate them) for the market shares of other firms that provide courier services in the 
same area. Nevertheless, Ylikoski considers that causal mechanistic explanations of social macro-
phenomena require microfoundations. Appealing to micro-level entities, properties, activities, and relations 
is essential for understanding how the explanatory counterfactual dependencies hold. Consequently, he 
argues that the components of social mechanisms in causal mechanism-based explanations of social macro-
phenomena must be located at the micro level. Ylikoski concludes that, despite their relevant differences, 
 
8 Several new mechanists (e.g. Craver 2007) consider that the explanandum of a constitutive mechanistic explanation 
is a behaviour of a system. However, Ylikoski (2013) argues that the notion of behaviour can refer to both properties 
and events, and is potentially confusing. He claims that explananda of constitutive mechanism-based explanations must 
be characterized as properties of entities.  
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in both constitutive and causal mechanistic explanations of social macro-phenomena, social mechanisms 
must be composed of micro-level entities, properties, activities, and relations. 
Ylikoski’s proposal is less rigid than the analytical sociology’s initial position regarding the question 
of components. He holds that components of social mechanisms in mechanism-based explanations of social 
macro-phenomena must be micro-level entities, properties, activities, and relations. Nonetheless, he 
considers that there is not a unique and predetermined micro level (e.g. the individual level) to which 
components of social mechanisms must always belong. The distinction between micro and macro is 
understood as a question of scale: “the difference between small- and large-scale social phenomena” 
(Ylikoski 2012, p. 27). What is considered as micro-level entities, properties, activities, and relations 
depends on the explanandum phenomenon (and the explanatory interests). A component could be 
considered micro regarding certain social phenomenon but not regarding another one. As an example, take 
into account regional governments. A regional government would be considered a micro entity regarding 
the gross domestic product of a country but not regarding the performance of town councils. Although 
micro-macro relations involve differences in scale, all differences in scale do not constitute legitimate 
micro-macro relations. For instance, between people’s literary preferences and countries’ migration policies 
there is a difference of scale, but it hardly constitutes a micro-macro relation.  Nonetheless, Ylikoski 
acknowledges that it is difficult to identify the additional traits that characterise legitimate social micro-
macro relations and differentiate them from other differences in scale. He considers that it is only possible 
to underline some traits that are often present in social micro-macro relations. For example, many social 
micro-macro relations are part-whole relationships and macro social facts are usually supra-individual. 
Ylikoski’s perspectival version avoids the main difficulty of the analytical sociology’s initial 
approach to the question of components. It is compatible with the fact that not all social mechanisms are at 
the individual level. In that proposal, it is considered that micro components of social mechanisms may be 
at different levels. Ylikoski’s approach also avoids the problem of Schmid’s argument. In it, it is not 
required that mechanism-based explanations of social macro-phenomena include laws. Nevertheless, the 
perspectival proposal developed by Ylikoski faces some relevant difficulties.    
The main problem of Ylikoski’s proposal is that it is too vague and, consequently, does not constitute 
a proper answer to the question of components. In order to avoid the problem of the analytical sociology’s 
initial position, the requirement of individual-level components is substituted by the requirement of micro-
level components. Nevertheless, the notion of micro level is not accurately characterised. The micro-macro 
relation is defined as a particular kind of difference in scale. But the traits that characterise it and distinguish 
it from other differences in scale are not identified. It is always ambiguous whether the components of a 
social mechanism are at the micro level and meet the requirement. 
Another problematic aspect of Ylikoski’s proposal is that it does not provide a guide for building 
mechanism-based explanations of social macro-phenomena. Firstly, as it has been noted, it is not concrete 
enough. It is never certain if a particular entity, property, activity or relation is at the micro level. And 
secondly, the identification of the micro level would require the previous specification of the explanans and 
the explanandum. In order to belong to the micro level, a component must be explanatorily relevant for the 
explanandum macro-phenomenon. In this sense, Ylikoski says: “Macro-level facts are explained by 
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appealing to micro-level processes, entities, and relations, but these items belong to the micro level just 
because they are required for the full explanation of the macro fact” (2012, p. 25). Consequently, it would 
not be possible to identify which entities, properties, activities, and relations are at the micro level before 
the development of the explanation. 
Finally, despite being less rigid than analytical sociology’ initial approach, Ylikoski’s proposal does 
not suit many mechanism-based explanations of social macro-phenomena. In social science, causal 
mechanistic explanations of social macro-events often include causal relevant entities, properties, activities, 
or relations that are unlikely to be at the micro level. An example can be found in Aaron M. McCright and 
Riley E. Dunlap’s (2003) analysis of the conservative movement’s impact on the United States climate 
change policy. They provide a causal mechanism-based explanation of the no ratification of the Kyoto 
Protocol by the United States senate. Conservative movement saw the concern over global warming as 
threatening American industry, prosperity, and lifestyle. It considered that changes resulting from efforts 
to ameliorate the global warming would harm American economy. Because of those worries, conservative 
think tanks (e.g. Cato Institute, Heritage Foundation, Marshall Institute…) challenged the legitimacy of 
global warming as a problem by means of diverse strategic activities, such as publishing documents (e.g. 
policy studies), producing advertisements, presenting their global warming counter-claims to policy makers 
in Congressional hearings, and appearing on television programs. Their activities and their collaboration 
with American climate change sceptics eventually produced a redefinition of global warming as non-
problematic. That redefinition influenced in the policy arena and brought about the no ratification of the 
Kyoto Protocol by the United States senate. In McCright and Dunlap’s causal mechanism-based 
explanation, most components of the social mechanism are hardly at the micro level. Firstly, there is not a 
clear difference in scale between them and the explanandum macro-phenomenon. For instance, consider 
think thanks’ challenge of the legitimacy of global warming as a problem. It does not seem reasonable to 
consider it a small-scale activity and the no ratification by the senate a large-scale phenomenon. Both are 
supra-individual events, and there is no relevant difference between them that supports that differentiation. 
And secondly, even if there was a difference in scale between them, the relation between the components 
of the mechanism and the explanandum would hardly constitute a meaningful micro-macro relation. The 
traits that usually characterise micro-macro relations are not present there. For example, there is not a part-
whole relationship between them. United States conservative movement, American network of climate 
change sceptics, and think thanks are not part of the United States senate. 
In summary, Ylikoski defends a modified version of the analytical sociology’s initial position 
regarding the question of components. The requirement of individual-level components is substituted by 
the requirement of micro-level components. He claims that components of social mechanisms in 
mechanism-based explanations of social macro-phenomena must be micro-level entities, properties, 
activities, and relations. That proposal avoids the problems of the analytical sociology’s initial position and 
of the Schmid’s argument. Nevertheless, it faces relevant difficulties. As it has been argued, it is too vague, 
it does not provide a guide for building mechanism-based explanations, and it does not suit many causal 
mechanistic explanations of social macro-phenomena. Ylikoski does not offer a satisfactory answer to the 




5. A minimal requirement 
Analytical sociologists’ proposals regarding components of social mechanisms in explanations of social 
macro-phenomena face outstanding difficulties. Nevertheless, I consider that it is possible to offer a proper 
response to the question of components. The aim of this section is to present a minimal requirement 
regarding the components of social mechanisms, which applies to both causal and constitutive mechanistic 
explanations of social macro-phenomena. 
Mechanism-based explanations of social macro-phenomena can be causal or constitutive 
explanations (Ylikoski 2012, 2013). In a mechanistic explanation, the explanandum phenomenon is 
explained by specifying the mechanism that is responsible for it. But the relation between the explanandum 
social macro-phenomenon and the social mechanism responsible for it may be causal or constitutive. Causal 
mechanistic explanations of social macro-phenomena include parts of the causal history of the 
explanandum that are causally relevant for it, while constitutive mechanistic explanations include parts of 
the system whose property or behaviour is the explanandum that are constitutively relevant for it.  An 
example of a causal mechanistic explanation of a social macro-phenomenon is Salganik, Dodds, and Watts’ 
(2006) explanation of inequality of success in cultural markets (see section 2). They specify how the 
behaviour of individual consumers, which is socially influenced, brings about that inequality. Other 
examples of causal mechanistic explanations are McCright and Dunlap’s (2003) explanation of the failure 
of the United States to ratify the Kyoto Protocol, and Katherine Stovel and Christine Fountain’s (2009) 
explanation of the persistence of segregation in the labour market. An example of a constitutive mechanistic 
explanation of a social macro-phenomenon is Mann’s (2004) explanation of the property of certain 
European countries of not being susceptible to fascist movements seizing power (see section 3). He 
specifies how certain properties of the components of those countries (e.g. political parties) constituted the 
property of interest. Other examples of constitutive mechanistic explanations could be a mechanistic 
explanation of a property of a parliament (e.g. liberals having an absolute majority), and a mechanistic 
explanation of the differences in the problem-solving capacities of two groups (Ylikoski 2012).  
There is no privileged level to which components of social mechanisms in mechanistic explanations 
of social macro-phenomena must always belong. Neither in causal mechanism-based explanations nor in 
constitutive mechanism-based explanations of social macro-phenomena, must components of social 
mechanisms always be at certain fixed level. Both causally relevant components and constitutively relevant 
components may be at diverse levels. As a matter of fact, components of social mechanisms included in 
mechanistic explanations of social macro-phenomena are not always at the same level. Consider Salganik, 
Dodds, and Watts’ (2006) and McCright and Dunlap’s (2003) causal mechanism-based explanations. 
Salganik, Dodds, and Watts refer to a mechanism whose components are at the individual level (e.g. 
individual consumers), while McCright and Dunlap refer to a mechanism whose main components are 
collective agents (e.g. think tanks). The same diversity can be found in constitutive mechanism-based 
explanations. Constitutive mechanistic explanations of the problem-solving capacity of a group refer to 
mechanisms whose components are at the individual level (e.g. social skills of individual members of the 
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group), while constitutive mechanistic explanations of a property of a parliament often refer to mechanisms 
whose main components are collective agents (e.g. parliamentary groups) and their properties. 
 Given this scenario, it could be considered that a proper answer to questions of components is hardly 
achievable. It seems that proposals that account for the diversity of mechanistic explanations of social 
macro-phenomena (as Ylikoski’s proposal) are too vague and unable to provide a guide for building 
mechanism-based explanations, while concrete and operational proposals (as analytical sociology’s initial 
position) do not suit the diversity of mechanistic explanations of social macro-phenomena. Nonetheless, I 
think that a minimal requirement, which is concrete and operational without neglecting the diversity of 
mechanism-based explanations, can be raised regarding the components of social mechanisms. Particularly, 
a component of a social mechanism in a mechanistic explanation of a social macro-phenomenon must not 
have the explanandum phenomenon as a part of it. This minimal requirement is concrete enough and 
provides a guide for building mechanism-based explanations of social macro-phenomena. The 
identification of parts does not require the previous specification of the explanans and the explanandum. 
Moreover, the minimal requirement applies to both causal and constitutive mechanism-based explanations 
of social macro-phenomena. 
In a causal mechanism-based explanation of a social macro-phenomenon, components of the 
mechanism must not have the explanandum phenomenon as a part of them. In order to be a component of 
the mechanism, an entity or an activity (or another kind of component) must be causally relevant for the 
explanandum phenomenon. An entity or an activity is causally relevant for a phenomenon if there is a 
relation of causal dependence between them (i.e. there are causal counterfactuals that relate them) 
(Woodward 2003; Ylikoski 2012). However, there cannot be a relation of causal dependence between an 
entity or an activity and the explanandum phenomenon if the former has the phenomenon as a part of it. A 
relation of causal dependence is not possible between a whole and one of its parts.9 It is generally agreed 
that, in a relation of causal dependence, the relata must be wholly distinct (Hitchcock 2003; Craver and 
Bechtel 2007; Ehring 2009). Causes and effects must be able to be conceived as independent existences. In 
this sense, Lewis claims: “C and E must be distinct events – and distinct not only in the sense of non-
identity but also in the sense of nonoverlap and nonimplication” (2000, p. 78). Furthermore, causal 
dependence demands certain requirements that are not satisfied in whole-part relations. For instance, the 
relation of causal dependence must be asymmetric regarding manipulation and take time (i.e. the relation 
must not be synchronic) (Craver 2007; Ylikoski 2013). Consequently, in a causal mechanism-based 
explanation of a social macro-phenomenon, an entity or an activity (or another kind of component) that has 
the explanandum phenomenon as a part of it cannot be a component of the mechanism.  
 
9 Apparent cases of whole-part (or part-whole) causal relation can be finer understood as causal interactions among 
parts associated with one or more constitutive relations (Craver and Bechtel 2007). For instance, many putative whole-
part causal relations can be analysed as a particular constellation of states of parts, which constitutes certain state of the 
whole, that causes changes in some parts. Consider, for example, the apparent causal relation between societies’ 
political polarisation and individuals’ discrimination against opposing partisans (Iyengar and Westwood 2015). A 
society’s political polarisation is constituted by the divergence of individuals’ political attitudes to ideological extremes. 
Divergence of political attitudes causes affection toward copartisans and animosity toward opposing partisans, and this 





Likewise, in a constitutive mechanism-based explanation of a social macro-phenomenon, 
components of the mechanism must not have the explanandum phenomenon as a part of them either. In that 
kind of explanations, components of the mechanism must be proper parts (i.e. parts that are non-identical 
to the whole) of the system whose property or behaviour is the explanandum phenomenon (Craver 2007). 
Constitutive mechanistic explanations explain the explananda by appealing to how the diverse relevant 
parts together give rise to them. Nevertheless, a component cannot be a proper part of the system whose 
property or behaviour is the explanandum phenomenon if that phenomenon is part of it. If the phenomenon 
of interest is part of a component, the system whose property or behaviour is that phenomenon is also part 
of it. For example, if the problem-solving capacity of a team is part of a certain firm, the team is also part 
of that firm. And if the system is part of the component, the component cannot be a proper part of the 
system. Something cannot be a proper part of one of its parts (e.g. a society cannot be a proper part of one 
of its members). Therefore, in a constitutive mechanism-based explanation of a social macro-phenomenon, 
an entity or an activity (or another kind of component) that has the explanandum phenomenon as a part of 
it cannot be a component of the mechanism. 
The proposed minimal requirement constitutes a proper answer to the question of components. 
Certainly, it does not identify a privileged level (e.g. the level of individuals) to which components of social 
mechanisms in mechanistic explanations of social macro-phenomena must always belong. As it has been 
argued, there is no such level. Proposals that seek to identify a privileged level to which components of 
social mechanisms must always belong are doomed to failure. Nevertheless, the minimal requirement 
introduces a restriction regarding the relationship between the explanandum social macro-phenomena and 
components of social mechanisms. A component of a social mechanism in a mechanistic explanation of a 
social macro-phenomenon must not have the explanandum phenomenon as a part of it. It should be noted 
that the proposed requirement does not demand that components of social mechanisms in mechanism-based 
explanations of a social macro-phenomena must be proper parts of the explananda. Certainly, being a 
proper part of the explanandum social macro-phenomenon is a sufficient condition to satisfy the minimal 
requirement. A component that is a proper part of the explanandum phenomenon does not have that 
phenomenon as a part. For example, consider Mann’s (2004) mechanistic explanation of the property of 
certain European countries of not being susceptible to fascist movements seizing power.  The components 
of the social mechanism indicated in the explanation (e.g. political parties’ properties), which are proper 
parts of the explanandum (i.e. countries’ properties), meet the minimal requirement. However, being a 
proper part of the explanandum social macro-phenomenon is not a necessary condition to satisfy the 
minimal requirement. A component of a social mechanism in a mechanism-based explanation may satisfy 
the minimal requirement even if it is not a proper part of the explanandum phenomenon. A component of 
a social mechanism would also meet the minimal requirement if it is not constitutively related with the 
explanandum phenomenon. A component is not constitutively related with a phenomenon if and only if 
there is no part-whole relationship between them; neither is the component part of the phenomenon nor is 
the phenomenon part of the component. For example, consider the components of a social mechanism in a 
mechanism-based explanation of a change in certain neighbourhood (e.g. a change in its racial 
composition). Components such as households that do not belong to that neighbourhood (e.g. households 
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of other neighbourhoods of the same city), which are not constitutively related with the explanandum 
phenomenon, would meet the minimal requirement. 
The proposed requirement is less restrictive than the analytical sociology’s initial position regarding 
the question of components and the Ylikoski’s perspectival version. The minimal requirement allows those 
mechanistic explanations of social macro-phenomena that suit the analytical sociology’s initial proposal or 
its perspectival version, but also other legitimate mechanistic explanations that do not suit any of them. A 
mechanistic explanation of a social macro-phenomenon that suits the analytical sociology’s initial proposal 
would surely satisfy the minimal requirement. If components of a social mechanism in an explanation of a 
social macro-phenomenon are individuals, their properties, actions, and relations, they do not have the 
explanandum macro-phenomenon as a part of them. Likewise, a mechanistic explanation of a social macro-
phenomenon that suits the Ylikoski’s proposal would satisfy the minimal requirement. If components of a 
social mechanism in an explanation of a social macro-phenomenon are at the micro level regarding it, they 
do not have the explanandum macro-phenomenon as a part of them.10 Nevertheless, the minimal 
requirement is also satisfied by other legitimate mechanism-based explanations of social macro-phenomena 
that do not suit those proposals. For example, consider McCright and Dunlap’s (2003) explanation of the 
failure of the United States to ratify the Kyoto Protocol. This mechanistic explanation of a social macro-
phenomenon does not suit the analytical sociology’s initial proposal. It refers to a mechanism whose 
components are not just individuals, their properties, actions, and relations to one another. Conservative 
think tanks are the main component entities of the mechanism. Moreover, as it has been showed (see section 
4), that mechanism-based explanation does not suit Ylikoki’s perspectival proposal either. It refers to a 
mechanism whose components are hardly at the micro level.  However, McCright and Dunlap’s explanation 
does meet the proposed minimal requirement. The components of the social mechanism referred by 
McCright and Dunlap (e.g. Cato Institute) do not have the explanandum phenomenon (i.e. the failure of the 
United States to ratify the Kyoto Protocol) as a part of them. 
Advocates of more restrictive answers to the question of components could argue that the proposed 
minimal requirement is too broad and, consequently, ineffective. However, it is unlikely to be the case. 
Although the minimal requirement is broader than some alternative proposals (e.g. analytical sociology’s 
initial position), it is not so broad that it is ineffective. The minimal requirement introduces an effective 
restriction regarding the components of social mechanisms in mechanism-based explanations of social 
macro-phenomena. It excludes those components that have the explanandum phenomenon as part of them. 
This restriction is helpful in order to determine if an explanation of a social macro-phenomenon is a 
legitimate mechanistic explanation.11 For example, consider a mechanism-based explanation of a property 
of the city of London (e.g. a certain degree of economic inequality). If the explanation appealed to a social 
 
10 As it has been argued (see section 4), in Ylikoski’s perspectival proposal, micro-macro relations are not accurately 
characterised. Consequently, it is difficult to precisely compare that proposal with the minimal requirement. 
Nevertheless, any sensible characterisation of micro-macro relations would exclude the possibility that a macro-
phenomenon is part of a micro component. So, it is reasonable to compare both proposals in those general terms.  
11 It should be noted that failing to satisfy the minimal requirement does not necessarily mean that an explanation is 
illegitimate or lacks explanatory power. The minimal requirement aims to distinguish legitimate from non-legitimate 
mechanistic explanations. If a mechanism-based explanation does not meet the minimal requirement, it cannot be 
considered a legitimate mechanistic explanation. Nonetheless, an explanation that does not meet the minimal 
requirement could be a legitimate non-mechanistic explanation. For example, an explanation that accounts for people’s 
attitude in terms of the properties of a group to which they belong could be a legitimate non-mechanistic explanation. 
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mechanism whose components are neighbourhoods (e.g. Chelsea), their properties, actions, and relations, 
the explanation would satisfy the minimal requirement and it could be a legitimate mechanistic explanation. 
However, if England or the United Kingdom, which have London and its properties as parts of them, were 
among the components of the appealed social mechanism, the explanation would not satisfy the minimal 
requirement and could not be a legitimate mechanistic explanation. 
 
6. Conclusion 
The analytical sociology’s initial position regarding components of social mechanisms in explanations of 
social macro-phenomena is that they must be individuals, their properties, actions, and relations to one 
another. After the critiques against this approach, different answers have been raised by analytical 
sociologists. Schmid (2011) has formulated a new argument in support of that initial position, while 
Ylikoski (2012) has proposed a perspectival version of it. Nevertheless, both proposals face outstanding 
difficulties. The analytical sociology’s initial position regarding components of social mechanisms should 
be given up. There is no privileged level to which components of social mechanisms in mechanistic 
explanations of social macro-phenomenon must always belong. However, a minimal requirement can be 
raised with respect to components of social mechanisms, that is, components of social mechanisms in 
mechanistic explanations of social macro-phenomena must not have the explanandum phenomenon as a 
part.  
The proposed minimal requirement would considerably contribute to the development of the 
mechanistic account of scientific explanation in social science. Firstly, it offers a unified and justified 
response to the question of components. In all mechanism-based explanations of social macro-phenomena, 
components of social mechanisms must satisfy the proposed requirement. Secondly, the adoption of the 
minimal requirement would make the mechanistic account less narrow and able to account for a greater 
number of legitimate explanations. This would aid to actualize its will of broad applicability. As it has been 
noted, the mechanistic account aims to be broader than previous proposals (e.g. covering-law model) and 
suit many legitimate explanations that are excluded by them. And thirdly, the proposed minimal 
requirement provides a framework within which more specific non-individualist approaches to mechanism-
based explanations in social science could be developed. For example, it could assist the elaboration of 
actor-based approaches to causal mechanistic explanations (e.g. Ruonavaara 2012). Those approaches are 
based on the idea that causal mechanistic explanations (especially when the explanandum is an 
interdependency between social phenomena) have to be in terms of actors, which do not need to be 
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Explanation is one of the main aims of science. Scientists frequently seek to 
explain scientific phenomena. This paper addresses the relationship between 
scientific explanation and science denialism. In it, explanatory wars are 
introduced. An explanatory war is a situation in which the standard scientific 
explanation of a phenomenon is systematically denied by a group of people. 
It is argued that the mechanistic account of scientific explanation is helpful 
in order to face this kind of science denialism. Mechanistic explanations are 
resistant to the arguments usually raised by denialists. The relevant role of 
mechanistic explanations is illustrated by the case of tobacco disease 
denialism during the second half of twentieth century. 
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XPLANATION IS ONE OF THE MAIN AIMS of science. As Ylikoski accurately 
claims, science could be considered “the business of explaining things” 
(2013, p. 277). Scientists frequently seek to explain scientific 
phenomena. The explananda can be regularities (e.g. the movement of 
planets), events (e.g. the cracking of a car radiator) or properties (e.g. the 
hardness of diamonds). The central role of explanation in science has not gone 
unnoticed by philosophers. Scientific explanation has been a subject of 
philosophical reflection since Pre–Socratic times —although the modern 
discussion began with the development of the covering–law model (Hempel 
1965). Philosophers of science have not only discussed the nature of scientific 
explanation. They have also addressed related issues such as the notion of 
explanatory value, the relation between explanation and other epistemic goals 
(e.g. prediction), the role of models in explanation, etc. 
The aim of this paper is to address the relationship between scientific 
explanation and science denialism. The structure of the paper is as follows. 
Section two analyses science denialism and introduces explanatory wars. An 
explanatory war is a situation in which the standard scientific explanation of a 
phenomenon is systematically denied by a group of people. Section three 
presents the mechanistic account of scientific explanation and argues that it is 
helpful in order to face explanatory wars. Mechanistic explanations are resistant 
to the arguments usually raised by denialists. Section four illustrates the 
relevance of mechanistic explanations to face explanatory wars by means of 
analysing a paradigmatic example (i.e. tobacco disease denialism during the 
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§ 2. Science denialism and explanatory wars 
Two forms of pseudoscience have been identified: science denialism and 
pseudotheory promotion (Hansson 2017). While pseudotheory promotion’s 
main aim is to promote a specific theory (e.g. homeopathy, i.e., the claim that a 
substance that causes certain symptoms in healthy people would in highly 
diluted form cure similar symptoms in sick people), science denialism is 
focused on denying certain scientific claims (e.g. Earth is warming because of 
greenhouse gas emissions). Science denialism consists in the systematic 
rejection of a claim on which a scientific consensus exists (Diethelm and Mckee 
2009; Liu 2012; Hansson 2017). It is usually targeted at scientific claims that 
damage people’s lifestyle or worldviews, or that threaten corporate interests 
(Lewandowsky et al. 2016). Some prominent examples of science denialism are 
tobacco disease denialism, evolution denialism, climate change denialism, 
holocaust denialism, aids denialism, and relativity theory denialism. 
In spite of their dissimilarities, there are five epistemological characteristics 
that are present in all cases of science denialism (Liu 2012; Hansson 2017; 
2018a). Firstly, cherry–picking of data is systematically employed in their 
argumentations. Only a small part of the available evidence in taken into 
account.1 Secondly, refuted claims are not always given up. Denialists are 
reluctant to give up ideas and arguments even when they have been refuted. 
Thirdly, fake controversies are fabricated. It is claimed that a certain issue is 
subject to a genuine scientific controversy, although an overwhelming 
consensus exists among scientists. Fourthly, deviant criteria of assent are 
introduced. Denialists set unrealistic standards for evidence, which hardly can 
be met by current scientific research. And fifthly, the opposed viewpoint is 
misrepresented. The scientific claim is distorted by means of logical fallacies 
(e.g. the strawman fallacy), taking quotes out of context, focusing on what is 
unknown and ignoring what is known, etc. 
There are also several sociological characteristics that are usually present in 
science denialism (Diethelm and Mckee 2009; Liu 2012; Hansson 2017; 2018a). 
Science denialism often has strong political connections (e.g. evolution 
denialism is related with Christian right wing) and is supported mostly by men. 
Its main advocates use to be fake experts who, although they may be competent 
in a certain field, are not qualified researchers in the pertinent area. Besides, 
denialists appeal to complex and secretive conspiracies to account for the 
 
1 It should be noted that, although denialists often ignore unfavourable evidence, they could hardly 
ignore the target scientific claim itself. The main aim of scientific denialism is to undermine and deny 
that claim. Consequently, ignoring it would go against their own purposes. 
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scientific consensus on the denied claim and their inability to publish in 
mainstream peer–reviewed journals. Other sociological characteristics that are 
often present in science denialism are attacking individual scientists personally 
and professionally, pretending to have a significant support within science, and 
addressing laypeople instead of scholars. 
Several characteristics of science denialism are also present in pseudotheory 
promotion (Hansson 2018a; 2018b). In both forms of pseudoscience, cherry–
picking is used, refuted claims are not always given up, and criteria of assent 
almost impossible to satisfy are introduced. Other shared traits are: appealing to 
fake experts, directly addressing the public, and pretending to have a significant 
support within science. Nonetheless, there are relevant differences between 
science denialism and pseudotheory promotion. The main difference concerns 
their approaches to conflicts with genuine science (Hansson 2018a). 
Pseudotheory promotors tend to avoid conflicts with genuine science. To 
increase the acceptability of the promoted theory, they want to give the 
impression that it is compatible with mainstream science. However, science 
denialists have a conflict seeking attitude to genuine science. Their aim is to 
defeat a certain part of mainstream science, and opposing it is an important 
step to achieve that goal. Another relevant difference is that fabrication of fake 
controversies, which has an important role in science denialism, is not present 
in pseudotheory promotion (Hansson 2017). Furthermore, strong political 
connections, male dominance, and fierce attacks on individual scientists 
characterize science denialism, but not in general pseudotheory promotion. 
It is important to note that science denialism is not a form of genuine 
scientific scepticism (Liu 2012; Prothero 2013; Lewandowsky et al. 2016). 
Scientific scepticism consists in not believing things just because someone 
claims them, but being cautious and test claims against evidence. If a claim is 
eventually widely supported by evidence, the sceptic must accept it. However, 
science denialism consists in being ideologically committed to reject a scientific 
claim. The denialist will hardly change their mind, whatever the evidence says. 
Furthermore, science denialism’s characteristics such as fabricating fake 
controversies, invoking conspiracies, and personally and professionally 
attacking scientists, are not proper to genuine scientific scepticism. In fact, 
science denialism is a misrepresentation of scientific method.2 As Rosenau 
explains, “[b]y dismissing the knowledge produced by scientific processes and 
 
2 Science denialism is not an anti–science movement (Rosenau 2012). Actually, it often presents itself as 
science in order to take advantage of the cultural and epistemic authority of science. Science denialists 
establish research institutions, launch journals, organize conferences, etc. 
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touting ideas that are untestable or have failed such tests, science denial 
misleads the public about how science works, opening the door to other 
pseudoscientific beliefs” (2012, p. 567). 
A relevant kind of science denialism, which has not been previously 
addressed, is explanatory war. An explanatory war is a situation in which (i) there 
is an undisputed phenomenon (e.g. an increasing incidence of a disease), (ii) 
in the scientific community there is a broad consensus on its explanation, and 
(iii) the standard scientific explanation is systematically denied by a group of 
people. In this kind of science denialism, denialists do not question that the 
explanandum exists. It is accepted that certain phenomenon is the case and 
that it requires an explanation. However, they reject the explanans to which 
mainstream science appeals to account for the phenomenon. In order to fight 
down the mainstream science’s explanation, two strategies are usually followed 
by denialists. On the one hand, they directly attack the standard explanation. 
For instance, they claim that the causal link between explanans and 
explanandum has not been proved with one hundred percent certainty 
(Proctor 2011; Prothero 2013). On the other hand, denialists propose and 
promote alternative explanations, which are presented as being as legitimate as 
the standard explanation, to increase the controversy and make their case more 
credible (Proctor 2004; Proctor 2011; Pearl and Mackenzie 2018).3 For 
example, they support private research to study every minimally plausible 
alternative explanation. They also demand equal time and space in the media 
for alternative proposals (Hansson 2018a). In explanatory wars, science 
denialism’s distinctive characteristics are present. For example, the introduction 
of deviant criteria of assent and the fabrication of fake controversies have a 
central role in the offensive against the standard explanation. Cherry–picking 
evidence is also relevant; denialists often ignore part of the evidence in support 
of the standard explanation. 
A paradigmatic example of explanatory war is tobacco disease denialism 
during the second half of twentieth century (i.e. the tobacco wars) (Proctor 
2011). In that period, it was generally accepted that the incidence of lung 
cancer had dramatically increased during the twentieth century. Furthermore, 
since the mid–1950s, there was a broad consensus among scientists that the 
increase in tobacco consumption accounted for this phenomenon (Proctor 
2011; 2012). However, the tobacco industry systematically denied the standard 
 
3 In explanatory wars, a certain form of pseudotheory promotion is often present. Denialists introduce 
and promote alternative explanations to increase the controversy. Nonetheless, this promotion has only 
a subsidiary relation to the denial of the standard explanation. 
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explanation of the lung cancer epidemic (Proctor 2011; Prothero 2013; Pearl 
and Mackenzie 2018). Although they accepted that the frequency of lung 
cancer had increased and that this required an explanation, they rejected the 
explanation that linked the lung cancer epidemic with their product. In order 
to fight down the standard explanation, the tobacco industry attacked it (e.g. it 
was argued that the statistical evidence that linked explanans and explanandum 
was not conclusive) and promoted alternative explanations (e.g. industrial air 
pollution is responsible for the lung cancer epidemic). 
Science denialism is a form of pseudoscience whose main aim is to deny 
certain scientific claim. A particular kind of science denialism is explanatory 
war. An explanatory war is a situation in which the standard scientific 
explanation of a phenomenon is systematically denied by a group of people. 
This kind of explanatory denialism is especially relevant because it undermines 
one of the main aims of science, i.e., explaining phenomena, insofar as shared 
criteria concerning how good an explanation is are challenged. Furthermore, 
given the central role of explanation in understanding, it is prejudicial for the 
public understanding of science. In the following section, it will be argued that 
the mechanistic account of scientific explanation can help to face explanatory 
wars. 
 
§ 3. The mechanistic account of scientific explanation 
The mechanistic account of scientific explanation has recently been developed 
within the framework of the new mechanical philosophy (Machamer, Darden 
and Craver 2000; Bechtel and Abrahamsen 2005; Glennan 2017). Nevertheless, 
its main principles were previously proposed by authors such as Rom Harré 
(1972) and Wesley Salmon (1984). The mechanistic approach is based on the 
idea that a phenomenon is explained by means of identifying the mechanism 
that is responsible for it. Within the new mechanical philosophy, there is no 
consensus on the notion of mechanism (Hedström and Ylikoski 2010). 
Nonetheless, some basic aspects are shared by most proposals. A mechanism is 
usually characterized as an organized constellation of entities and activities 
(Machamer, Darden and Craver 2000; Glennan 2017). It is considered that a 
mechanism is always a mechanism for a phenomenon (Glennan 2017). The 
phenomenon for which a mechanism is responsible is the main reference for its 
identification, delimitation, and decomposition. New mechanists also agree that 
mechanisms are nested and form a hierarchy (Machamer, Darden and Craver 
2000). A component of a mechanism is often a mechanism itself. For example, 
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a heart is both a mechanism and a component of a mechanism (e.g. circulatory 
system). 
Mechanistic explanations can be causal or constitutive (Ylikoski 2013). The 
relation between a mechanism and the phenomenon for which it is responsible 
may be causal or constitutive. Consequently, depending on the relation between 
the identified mechanism and the phenomenon of interest, an explanation is 
either a causal mechanistic explanation or a constitutive mechanistic 
explanation. Mechanistic explanations are often presented by means of 
mechanistic models. A mechanistic model has two components: a phenomenal 
description and a mechanistic description (Glennan 2017). The phenomenal 
description is a model of the phenomenon of interest, while the mechanistic 
description is a model of the mechanism responsible for that phenomenon. In 
this kind of explanations, the phenomenal description is (or represents) the 
explanandum and the mechanistic description is (or represents) the explanans 
(Glennan 2005). 
An example of a mechanistic explanation is Schnitzer’s (2005) explanation 
of global patterns of liana abundance and distribution. Unlikely trees and 
shrubs, lianas correlate negatively with annual precipitation. There is a higher 
abundance of lianas in forests with low precipitation and high seasonality than 
in aseasonal wet forests. Schnitzer explains that phenomenon by means of 
identifying the mechanism responsible for it, i.e., “the extensive root and 
efficient vascular systems of lianas” (Schnitzer 2005, p. 274). He argues that 
“[l]ianas have extremely deep and efficient root and vascular systems and thus 
may be able to tap water and nutrients that many trees and shrubs are unable to 
access during drought conditions” (Schnitzer 2005, p. 266). During dry seasons, 
because of their constant supply of water, lianas are not water stressed. They 
capitalize on solar radiation, which is more abundant in dry seasons, and grow 
more than trees and shrubs. Lianas’ dry season growth advantage results in a 
high abundance of them in seasonal forests. However, in aseasonal wet forests, 
where water is rarely limiting, lianas cannot benefit from their dry season 
growth advantage. They face a fiercer competition from other plants. 
Consequently, lianas are less abundant in aseasonal wet forests. 
Mechanistic explanations have been developed as an alternative to 
covering–law and statistical explanations (Salmon 1984; Hedström 2005). 
Covering–law and statistical explanations are “black–box explanations” 
(Hedström and Swedberg 1998). They connect initial conditions with final 
output by means of universal laws or statistical generalizations. However, the 
processes through which explanans and explanandum are actually linked are 
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not addressed by them. They consider that the link between explanans and 
explanandum is devoid of structure or that its structure is explanatorily 
irrelevant. On the contrary, mechanistic explanations are “how–explanations”. 
They show “how some phenomenon comes about” (Glennan 2017, p. 228). 
Mechanistic explanations open the black box between explanans and 
explanandum and detail the processes that give rise to the latter. The 
mechanistic account of scientific explanation also addresses other problematic 
aspects of covering–law and statistical approaches. One of the main problems of 
the covering–law model is its narrow scope (Scriven 1959). Given that few or no 
laws are known in several fields of science (e.g. sociology, biology, 
economics…), it has a very limited scope of application. Nevertheless, many 
mechanisms are often known in those fields where laws are not available. The 
mechanistic account of scientific explanation, which does not require laws, has 
a broader scope. It can be adopted in those fields where few or no laws are 
known. With regard to statistical explanations, their main problem is that 
“[s]tatistical regularities are rarely (if ever) as unequivocal and easily 
interpretable in causal terms as this view would seem to suggest” (Hedström 
2005, p. 23). On the contrary, mechanisms do offer unequivocal information 
about causal relations (Steel 2004; 2008). On the positive side, from knowing 
the causal mechanism through which X influences Y, it can be inferred that X is 
a cause of Y. And on the negative side, if no plausible causal mechanism 
running from X to Y can be conceived, it can be concluded that X is not a cause 
of Y.  
The mechanistic account of scientific explanation is helpful to face 
explanatory wars.4 In an explanatory war, the standard scientific explanation of 
a phenomenon is denied by a group of people. Nonetheless, if the standard 
explanation is mechanistic, denialists’ offensive is less effective. Mechanistic 
explanations are resistant to the arguments usually raised by denialists. In order 
to fight down the mainstream science’s explanation, two strategies are followed 
by denialists. Firstly, they directly attack the standard explanation. Denialists’ 
attacks often focus on arguing that the standard explanation does not 
satisfactorily prove the causal link between explanans and explanandum. For 
 
4 Mechanistic explanations are also relevant for public understanding of science (Lewandowsky and 
Oberauer 2016). Recent experimental studies show that a brief mechanistic explanation of global 
warming significantly increases climate change acceptance (Ranney and Clark 2016). Nonetheless, it 
should be noted that pseudoscience (particularly pseudotheory promotion) may also take advantage of 
the compelling nature of mechanistic explanations (for a real case, see Holman 2017). The seductive 
allure effect of mechanistic explanations holds even when the reductive information is logically 
irrelevant (Hopkins, Weisberg and Taylor 2016). 
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example, they claim that statistical methods are inadequate for identifying 
causal relations. Their arguments are based on “an extraordinarily narrow and 
mechanical conception of causation” (Proctor 2011, p. 275). Secondly, 
denialists propose and promote alternative explanations to increase the 
controversy. Alternative explanations usually rely on statistical correlations 
between the explanandum phenomenon and variables not included in the 
mainstream science’s explanation (Proctor 2004; 2011). Those explanations are 
presented as being as legitimate as the denied standard explanation. However, 
the strategies followed by denialists are hardly effective against mechanistic 
explanations. On the one hand, mechanistic explanations prove the (causal or 
constitutive) link between explanans and explanandum. They show how the 
phenomenon of interest comes about. On the other hand, alternative 
explanations raised by denialists would not be legitimate explanations on the 
same footing than the standard explanation. They are rarely mechanistic 
explanations, but black–box explanations that do not address the link between 
explanans and explanandum, and are not supported by the same kind of 
evidence that supports standard mechanistic explanations.5  
The mechanistic account of scientific explanation, which is based on the 
idea that a phenomenon is explained by means of identifying the mechanism 
that gives rise to it, is helpful to face explanatory wars. Mechanistic explanations 
are resistant to denialists’ attacks. Consequently, if the standard explanation is 
mechanistic, denialism’s offensive is less effective. In the next section, the 
relevant role of mechanistic explanations will be illustrated by analysing the 
explanatory war regarding the global lung cancer epidemic. In order to address 
that case, the work by the historian of science Robert Proctor (2001; 2004; 2006; 
2011; 2012) will be taken as reference. 
 
§ 4. The tobacco wars 
At the beginning of the twentieth century, lung cancer was an extraordinarily 
rare disease (Proctor 2001; 2011; 2012). It was so uncommon that “[o]nly 140 
 
5 Denialists could, given the ease with which humans come up with mechanistic narratives, propose 
alternative mechanistic explanations with little actual evidence in favour. Nevertheless, it is doubtful 
that they could successfully use them against a standard mechanistic explanation. In order to increase 
the controversy and make their point more credible, denialists must propose alternative explanations 
that can be widely considered as legitimate as the standard explanation. However, hardly could 
alternative mechanistic explanations invented by denialists be considered as legitimate as the standard 
mechanistic explanation. They, unlike the standard explanation, would be neither supported by 
evidence of mechanisms nor compatible with the available evidence of mechanisms. 
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cases had been reported in the world medical literature by 1898, and only 374 
were known to [Isaac] Adler when he composed his 1912 review” (Proctor 2001, 
p. 83). When a case was discovered, physicians were called to observe it because 
they may never see another (Proctor 2001). However, during the first decades 
of the twentieth century, an increased incidence of lung cancer was noted in 
several countries (e.g. USA, Germany…). The disease “began showing up more 
often, both clinically and at autopsy, prompting head scratching and, eventually, 
alarm” (Proctor 2004, p. 374). This dramatic change in the incidence of lung 
cancer begged for an explanation. Scientists started considering what might be 
responsible. 
During the following decades, several possible explanations of the lung 
cancer epidemic were proposed. Among the diverse factors that were taken into 
account were atmospheric pollution, asphalt dust emissions from newly paved 
roads, occupational exposures, X–rays, genetic predispositions, poison gas from 
First World War, the 1918–1919 flu pandemic, aluminium dishware, the fashion 
of eating tomatoes, racial intermarriage, and the growing popularity of 
cigarettes (Proctor 2004; 2011). In that period, cigarettes were considered just 
one of many possible causes of the global lung cancer epidemic. 
Nevertheless, during the 1950s, the idea that tobacco consumption 
explained the lung cancer epidemic took the lead (Proctor 2011). Experts in 
the field considered that smoking indeed caused lung cancer. The causal link 
between cigarettes and lung cancer was established by four distinct lines of 
evidence: population studies, animal experimentation, cellular pathology, and 
chemical analytics (Proctor 2012). Scientific agreement regarding the causal 
relationship between smoking and lung cancer was expressed “in medial 
editorials, reviews, and textbooks; in annual reports of medical associations; and 
in ‘white papers’ and resolutions issued by public health authorities” (Proctor 
2011, p. 232). As a result of this causal knowledge, a broad consensus emerged 
among experts that tobacco consumption accounted for the global lung cancer 
epidemic (Proctor 2011; 2012). It was widely considered that the growing 
popularity of cigarettes explained the high incidence of lung cancer.  
By the mid–1950s, there was a consensus among scientists that tobacco 
consumption explained the lung cancer epidemic. However, the tobacco 
industry systematically denied that explanation. They admitted that the 
frequency of lung cancer had increased and that it required an explanation, but 
they rejected the explanation that linked the lung cancer epidemic to tobacco 
consumption. Part of the diverse evidence in support of the standard 
explanation was ignored by them, although this did not suffice to significantly 
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threaten it (Proctor 2011). In order to fight down the explanation of 
mainstream science, the tobacco industry followed two strategies. Firstly, they 
directly attacked the standard explanation. Their main argument was that the 
causal link between tobacco and lung cancer was not conclusively established 
and more research was needed (Proctor 2011). They adopted a narrow and 
mechanistic account of causality and “developed an elaborate strategy by which 
each new proof of a hazard would be met by insinuations of doubt and calls for 
endlessly more research” (Proctor 2004, p. 374). Despite the broad consensus in 
the scientific community, the tobacco industry claimed that the case was not yet 
closed and that it would be dangerous to hastily jump to conclusions. A great 
part of their efforts focused on undermining the statistical evidence that linked 
tobacco consumption to lung cancer (Pearl and Mackenzie 2018). For example, 
in “A Frank Statement to Cigarette Smokers” (1954), it was argued that 
“statistics purporting to link cigarette smoking with the disease could apply with 
equal force to any one of many other aspects of modern life”.6 Secondly, the 
tobacco industry promoted alternative explanations of the global lung cancer 
epidemic (Proctor 2004; 2011). By means of bodies such as the Tobacco 
Industry Research Committee (renamed as Council for Tobacco Research in 
1964) and the Tobacco Institute, they funded and publicised research focused 
on investigating possible causes of lung cancer other than tobacco (e.g. stress, 
pesticides, industrial air pollution…). As Proctor claims, “‘open controversy’ 
was a key pillar in the industry’s conspiracy, and the CTR [Council for Tobacco 
Research] always professed its ‘openness’ to alternate hypotheses when it came 
to disease causation” (2011, p. 273). A well–known alternative explanation 
publicised by the tobacco industry was that a “smoking gene” both caused 
people to smoke cigarettes and made them more likely to develop lung cancer 
(Fisher 1957; 1958). 
 
 
6 “A Frank Statement to Cigarette Smokers” is a full–page advertisement by the Tobacco Industry 
Research Committee that was published in 448 US newspapers on January 4, 1954. It marked the 
beginning of tobacco industry’s denialist approach (Proctor 2011). 
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Figure 1. Link between cigarette smoking and cancer through carcinogens in tobacco smoke 
(U.S. Department of Health and Human Service 2010). 
 
In the 1990s, the mechanisms through which smoking causes lung cancer were 
discovered (Proctor 2001). For instance, Denissenko et al. (1996) provided “a 
direct link between a defined cigarette smoke carcinogen and human cancer 
mutations” (1996, p. 274). Mainstream science’s explanation of the lung cancer 
epidemic became a causal mechanistic explanation (Russo and Williamson 
2007). It detailed the mechanisms through which smoking brings about lung 
cancer (see figure 1). At the same time, there was a radical change in the 
tobacco industry’s approach (Proctor 2001; 2006; 2011). They stopped denying 
the standard explanation of the global lung cancer epidemic. They accepted 
that tobacco was a risk factor in the development of lung cancer and that 
tobacco consumption accounted for the high incidence of lung cancer. This 
change has been evidenced in trials against tobacco companies (Proctor 2001; 
2006; 2011). Their legal strategy is not anymore denying the causal link between 
smoking and lung cancer, but arguing “that the risks of smoking have been 
well–known for decades, and that people therefore voluntarily assume such 
risks when they take up the habit” (Proctor 2001, p. 84). Historians of medicine 
are hired by tobacco companies to “re–narrate the past, creating an account for 
judges and juries that make it appear that ‘everyone has always known’ that 
cigarettes are harmful” (Proctor 2006, p. iv117). Historians hired by tobacco 
companies also argue that there was no conclusive evidence that cigarettes are 
harmful until quite late, thereby justifying industry’s extreme caution to accept 
cigarettes’ hazards. 
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 Tobacco denialism during the second half of twentieth century is a 
representative case of explanatory war (see section 2).  It was generally accepted 
that the incidence of lung cancer had dramatically increased during the 
twentieth century and there was a broad consensus among scientists that 
tobacco consumption accounted for that phenomenon. However, the tobacco 
industry systematically denied the standard explanation of the lung cancer 
epidemic. This paradigmatic example of an explanatory war illustrates the 
relevance of mechanistic explanations to face them. 
From the mid–1950s to the 1990s, the standard scientific explanation of the 
global lung cancer epidemic was not mechanistic. It was a non–mechanistic 
causal explanation based on statistical evidence (Russo and Williamson 2007). 
During that period, the tobacco industry denied the standard explanation. 
They followed two strategies to undermine it. Firstly, they claimed that it was not 
a satisfactory explanation. They argued that it did not conclusively establish the 
causal link between smoking and lung cancer. Statistical evidence was 
considered insufficient for supporting a causal claim. Secondly, the tobacco 
industry promoted alternative explanations (e.g. the “smoking gene” 
explanation), which were presented as being as legitimate as the standard 
explanation. They were compatible with the available evidence. Furthermore, 
many of them were supported by the same kind of evidence as the explanation 
used in mainstream science (i.e. statistical evidence).7 
In the 1990s, however, the standard explanation of the global lung cancer 
epidemic became mechanistic. It detailed the mechanisms through which 
smoking brings about lung cancer. Consequently, the tobacco industry’s 
strategies against mainstream science lost their effectiveness. On the one hand, 
the standard explanation conclusively established the causal link between 
smoking and lung cancer. It suited the narrow mechanistic account of causality 
adopted by denialists and made the “more research” argument obsolete. On the 
other hand, the standard explanation clearly distinguished itself from the 
alternative explanations promoted by denialists. It was a causal mechanistic 
explanation, while the alternatives were statistical or non–mechanistic causal 
explanations (i.e. black–box explanations). They were not supported by the 
same kind of evidence either. The standard explanation was supported both by 
 
7 Several scientific studies, most of which were funded by the tobacco industry, offered statistical 
evidence in support of alternative explanations (Proctor 2011). For example, Wynder and Hammond 
(1962) presented statistical evidence linking general air pollutants to the development of lung cancer, 
and Hickey, Boyce, Harner, and Clelland (1970) identified a significant statistical correlation between 
certain environmental chemicals and lung cancer. 
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statistical evidence and evidence of mechanisms, but alternative explanations 
were at best supported only by statistical evidence. They did not suit the 
available evidence of mechanisms. Finally, in the 1990s, the tobacco industry 
changed its approach and stopped denying the standard explanation of the 
lung cancer epidemic. They accepted that tobacco was a risk factor in the 
development of lung cancer and that tobacco consumption explained the high 
incidence of lung cancer.  
Tobacco disease denialism during the second half of the twentieth century is 
a paradigmatic example of an explanatory war. This case illustrates how the 
mechanistic account of scientific explanation is helpful to face this kind of 
science denialism. In the 1990s, mainstream science’s explanation of the global 
lung cancer epidemic became a causal mechanistic explanation. This change 
made it more resistant to denialists’ attacks. It satisfied denialists’ demanding 
requirements (e.g. the mechanistic account of causality) and distinguished itself 
from the alternative explanations promoted by denialists. This resistance 
undermined the denialists’ approach and, ultimately, influenced them to admit 
to the standard explanation. 
 
§ 5. Conclusion 
Science denialism is a form of pseudoscience. Unlike pseudotheory promotion, 
it does not focus on promoting a specific theory (e.g. homeopathy). Science 
denialism consists in the systematical rejection of a claim on which scientific 
consensus exists. A relevant kind of science denialism is explanatory war. An 
explanatory war is a situation in which (i) there is an undisputed phenomenon, 
(ii) in the scientific community there is a broad consensus on its explanation, 
and (iii) the standard scientific explanation is systematically denied by a group 
of people. The mechanistic account of scientific explanation is helpful to face 
explanatory wars. Mechanistic explanations are resistant to the arguments 
usually raised by denialists. Tobacco disease denialism during the second half of 
twentieth century, which is a paradigmatic example of an explanatory war, 
illustrates the relevant role of mechanistic explanations. 
It should be noted that this does not imply that explanatory wars are 
unavoidably doomed to failure when the standard scientific explanation is 
mechanistic. Standard mechanistic explanations are resistant to denialists’ usual 
attacks. However, it does not mean that they are completely immune to any 
possible denialists’ offensive. In fact, there are cases of science denialism 
(although of a different kind than explanatory wars) in which it remains 
moderately active despite the target scientific claim being mechanistic (e.g. 
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AIDS denialism). Nerveless, what kinds of critiques and attacks could still be 
effective against standard mechanistic explanations is a question that exceeds 
the scope of this paper. 
Several benefits of mechanistic explanations have been identified previously. 
They increase public understanding of science, connect different ontological 
levels, offer helpful possibilities of representation, do not require covering–
laws... In addition, as it has been argued through this paper, they are also 
helpful to face a certain kind of science denialism, i.e., an explanatory war. 
Mechanistic explanations are more resistant to denialists’ offensives than other 
kinds of explanations (e.g. statistical explanations). Consequently, adopting a 
mechanistic account of explanation is a useful tool for dealing with science 
denialism. Mechanistic explanations should be encouraged in those areas of 
science where science denialism is a major problem. 
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